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ESSAYS

AND

TREATISES

ON

SEVERAL SUBJECTS.

By DAVID HUME, Esq:

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OF THE

SECOND VOLUME.

ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY.

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ESSAYS

ESSAYS,

MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY;

PART II.*

ESSAY I.

OF COMMERCE.

THE greater part of mankind may be divided into two claſſes; that of *ſhallow* thinkers, who fall ſhort of the truth; and that of *abſtruſe* thinkers, who go beyond it. The latter claſs are by far the moſt rare; and I may add, by far the moſt uſeful and valuable. They ſuggeſt hints, at leaſt, and ſtart difficulties, which they want, perhaps, ſkill to purſue; but which may produce fine diſcoveries, when handled by men who have a more juſt way of thinking. At worſt, what they ſay is uncommon; and if it ſhould coſt ſome pains to comprehend it, one has, however, the pleaſure of hearing ſomething that is new. An author is little to be valued, who tells us nothing but what we can learn from every coffeehouſe-converſation.

* Publiſhed in 1752.

All people of *ſhallow* thought are apt to decry even thoſe of *ſolid* underſtanding, as *abſtruſe* thinkers and metaphyſicians, and refiners; and never will allow any thing to be juſt which is beyond their own conceptions. There are ſome caſes, I own, where an extraordinary refinement affords a ſtrong preſumption of falſhood, and where no reaſoning is to be truſted but what is natural and eaſy. When a man deliberates concerning his conduct in any *particular* affair, and forms ſchemes in politics, trade, economy, or any buſineſs in life; he never ought to draw his arguments too fine, or connect too long a chain of conſequences together. Something is ſure to happen that will diſconcert his reaſoning, and produce an event different from what he expected. But when we reaſon upon *general* ſubjects, one may juſtly affirm, that our ſpeculations can ſcarcely ever be too fine, provided they be juſt; and that the difference between a common man and a man of genius, is chiefly ſeen in the ſhallowneſs or depth of the principles upon which they proceed. General reaſonings ſeem intricate, merely becauſe they are general; nor is it eaſy for the bulk of mankind to diſtinguiſh, in a great number of particulars, that common circumſtance in which they all agree, or to extract it, pure and unmixed, from the other ſuperfluous circumſtances. Every judgment or concluſion with them is particular. They cannot enlarge their view to thoſe univerſal propoſitions, which comprehend under them an infinite number of individuals, and include a whole ſcience in a ſingle theorem. Their eye is confounded with ſuch an

extenſive proſpect; and the concluſions derived from it, even though clearly expreſſed, ſeem intricate and obſcure. But however intricate they may ſeem, it is certain, that general principles, if juſt and ſound, muſt always prevail in the general courſe of things, though they may fail in particular caſes; and it is the chief buſineſs of philoſophers to regard the general courſe of things. I may add, that it is alſo the chief buſineſs of politicians; eſpecially in the domeſtic government of the ſtate, where the public good, which is, or ought to be, their object, depends on the concurrence of a multitude of cauſes; not, as in foreign politics, on accidents and chances, and the caprices of a few perſons. This therefore makes the difference between *particular* deliberations and *general* reaſonings, and renders ſubtilty and refinement much more ſuitable to the latter than to the former.

I thought this introduction neceſſary before the following diſcourſes on *commerce*, *money*, *intereſt*, *balance of trade*, *&c.* where, perhaps, there will occur ſome principles which are uncommon, and which may ſeem too refined and ſubtile for ſuch vulgar ſubjects. If falſe, let them be rejected: but no one ought to entertain a prejudice againſt them, merely becauſe they are out of the common road.

The greatneſs of a ſtate, and the happineſs of its ſubjects, how independent ſoever they may be ſuppoſed in ſome reſpects, are commonly allowed to be inſeparable with regard to commerce; and as private men receive greater ſecurity, in the poſſeſſion of their trade and riches, from the power of the public;

to the public becomes powerful in proportion to the opulence and extenſive commerce of private men. This maxim is true in general; though I cannot forbear thinking, that it may poſſibly admit of exceptions, and that we often eſtabliſh it with too little reſerve and limitation. There may be ſome circumſtances, where the commerce and riches and luxury of individuals, inſtead of adding ſtrength to the public, will ſerve only to thin its armies, and diminiſh its authority among the neighbouring nations. Man is a very variable being, and ſuſceptible of many different opinions, principles, and rules of conduct. What may be true, while he adheres to one way of thinking, will be found falſe, when he has embraced an oppoſite ſet of manners and opinions.

The bulk of every ſtate may be divided into *huſbandmen* and *manufacturers*. The former are employed in the culture of the land; the latter work up the materials furniſhed by the former into all the commodities which are neceſſary or ornamental to human life. As ſoon as men quit their ſavage ſtate, where they live chiefly by hunting and fiſhing, they muſt fall into theſe two claſſes; though the arts of agriculture employ *at firſt* the moſt numerous part of the ſociety [2]. Time and experience improve

[2] Monſ. Melon, in his political eſſay on commerce, aſſerts, that even at preſent, if you divide France into 20 parts, 16 are laborers or peaſants; two only artiſans; one belonging to the law, church, and military; and one merchants, financiers, and bourgeois. This calculation is certainly very erroneous. In France, England, and indeed moſt parts of Europe, half of the inhabitants live in cities; and even of thoſe who live in the country, a great number are artiſans, perhaps above a third.

ſo much theſe arts, that the land may eaſily maintain a much greater number of men, than thoſe who are immediately employed in its culture, or who furniſh the more neceſſary manufactures to ſuch as are ſo employed.

If theſe ſuperfluous hands apply themſelves to the finer arts, which are commonly denominated the arts of *luxury*, they add to the happineſs of the ſtate; ſince they afford to many the opportunity of receiving enjoyments, with which they would otherwiſe have been unacquainted. But may not another ſcheme be propoſed for the employment of theſe ſuperfluous hands? May not the ſovereign lay claim to them, and employ them in fleets and armies, to increaſe the dominions of the ſtate abroad, and ſpread its fame over diſtant nations? It is certain, that the fewer deſires and wants are found in the proprietors and laborers of land, the fewer hands do they employ; and conſequently the ſuperfluities of the land, inſtead of maintaining tradeſmen and manufacturers, may ſupport fleets and armies to a much greater extent, than where a great many arts are required to miniſter to the luxury of particular perſons. Here, therefore, ſeems to be a kind of oppoſition between the greatneſs of the ſtate and the happineſs of the ſubject. A ſtate is never greater than when all its ſuperfluous hands are employed in the ſervice of the public. The eaſe and convenience of private perſons require, that theſe hands ſhould be employed in their ſervice. The one can never be ſatisfied but at the expenſe of the other. As the ambition of the ſovereign muſt intrench on

the luxury of individuals; ſo the luxury of individuals muſt diminiſh the force, and check the ambition of the ſovereign.

Nor is this reaſoning merely chimerical; but is founded on hiſtory and experience. The republic of Sparta was certainly more powerful than any ſtate now in the world, conſiſting of an equal number of people; and this was owing entirely to the want of commerce and luxury. The Helotes were the laborers: The Spartans were the ſoldiers or gentlemen. It is evident, that the labor of the Helotes could not have maintained ſo great a number of Spartans, had theſe latter lived in eaſe and delicacy, and given employment to a great variety of trades and manufactures. The like policy may be remarked in Rome. And, indeed, throughout all ancient hiſtory, it is obſervable, that the ſmalleſt republic raiſed and maintained greater armies, than ſtates, conſiſting of triple the number of inhabitants, are able to ſupport at preſent. It is computed, that, in all European nations, the proportion between ſoldiers and people does not exceed one to a hundred. But we read, that the city of Rome alone, with its ſmall territory, raiſed and maintained, in early times, ten legions againſt the Latins. Athens, the whole of whoſe dominions was not larger than Yorkſhire, ſent to the expedition againſt Sicily near forty thouſand men [1]. Dionyſius the elder, it is ſaid, maintained a ſtanding army of a hundred thouſand foot and ten thouſand horſe,

[1] Thucydides, lib. vii.

beſides a large fleet of four hundred ſail [4]; though his territories extended no farther than the city of Syracuſe, about a third of the iſland of Sicily, and ſome ſea-port-towns and garriſons on the coaſt of Italy and Illyricum. It is true, the ancient armies in time of war, ſubſiſted much upon plunder: But did not the enemy plunder in their turn? which was a more ruinous way of levying a tax, than any other that could be deviſed. In ſhort, no probable reaſon can be aſſigned for the great power of the more ancient ſtates above the modern, but their want of commerce and luxury. Few artiſans were animated by the labor of the farmers, and therefore more ſoldiers might live upon it. Livy ſays, that Rome, in his time, would find it difficult to raiſe as large an army as that which, in her early days, ſhe ſent out againſt the Gauls and Latins [5]. Inſtead of thoſe ſoldiers who fought for liberty and empire in Camillus's time, there were in Auguſtus's days, muſicians, painters, cooks, players, and taylors; and if the land was equally cultivated at both periods, it could certainly maintain equal numbers in the one profeſſion as in the other. They added nothing to the mere neceſſaries of life, in the latter period more than in the former.

It is natural on this occaſion to aſk, whether ſovereigns may not return to the maxims of ancient

[4] Diod. Sic. lib. vii. This account, I own, is ſomewhat ſuſpicious, not to ſay worſe; chiefly becauſe this army was not compoſed of citizens, but of mercenary forces.

[5] Titi Livii, lib. vii. cap. 24. "Adeo in quæ labora-
"mus," ſays he, "ſola crevimus, divitias luxuriamque."

policy, and conſult their own intereſt in this reſpect, more than the happineſs of their ſubjects? I anſwer, that it appears to me almoſt impoſſible; and that becauſe ancient policy was violent, and contrary to the more natural and uſual courſe of things. It is well known with what peculiar laws Sparta was governed, and what a prodigy that republic is juſtly eſteemed by every one, who has conſidered human nature, as it has diſplayed itſelf in other nations, and other ages. Were the teſtimony of hiſtory leſs poſitive and circumſtantial, ſuch a government would appear a mere philoſophical whim or fiction, and impoſſible ever to be reduced to practice. And though the Roman and other ancient republics were ſupported on principles ſomewhat more natural, yet was there an extraordinary concurrence of circumſtances to make them ſubmit to ſuch grievous burdens. They were free ſtates; they were ſmall ones; and the age being martial, all their neighbours were continually in arms. Freedom naturally begets public ſpirit, eſpecially in ſmall ſtates; and this public ſpirit, this *amor patriæ*, muſt increaſe, when the public is almoſt in continual alarm, and men are obliged every moment to expoſe themſelves to the greateſt dangers for its defence. A continual ſucceſſion of wars makes every citizen a ſoldier: He takes the field in his turn: And during his ſervice he is chiefly maintained by himſelf. This ſervice is indeed equivalent to a heavy tax; yet is it leſs felt by a people addicted to arms, who fight for honor and revenge more than pay, and are unacquainted with gain and induſtry as well as pleaſure [a].

[a] See Note [A].

Not to mention the great equality of fortunes among the inhabitants of the ancient republics, where every field belonging to a different proprietor, was able to maintain a family, and rendered the numbers of citizens very conſiderable, even without trade and manufactures.

But though the want of trade and manufactures, among a free and very martial people, may *ſometimes* have no other effect than to render the public more powerful, it is certain, that, in the common courſe of human affairs, it will have a quite contrary tendency. Sovereigns muſt take mankind as they find them, and cannot pretend to introduce any violent change in their principles and ways of thinking. A long courſe of time, with a variety of accidents and circumſtances, are requiſite to produce thoſe great revolutions, which ſo much diverſify the face of human affairs. And the leſs natural any ſet of principles are, which ſupport a particular ſociety, the more difficulty will a legiſlator meet with in raiſing and cultivating them. It is his beſt policy to comply with the common bent of mankind, and give it all the improvements of which it is ſuſceptible. Now, according to the moſt natural courſe of things, induſtry and arts and trade increaſe the power of the ſovereign, as well as the happineſs of the ſubjects; and that policy is violent, which aggrandizes the public by the poverty of individuals. This will eaſily appear from a few conſiderations, which will preſent to us the conſequences of ſloth and barbarity.

Where manufactures and mechanic arts are not cultivated, the bulk of the people muſt apply

themſelves to agriculture; and if their ſkill and induſtry increaſe, there muſt ariſe a great ſuperfluity from their labor, beyond what ſuffices to maintain them. They have no temptation, therefore, to increaſe their ſkill and induſtry; ſince they cannot exchange that ſuperfluity for any commodities, which may ſerve either to their pleaſure or vanity. A habit of indolence naturally prevails. The greater part of the land lies uncultivated. What is cultivated, yields not its utmoſt for want of ſkill and aſſiduity in the farmers. If at any time the public exigencies require that great numbers ſhould be employed in the public ſervice, the labor of the people furniſhes now no ſuperfluities, by which theſe numbers can be maintained. The laborers cannot increaſe their ſkill and induſtry on a ſudden. Lands uncultivated cannot be brought into tillage for ſome years. The armies, mean while, muſt either make ſudden and violent conqueſts, or diſband for want of ſubſiſtence. A regular attack or defence, therefore, is not to be expected from ſuch a people; and their ſoldiers muſt be as ignorant and unſkilful as their farmers and manufacturers.

Every thing in the world is purchaſed by labor, and our paſſions are the only cauſes of labor. When a nation abounds in manufactures and mechanic arts, the proprietors of land, as well as the farmers, ſtudy agriculture as a ſcience, and redouble their induſtry and attention. The ſuperfluity which ariſes from their labor is not loſt; but is exchanged with manufactures for thoſe commodities which men's luxury now makes them covet. By this means, land

furniſhes a great deal more of the neceſſaries of life, than what ſuffices for thoſe who cultivate it. In times of peace and tranquillity, this ſuperfluity goes to the maintenance of manufacturers and the improvers of liberal arts. But it is eaſy for the public to convert many of theſe manufacturers into ſoldiers, and maintain them by that ſuperfluity which ariſes from the labor of the farmers. Accordingly we find, that this is the caſe in all civilized governments. When the ſovereign raiſes an army, what is the conſequence? He impoſes a tax. This tax obliges all the people to retrench what is leaſt neceſſary to their ſubſiſtence. Thoſe who labor in ſuch commodities, muſt either inliſt in the troops, or turn themſelves to agriculture, and thereby oblige ſome laborers to inliſt for want of buſineſs. And to conſider the matter abſtractedly, manufactures increaſe the ſtate only as they ſtore up ſo much labor, and that of a kind to which the public may lay claim, without depriving any one of the neceſſaries of life. The more labor, therefore, is employed beyond mere neceſſaries, the more powerful is any ſtate; ſince the perſons engaged in that labor may eaſily be converted to the public ſervice. In a ſtate without manufactures, there may be the ſame number of hands, but there is not the ſame quantity of labor, nor of the ſame kind. All the labor is there beſtowed upon neceſſaries, which can admit of little or no abatement.

Thus the greatneſs of the ſovereign and the happineſs of the ſtate are, in a great meaſure, united with regard to trade and manufactures. It is a violent

method, and in moſt caſes impracticable, to oblige the laborer to toil, in order to raiſe from the land more than what ſubſiſts himſelf and family. Furniſh him with manufactures and commodities, and he will do it of himſelf. Afterwards you will find it eaſy to ſeize ſome part of his ſuperfluous labor, and employ it in the public ſervice, without giving him his wonted return. Being accuſtomed to induſtry, he will think this leſs grievous, than if, at once, you obliged him to an augmentation of labor without any reward. The caſe is the ſame with regard to the other members of the ſtate. The greater is the ſtock of labor of all kinds, the greater quantity may be taken from the heap, without making any ſenſible alteration in it.

A public granary of corn, a ſtorehouſe of cloth, a magazine of arms; all theſe muſt be allowed real riches and ſtrength in any ſtate. Trade and induſtry are really nothing but a ſtock of labor, which, in times of peace and tranquillity, is employed for the eaſe and ſatisfaction of individuals; but in the exigencies of ſtate, may, in part, be turned to public advantage. Could we convert a city into a kind of fortified camp, and infuſe into each breaſt ſo martial a genius, and ſuch a paſſion for public good, as to make every one willing to undergo the greateſt hardſhips for the ſake of the public; theſe affections might now, as in ancient times, prove alone a ſufficient ſpur to induſtry, and ſupport the community. It would then be advantageous, as in camps, to baniſh all arts and luxury: and, by reſtrictions on equipage and tables, make the

provisions and forage last longer, than if the army were loaded with a number of superfluous retainers. But as these principles are too disinterested, and too difficult to support, it is requisite to govern man by other passions, and animate him with a spirit of avarice and industry, art and luxury. The camp is, in this case, loaded with a superfluous retinue; but the provisions flow in proportionably larger. The harmony of the whole is still supported; and the natural bent of the mind being more complied with individuals, as well as the public, find their account in the observance of those maxims.

The same method of reasoning will let us see the advantages of *foreign* commerce, in augmenting the power of the state, as well as the riches and happiness of the subject. It increases the stock of labor in the nation; and the sovereign may convert what share of it he finds necessary to the service of the public. Foreign trade, by its imports, furnishes materials for new manufactures; and by its exports, it produces labor in particular commodities, which could not be consumed at home. In short, a kingdom, that has a large import and export, must abound more with industry and that employed upon delicacies and luxuries, than a kingdom which rests contented with its native commodities. It is, therefore, more powerful, as well as richer and happier. The individuals reap the benefit of these commodities, so far as they gratify the senses and appetites. And the public is also a gainer, while a greater stock of labor is, by this means, stored up against any public exigency: that is, a greater number of

laborious men are maintained, who may be diverted to the public ſervice, without robbing any one of the neceſſaries, or even the chief conveniences, of life.

If we conſult hiſtory, we ſhall find, that, in moſt nations, foreign trade has preceded any refinement in home-manufactures, and given birth to domeſtic luxury. The temptation is ſtronger to make uſe of foreign commodities, which are ready for uſe, and which are entirely new to us, than to make improvements on any domeſtic commodity, which always advance by ſlow degrees, and never affect us by their novelty. The profit is alſo very great, in exporting what is ſuperfluous at home, and what bears no price to foreign nations, whoſe ſoil or climate is not favorable to that commodity. Thus men become acquainted with the *pleaſures* of luxury and the *profits* of commerce; and their *delicacy* and *induſtry*, being once awakened, carry them on to farther improvements, in every branch of domeſtic as well as foreign trade. And this perhaps is the chief advantage which ariſes from a commerce with ſtrangers. It rouſes men from their indolence; and preſenting the gayer and more opulent part of the nation with objects of luxury, which they never before dreamed of, raiſes in them a deſire of a more ſplendid way of life than what their anceſtors enjoyed. And at the ſame time, the few merchants, who poſſeſs the ſecret of this importation and exportation, make great profits; and, becoming rivals in wealth to the ancient nobility, tempt other adventurers to become their rivals in commerce. Imitation ſoon diffuſes

all thoſe arts; while domeſtic manufactures emulate the foreign in their improvements, and work up every home-commodity to the utmoſt perfection of which it is ſuſceptible. Their own ſteel and iron, in ſuch laborious hands, become equal to the gold and rubies of the Indies.

When the affairs of the ſociety are once brought to this ſituation, a nation may loſe moſt of its foreign trade, and yet continue a great and powerful people. If ſtrangers will not take any particular commodity of ours, we muſt ceaſe to labor in it. The ſame hands will turn themſelves towards ſome refinement in other commodities, which may be wanted at home. And there muſt always be materials for them to work upon; till every perſon in the ſtate, who poſſeſſes riches, enjoys as great plenty of home-commodities, and thoſe in as great perfection, as he deſires: which can never poſſibly happen. China is repreſented as one of the moſt flouriſhing empires in the world; though it has very little commerce beyond its own territories.

It will not, I hope, be conſidered as a ſuperfluous digreſſion, if I here obſerve, that as the multitude of mechanical arts is advantageous, ſo is the great number of perſons to whoſe ſhare the productions of theſe arts fall. A too great diſproportion among the citizens weakens any ſtate. Every perſon, if poſſible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his labor, in a full poſſeſſion of all the neceſſaries, and many of the conveniences of life. No one can doubt, but ſuch an equality is moſt ſuitable to human nature, and diminiſhes much leſs from the *happineſs* of the

rich, than it adds to that of the poor. It alſo augments the *power of the ſtate*, and makes any extraordinary taxes or impoſitions be paid with more cheerfulneſs. Where the riches are engroſſed by a few, theſe muſt contribute very largely to the ſupplying of the public neceſſities. But when the riches are diſperſed among multitudes, the burden feels light on every ſhoulder, and the taxes make not a very ſenſible difference on any one's way of living.

Add to this, that where the riches are in few hands, theſe muſt enjoy all the power, and will readily conſpire to lay the whole burden on the poor, and oppreſs them ſtill farther, to the diſcouragement of all induſtry.

In this circumſtance conſiſts the great advantage of England above any nation at preſent in the world, or that appears in the records of any ſtory. It is true, the Engliſh feel ſome diſadvantages in foreign trade by the high price of labor, which is in part the effect of the riches of their artiſans as well as of the plenty of money: But as foreign trade is not the moſt material circumſtance, it is not to be put in competition with the happineſs of ſo many millions. And if there were no more to endear to them that free government under which they live, this alone were ſufficient. The poverty of the common people is a natural, if not an infallible, effect of abſolute monarchy; though I doubt, whether it be always true, on the other hand, that their riches are an infallible reſult of liberty. Liberty muſt be attended with particular accidents, and a certain

turn of thinking, in order to produce that effect. Lord Bacon, accounting for the great advantages obtained by the Engliſh in their wars with France, aſcribes them chiefly to the ſuperior eaſe and plenty of the common people amongſt the former; yet the government of the two kingdoms was, at that time, pretty much alike. Where the laborers and artiſans are accuſtomed to work for low wages, and to retain but a ſmall part of the fruits of their labor, it is difficult for them, even in a free government, to better their condition, or conſpire among themſelves to heighten their wages. But even where they are accuſtomed to a more plentiful way of life, it is eaſy for the rich, in an arbitrary government, to conſpire againſt *them*, and throw the whole burden of the taxes on their ſhoulders.

It may ſeem an odd poſition, that the poverty of the common people in France, Italy, and Spain, is, in ſome meaſure, owing to the ſuperior riches of the ſoil and happineſs of the climate; yet there want not reaſons to juſtify this paradox. In ſuch a fine mould or ſoil as that of thoſe more ſouthern regions, agriculture is an eaſy art; and one man, with a couple of ſorry horſes, will be able, in a ſeaſon, to cultivate as much land as will pay a pretty conſiderable rent to the proprietor. All the art, which the farmer knows, is to leave his ground fallow for a year, as ſoon as it is exhauſted; and the warmth of the ſun alone, and temperature of the climate, enrich it, and reſtore its fertility. Such poor peaſants, therefore, require only a ſimple maintenance for their labor. They have no ſtock or riches which

claim more; and at the ſame time, they are for ever dependant on their landlord, who gives no leaſes, nor fears that his land will be ſpoiled by the ill methods of cultivation. In England, the land is rich but coarſe; muſt be cultivated at a great expenſe; and produces ſlender crops when not carefully managed, and by a method which gives not the full profit but in a courſe of ſeveral years. A farmer, therefore, in England muſt have a conſiderable ſtock, and a long leaſe, which beget proportional profits. The fine vineyards of Champagne and Burgundy, that often yield to the landlord above five pounds *per* acre, are cultivated by peaſants who have ſcarcely bread: The reaſon is, that ſuch peaſants need no ſtock but their own limbs, with inſtruments of huſbandry which they can buy for twenty ſhillings. The farmers are commonly in ſome better circumſtances in thoſe countries: But the graziers are moſt at their eaſe of all thoſe who cultivate the land. The reaſon is ſtill the ſame: Men muſt have profits proportionable to their expenſe and hazard. Where ſo conſiderable a number of the laboring poor, as the peaſants and farmers, are in very low circumſtances, all the reſt muſt partake of their poverty, whether the government of that nation be monarchical or republican.

We may form a ſimilar remark with regard to the general hiſtory of mankind. What is the reaſon, why no people, living between the tropics, could ever yet attain to any art or civility, or reach even any police in their government, and any military diſcipline; while few nations in the temperate cli-

mates have been altogether deprived of these advantages? It is probable, that one cause of this phenomenon is the warmth and equality of weather in the torrid zone, which render clothes and houses less requisite for the inhabitants, and thereby remove, in part, that necessity which is the great spur to industry and invention. *Curis acuens mortalia corda.* Not to mention, that the fewer goods or possessions of this kind any people enjoy, the fewer quarrels are likely to arise amongst them, and the less necessity will there be for a settled police or regular authority to protect and defend them from foreign enemies, or from each other.

ESSAY II.

OF REFINEMENT IN THE ARTS.

LUXURY is a word of an uncertain signification, and may be taken in a good as well as in a bad sense. In general, it means great refinement in the gratification of the senses; and any degree of it may be innocent or blamable, according to the age, or country, or condition of the person. The bounds between the virtue and the vice cannot here be exactly fixed, more than in other moral subjects. To imagine that the gratifying of any sense, or the indulging of any delicacy in meat, drink, or apparel, is of itself a vice, can never enter into a head, that is not disordered by the frenzies of enthusiasm. I have, indeed, heard of a monk abroad, who, because the windows of his cell opened upon a noble

proſpect, made a *covenant with his eyes* never to turn that way, or receive ſo ſenſual a gratification. And ſuch is the crime of drinking Champagne or Burgundy, preferably to ſmall beer or porter. Theſe indulgencies are only vices when they are purſued at the expenſe of ſome virtue, as liberality or charity; in like manner as they are follies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himſelf to want and beggary. Where they intrench upon no virtue, but leave ample ſubject whence to provide for friends, family, and every proper object of generoſity or compaſſion, they are entirely innocent, and have in every age been acknowledged ſuch by almoſt all moraliſts. To be entirely occupied with the luxury of the table, for inſtance, without any reliſh for the pleaſures of ambition, ſtudy, or converſation, is a mark of ſtupidity, and is incompatible with any vigor of temper or genius. To confine one's expenſe entirely to ſuch a gratification, without regard to friends or family, is an indication of a heart deſtitute of humanity or benevolence; but if a man reſerve time ſufficient for all laudable purſuits, and money ſufficient for all generous purpoſes, he is free from every ſhadow of blame or reproach.

Since luxury may be conſidered either as innocent or blamable, one may be ſurpriſed at thoſe prepoſterous opinions which have been entertained concerning it; while men of libertine principles beſtow praiſes even on vicious luxury, and repreſent it as highly advantageous to ſociety; and on the other hand, men of ſevere morals blame even

the moſt innocent luxury, and repreſent it as the ſource of all the corruptions, diſorders, and factions, incident to civil government. We ſhall here endeavour to correct both theſe extremes, by proving, *firſt*, that the ages of refinement are both the happieſt and moſt virtuous; *ſecondly*, that wherever luxury ceaſes to be innocent, it alſo ceaſes to be beneficial; and when carried a degree too far, is a quality pernicious, though perhaps not the moſt pernicious, to political ſociety.

To prove the firſt point, we need but conſider the effects of refinement both on *private* and on *public* life. Human happineſs, according to the moſt received notions, ſeems to conſiſt in three ingredients, action, pleaſure, and indolence: And though theſe ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the particular diſpoſition of the perſon; yet no one ingredient can be entirely wanting, without deſtroying, in ſome meaſure, the reliſh of the whole compoſition. Indolence or repoſe, indeed, ſeems not of itſelf to contribute much to our enjoyment; but, like ſleep, is requiſite as an indulgence to the weakneſs of human nature, which cannot ſupport an uninterrupted courſe of buſineſs or pleaſure. That quick march of the ſpirits which takes a man from himſelf, and chiefly gives ſatisfaction, does in the end exhauſt the mind, and requires ſome intervals of repoſe, which, though agreeable for a moment, yet, if prolonged, beget a languor and lethargy that deſtroy all enjoyment. Education, cuſtom, and example, have a mighty influence in turning the mind to any of theſe purſuits; and it muſt be

owned, that where they promote a reliſh for action and pleaſure, they are ſo far favorable to human happineſs. In times when induſtry and the arts flouriſh, men are kept in perpetual occupation, and enjoy, as their reward, the occupation itſelf, as well as thoſe pleaſures which are the fruit of their labor. The mind acquires new vigor; enlarges its powers and faculties; and by an aſſiduity in honeſt induſtry, both ſatisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which commonly ſpring up when nouriſhed by eaſe and idleneſs. Baniſh thoſe arts from ſociety, you deprive men both of action and of pleaſure; and, leaving nothing but indolence in their place, you even deſtroy the reliſh of indolence, which never is agreeable but when it ſucceeds to labor, and recruits the ſpirits, exhauſted by too much application and fatigue.

Another advantage of induſtry and of refinements in the mechanical arts is, that they commonly produce ſome refinements in the liberal; nor can one be carried to perfection, without being accompanied, in ſome degree, with the other. The ſame age which produces great philoſophers and politicians, renowned generals and poets, uſually abounds with ſkilful weavers and ſhip-carpenters. We cannot reaſonably expect that a piece of woollen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a nation which is ignorant of aſtronomy, or where ethics are neglected. The ſpirit of the age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once roufed from their lethargy, and put into a fermentation, turn themſelves on all ſides, and carry, improvements into every art and ſcience. Profound

ignorance is totally baniſhed, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures, to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleaſures of the mind as well as thoſe of the body.

The more theſe refined arts advance, the more ſociable men become: Nor is it poſſible, that, when enriched with ſcience, and poſſeſſed of a fund of converſation, they ſhould be contented to remain in ſolitude, or live with their fellow-citizens in that diſtant manner which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock into cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge; to ſhow their wit or their breeding; their taſte in converſation or living, in clothes or furniture. Curioſity allures the wiſe; vanity the fooliſh; and pleaſure both. Particular clubs and ſocieties are every where formed: Both ſexes meet in an eaſy and ſociable manner; and the tempers of men, as well as their behaviour, refine apace. So that, beſide the improvements which they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, it is impoſſible but they muſt feel an increaſe of humanity, from the very habit of converſing together, and contributing to each other's pleaſure and entertainment. Thus *induſtry*, *knowledge*, and *humanity*, are linked together by an indiſſoluble chain, and are found, from experience as well as reaſon, to be peculiar to the more poliſhed, and, what are commonly denominated, the more luxurious ages.

Nor are theſe advantages attended with diſadvantages that bear any proportion to them. The more men refine upon pleaſure, the leſs will they indulge in exceſſes of any kind; becauſe nothing is more

deſtructive to true pleaſure than ſuch exceſſes. One may ſafely affirm, that the Tartars are oftener guilty of beaſtly gluttony, when they feaſt on their dead horſes, than European courtiers with all their refinements of cookery. And if libertine love, or even infidelity to the marriage-bed, be more frequent in polite ages, when it is often regarded only as a piece of gallantry; drunkenneſs, on the other hand, is much leſs common: A vice more odious, and more pernicious both to mind and body. And in this matter I would appeal, not only to an Ovid or a Petronius, but to a Seneca or a Cato. We know that Cæſar, during Cataline's conſpiracy, being neceſſitated to put into Cato's hands a *billet-doux*, which diſcovered an intrigue with Servilia, Cato's, own ſiſter, that ſtern philoſopher threw it back to him with indignation; and, in the bitterneſs of his wrath, gave him the appellation of drunkard, as a term more opprobrious than that with which he could more juſtly have reproached him.

But induſtry, knowledge, and humanity, are not advantageous in private life alone: They diffuſe their beneficial influence on the *public*, and render the government as great and flouriſhing as they make individuals happy and proſperous. The increaſe and conſumption of all the commodities, which ſerve to the ornament and pleaſure of life, are advantageous to ſociety; becauſe, at the ſame time that they multiply thoſe innocent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of *ſtorehouſe* of labor, which, in the exigencies of ſtate, may be turned to the public ſervice. In a nation, where there is no demand

for ſuch ſuperfluities, men ſink into indolence, loſe all enjoyment of life, and are uſeleſs to the public, which cannot maintain or ſupport its fleets and armies, from the induſtry of ſuch ſlothful members.

The bounds of all the European kingdoms are, at preſent, nearly the ſame they were two hundred years ago: But what a difference is there in the power and grandeur of thoſe kingdoms? Which can be aſcribed to nothing but the increaſe of art and induſtry. When Charles VIII. of France invaded Italy, he carried with him about 20,000 men: Yet this armament ſo exhauſted the nation, as we learn from Guicciardin, that for ſome years it was not able to make ſo great an effort. The late king of France, in time of war, kept in pay above 400,000 men [1], though from Mazarine's death to his own, he was engaged in a courſe of wars that laſted near thirty years.

This induſtry is much promoted by the knowledge inſeparable from ages of art and refinement; as, on the other hand, this knowledge enables the public to make the beſt advantage of the induſtry of its ſubjects. Laws, order, police, diſcipline; theſe can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reaſon has refined itſelf by exerciſe, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at leaſt of commerce and manufacture. Can we expect, that a government will be well-modelled by a people, who know not how to make a ſpinning-wheel, or to employ a loom to advantage? Not to

[1] The inſcription on the Place de Vendome ſays 440,000.

mention that all ignorant ages are infeſted with ſuperſtition, which throws the government off its bias, and diſturbs men in the purſuit of their intereſt and happineſs.

Knowledge in the arts of government naturally begets mildneſs and moderation, by inſtructing men in the advantages of humane maxims above rigor and ſeverity, which drive ſubjects into rebellion, and make the return to ſubmiſſion impracticable, by cutting off all hopes of pardon. When the tempers of men are ſoftened, as well as their knowledge improved, this humanity appears ſtill more conſpicuous, and is the chief characteriſtic which diſtinguiſhes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance. Factions are then leſs inveterate, revolutions leſs tragical, authority leſs ſevere, and ſeditions leſs frequent. Even foreign wars abate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle, where honor and intereſt ſteel men againſt compaſſion as well as fear; the combatants diveſt themſelves of the brute, and reſume the man.

Nor need we fear, that men, by loſing their ferocity, will loſe their martial ſpirit, or become leſs undaunted and vigorous in defence of their country or their liberty. The arts have no ſuch effect in enervating either the mind or body. On the contrary, induſtry, their inſeparable attendant, adds new force to both, and if anger, which is ſaid to be the whetſtone of courage, loſes ſomewhat of its aſperity, by politeneſs and refinement; a ſenſe of honor, which is a ſtronger, more conſtant, and more governable principle, acquires freſh vigor, by

that elevation of genius which arifes from knowledge and a good education. Add to this, that courage can neither have any duration, nor be of any ufe: when not accompanied with difcipline and martial fkill, which are feldom found among a barbarous people. The ancients remarked, that Datames was the only barbarian that ever knew the art of war. And Pyrrhus, feeing the Romans marfhal their army with fome art and fkill, faid with furprife, *Thefe barbarians have nothing barbarous in their difcipline!* It is obfervable, that, as the old Romans, by applying themfelves folely to war, were almoft the only uncivilized people that ever poffeffed military difcipline; fo the modern Italians are the only civilized people, among Europeans, that ever wanted courage and a martial fpirit. Thofe who would afcribe this effeminacy of the Italians to their luxury, or politenefs, or application to the arts, need but confider the French and Engliih, whofe bravery is as unconteftable, as their love for the arts, and their affiduity in commerce. The Italian hiftorians give us a more fatisfactory reafon for this degeneracy of their countrymen. They fhow us how the fword was dropped at once by all the Italian fovereigns; while the Venetian ariftocracy was jealous of its fubjects, the Florentine democracy applied itfelf entirely to commerce; Rome was governed by prieits, and Naples by women. War then became the bufinefs of foldiers of fortune, who fpared one another, and, to the aftoniihment of the world, could engage a whole

day in what they called a battle; and return at night to their camp, without the leaſt bloodſhed.

What has chiefly induced ſevere moraliſts to declaim againſt refinement in the arts, is the example of ancient Rome, which, joining to its poverty and ruſticity, virtue and public ſpirit, roſe to ſuch a ſurpriſing height of grandeur and liberty; but, having learned from its conquered provinces the Aſiatic luxury, fell into every kind of corruption; whence aroſe ſedition and civil wars, attended at laſt with the total loſs of liberty. All the Latin claſſics, whom we peruſe in our infancy, are full of theſe ſentiments, and univerſally aſcribe the ruin of their ſtate to the arts and riches imported from the Eaſt: Inſomuch that Salluſt repreſents a taſte for painting as a vice, no leſs than lewdneſs and drinking. And ſo popular were theſe ſentiments, during the later ages of the republic, that this author abounds in praiſes of the old rigid Roman virtue, though himſelf the moſt egregious inſtance of modern luxury and corruption; ſpeaks contemptuouſly of the Grecian eloquence, though the moſt elegant writer in the world; nay, employs prepoſterous digreſſions and declamations to this purpoſe, though a model of taſte and correctneſs.

But it would be eaſy to prove, that theſe writers miſtook the cauſe of the diſorders in the Roman ſtate, and aſcribed to luxury and the arts, what really proceeded from an ill-modelled government, and the unlimited extent of conqueſts. Refinement on the pleaſures and conveniencies of life has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption.

The value which all men put upon any particular pleaſure depends on compariſon and experience; nor is a porter leſs greedy of money, which he ſpends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier, who purchaſes champagne and ortolans. Riches are valuable at all times, and to all men; becauſe they always purchaſe pleaſures, ſuch as men are accuſtomed to, and deſire: Nor can any thing reſtrain or regulate the love of money, but a ſenſe of honor and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound moſt in ages of knowledge and refinement.

Of all European kingdoms, Poland ſeems the moſt defective in the arts of war as well as peace, mechanical as well as liberal; yet it is there that venality and corruption do moſt prevail. The nobles ſeem to have preſerved their crown elective for no other purpoſe, than regularly to ſell it to the higheſt bidder. This is almoſt the only ſpecies of commerce with which that people are acquainted.

The liberties of England, ſo far from decaying ſince the improvements in the arts, have never flouriſhed ſo much as during that period. And though corruption may ſeem to increaſe of late years; this is chiefly to be aſcribed to our eſtabliſhed liberty, when our princes have found the impoſſibility of governing without parliaments, or of terrifying parliaments by the phantom of prerogative. Not to mention, that this corruption or venality prevails much more among the electors than the elected; and therefore cannot juſtly be aſcribed to any refinements in luxury.

If we conſider the matter in a proper light, we ſhall find, that a progreſs in the arts is rather favorable to liberty, and has a natural tendency to preſerve, if not produce, a free government. In rude unpoliſhed nations, where the arts are neglected, all labor is beſtowed on the cultivation of the ground; and the whole ſociety is divided into two claſſes, proprietors of land, and their vaſſals or tenants. The latter are neceſſarily dependant, and fitted for ſlavery and ſubjection; eſpecially where they poſſeſs no riches, and are not valued for their knowledge in agriculture; as muſt always be the caſe where the arts are neglected. The former naturally erect themſelves into petty tyrants; and muſt either ſubmit to an abſolute maſter, for the ſake of peace and order; or if they will preſerve their independency, like the ancient barons, they muſt fall into feuds and conteſts among themſelves, and throw the whole ſociety into ſuch confuſion, as is perhaps worſe than the moſt deſpotic government. But where luxury nouriſhes commerce and induſtry, the peaſants, by a proper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent: while the tradeſmen and merchants acquire a ſhare of the property, and draw authority and conſideration to that middling rank of men, who are the beſt and firmeſt baſis of public liberty. Theſe ſubmit not to ſlavery, like the peaſants, from poverty and meanneſs of ſpirit; and having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they are not tempted, for the ſake of that gratification, to ſubmit to the tyranny of their ſovereign. They covet equal laws, which may ſecure their

property, and preſerve them from monarchical, as well as ariſtocratical tyranny.

The Lower Houſe is the ſupport of our popular government; and all the world acknowledges, that it owed its chief influence and conſideration to the increaſe of commerce, which threw ſuch a balance of propriety into the hands of the Commons. How inconſiſtent then is it to blame ſo violently a refinement in the arts, and to repreſent it as the bane of liberty and public ſpirit!

To declaim againſt preſent times, and magnify the virtue of remote anceſtors, is a propenſity almoſt inherent in human nature: And as the ſentiments and opinions of civilized ages alone are tranſmitted to poſterity, hence it is that we meet with ſo many ſevere judgments pronounced againſt luxury, and even ſcience; and hence it is that at preſent we give ſo ready an aſſent to them. But the fallacy is eaſily perceived, by comparing different nations that are contemporaries; where we both judge more impartially, and can better ſet in oppoſition thoſe manners, with which we are ſufficiently acquainted. Treachery and cruelty, the moſt pernicious and moſt odious of all vices, ſeem peculiar to uncivilized ages; and, by the refined Greeks and Romans, were aſcribed to all the barbarous nations which ſurrounded them. They might juſtly, therefore, have preſumed, that their own anceſtors, ſo highly celebrated, poſſeſſed no greater virtue, and were as much inferior to their poſterity in honor and humanity, as in taſte and ſcience. An ancient Frank or Saxon may be highly extolled: But I believe

every man would think his life or fortune much leſs ſecure in the hands of a Moor or Tartar, than in thoſe of a French or Engliſh gentleman, the rank of men the moſt civilized in the moſt civilized nations.

We come now to the *ſecond* poſition which we propoſed to illuſtrate, to wit, that, as innocent luxury, or a refinement in the arts and conveniences of life, is advantageous to the public; ſo wherever luxury ceaſes to be innocent, it alſo ceaſes to be beneficial; and when carried a degree farther, begins to be a quality pernicious, though, perhaps, not the moſt pernicious to political ſociety.

Let us conſider what we call vicious luxury. No gratification, however ſenſual, can of itſelf be eſteemed vicious. A gratification is only vicious, when it engroſſes all a man's expenſe, and leaves no ability for ſuch acts of duty and generoſity as are required by his ſituation and fortune. Suppoſe, that he correct the vice, and employ part of his expenſe in the education of his children, in the ſupport of his friends and in relieving the poor; would any prejudice reſult to ſociety? On the contrary, the ſame conſumption would ariſe; and that labor, which, at preſent, is employed only in producing a ſlender gratification to one man, would relieve the neceſſitous, and beſtow ſatisfaction on hundreds. The ſame care and toil that raiſe a diſh of peas at Chriſtmas, would give bread to a whole family during ſix months. To ſay, that without a vicious luxury, the labor would not have been employed at all, is only to ſay, that there is ſome other

defect

defect in human nature, such as indolence, selfishness, inattention to others, for which luxury in some measure provides a remedy; as one poison may be an antidote to another. But virtue, like wholesome food, is better than poisons, however corrected.

Suppose the same number of men, that are at present in Great Britain, with the same soil and climate; I ask, Is it not possible for them to be happier, by the most perfect way of life that can be imagined, and by the greatest reformation that Omnipotence itself could work in their temper and disposition? To assert that they cannot, appears evidently ridiculous. As the land is able to maintain more than all its present inhabitants, they could never, in such an Utopian state, feel any other ills than those which arise from bodily sickness: and these are not the half of human miseries. All other ills spring from some vice, either in ourselves or others; and even many of our diseases proceed from the same origin. Remove the vices, and the ills follow. You must only take care to remove all the vices. If you remove part, you may render the matter worse. By banishing *vicious* luxury, without curing sloth and an indifference to others, you only diminish industry in the state, and add nothing to men's charity or their generosity. Let us, therefore, rest contented with asserting, that two opposite vices in a state may be more advantageous than either of them alone: but let us never pronounce vice in itself advantageous. Is it not very inconsistent for an author to assert in one page, that moral

distinctions are inventions of politicians for public interest; and in the next page maintain, that vice is advantageous to the public [2]? And indeed it seems, upon any system of morality, little less than a contradiction in terms, to talk of a vice, which is in general beneficial to society.

I thought this reasoning necessary, in order to give some light to a philosophical question, which has been much disputed in England. I call it a *philosophical* question, not a *political* one. For whatever may be the consequence of such a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would endow them with every species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice; this concerns not the magistrate, who aims only at possibilities. He cannot cure every vice by substituting a virtue in its place. Very often he can only cure one vice by another; and in that case, he ought to prefer what is least pernicious to society. Luxury, when excessive, is the source of many ills; but is in general preferable to sloth and idleness, which would commonly succeed in its place, and are more hurtful both to private persons and to the public. When sloth reigns, a mean uncultivated way of life prevails amongst individuals, without society, without enjoyment. And if the sovereign, in such a situation, demands the service of his subjects, the labor of the state suffices only to furnish the necessaries of life to the laborers, and can afford nothing to those who are employed in the public service.

[2] Fable of the Bees.

ESSAY III.

OF MONEY.

MONEY is not, properly ſpeaking, one of the ſubjects of commerce; but only the inſtrument which men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another. It is none of the wheels of trade: It is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more ſmooth and eaſy. If we conſider any one kingdom by itſelf, it is evident, that the greater or leſs plenty of money is of no conſequence; ſince the prices of commodities are always proportioned to the plenty of money, and a crown in Harry VII's time ſerved the ſame purpoſe as a pound does at preſent. It is only the *public* which draws any advantage from the greater plenty of money; and that only in its wars and negociations with foreign ſtates. And this is the reaſon why all rich and trading countries from Carthage to Great Britain and Holland, have employed mercenary troops, which they hired from their poorer neighbours. Were they to make uſe of their native ſubjects, they would find leſs advantage from their ſuperior riches, and from their great plenty of gold and ſilver; ſince the pay of all their ſervants muſt riſe in proportion to the public opulence. Our ſmall army of 20 000 men is maintained at as great expenſe as a French army twice as numerous. The Engliſh fleet, during the late war, required as much money to ſupport it as all the Roman legions,

which kept the whole world in ſubjection, during the time of the emperors [1].

The greater number of people, and their greater induſtry, are ſerviceable in all caſes; at home and abroad, in private and in public. But the greater plenty of money, is very limited in its uſe, and may even ſometimes be a loſs to a nation in its commerce with foreigners.

There ſeems to be a happy concurrence of cauſes in human affairs, which checks the growth of trade and riches, and hinders them from being confined entirely to one people; as might naturally at firſt be dreaded from the advantages of an eſtabliſhed commerce. Where one nation has gotten the ſtart of another in trade, it is very difficult for the latter to regain the ground it has loſt; becauſe of the ſuperior induſtry and ſkill of the former, and the greater ſtocks, of which its merchants are poſſeſſed, and which enable them to trade on ſo much ſmaller profits. But theſe advantages are compenſated, in ſome meaſures, by the low price of labor in every nation which has not an extenſive commerce, and does not much abound in gold and ſilver. Manufactures, therefore, gradually ſhift their places, leaving thoſe countries and provinces which they have already enriched, and flying to others, whither they are allured by the cheapneſs of proviſions and labor; till they have enriched theſe alſo, and are again baniſhed by the ſame cauſes. And, in general, we may obſerve, that the dearneſs of every thing, from plenty of money, is a diſadvantage, which

[1] See NOTE [B].

attends an eſtabliſhed commerce, and ſets bounds to it in every country, by enabling the poorer ſtates to underſell the richer in all foreign markets.

This has made me entertain a doubt concerning the benefit of *banks* and *paper-credit*, which are ſo generally eſteemed advantageous to every nation.

That proviſions and labor ſhould become dear by the increaſe of trade and money, is, in many reſpects, an inconvenience; but an inconvenience that is unavoidable, and the effect of that public wealth and proſperity which are the end of all our wiſhes. It is compenſated by the advantages which we reap from the poſſeſſion of theſe precious metals, and the weight which they give the nation in all foreign wars and negociations: But there appears no reaſon for increaſing that inconvenience by a counterfeit money, which foreigners will not accept of in any payment, and which any great diſorder in the ſtate will reduce to nothing. There are, it is true, many people in every rich ſtate, who having large ſums of money; would prefer paper with good ſecurity; as being of more eaſy tranſport and more ſafe cuſtody. If the public provide not a bank, private bankers will take advantage of this circumſtance; as the goldſmiths formerly did in London, or as the bankers do at preſent in Dublin: And therefore it is better, it may be thought, that a public company ſhould enjoy the benefit of that paper-credit, which always will have place in every opulent kingdom. But to endeavour artificially to increaſe ſuch a credit, can never be the intereſt of any trading nation; but muſt lay them under diſadvantages, by increaſing money beyond

its natural proportion to labor and commodities, and thereby heightening their price to the merchant and manufacturer. And in this view, it must be allowed, that no bank could be more advantageous than such a one as locked up all the money it received [2], and never augmented the circulating coin, as is usual, by returning part of its treasure into commerce. A public bank, by this expedient, might cut off much of the dealings of private bankers and money-jobbers; and though the state bore the charge of salaries to the directors and tellers of this bank (for, according to the preceding supposition, it would have no profit from its dealings), the national advantage, resulting from the low price of labor and the destruction of paper-credit, would be a sufficient compensation. Not to mention, that so large a sum lying ready at command, would be a convenience in times of great public danger and distress; and what part of it was used might be replaced at leisure, when peace and tranquillity was restored to the nation.

But of this subject of paper-credit we shall treat more largely hereafter. And I shall finish this essay on money, by proposing and explaining two observations, which may, perhaps, serve to employ the thoughts of our speculative politicians.

It was a shrewd observation of Anacharsis [3] the Scythian, who had never seen money in his own country, that gold and silver seemed to him of no

[2] This is the case with the bank of Amsterdam.

[3] Plut. *Quomodo quis suos profectus in virtute sentire possit.*

uſe to the Greeks, but to aſſiſt them in numeration and arithmetic. It is indeed evident, that money is nothing but the repreſentation of labor and commodities, and ſerves only as a method of rating or eſtimating them. Where coin is in greater plenty, as a greater quantity of it is required to repreſent the ſame quantity of goods; it can have no effect, either good or bad, taking a nation within itſelf, any more than it would make an alteration on a merchant's books, if, inſtead of the Arabian method of notation, which requires few characters, he ſhould make uſe of the Roman, which requires a great many. Nay, the greater quantity of money, like the Roman character, is rather inconvenient, and requires greater trouble both to keep and tranſport it: But notwithſtanding this concluſion, which muſt be allowed juſt, it is certain, that, ſince the diſcovery of the mines in America, induſtry has increaſed in all the nations of Europe, except in the poſſeſſors of thoſe mines; and this may juſtly be aſcribed, amongſt other reaſons, to the increaſe of gold and ſilver. Accordingly we find that, in every kingdom into which money begins to flow in greater abundance than formerly, every thing takes a new face, labor and induſtry gain life; the merchant becomes more enterpriſing, the manufacturer more diligent and ſkilful; and even the farmer follows his plough with greater alacrity and attention. This is not eaſily to be accounted for, if we conſider only the influence which a greater abundance of coin has in the kingdom itſelf, by heightening the price of commodities, and obliging every one to pay a greater number of theſe

little yellow or white pieces for every thing he purchaſes: And as to foreign trade, it appears, that great plenty of money is rather diſadvantageous, by raiſing the price of every kind of labor.

To account, then, for this phenomenon, we muſt conſider, that though the high price of commodities be a neceſſary conſequence of the increaſe of gold and ſilver, yet it follows not immediately upon that increaſe; but ſome time is required before the money circulates through the whole ſtate, and makes its effect be felt on all ranks of people. At firſt, no alteration is perceived; by degrees the price riſes, firſt of one commodity, then of another; till the whole at laſt reaches a juſt proportion with the new quantity of ſpecie which is in the kingdom. In my opinion, it is only in this interval or intermediate ſituation, between the acquiſition of money and riſe of prices, that the increaſing quantity of gold and ſilver is favorable to induſtry. When any quantity of money is imported into a nation, it is not at firſt diſperſed into many hands; but is confined to the coffers of a few perſons, who immediately ſeek to employ it to advantage. Here are a ſet of manufacturers or merchants, we ſhall ſuppoſe, who have received returns of gold and ſilver for goods which they ſent to Cadiz. They are thereby enabled to employ more workmen than formerly, who never dream of demanding higher wages, but are glad of employment from ſuch good paymaſters. If workmen become ſcarce, the manufacturer gives higher wages, but at firſt requires an increaſe of labor; and this is willingly ſubmitted to by the artiſan, who can now eat

and drink better, to compenſate his additional toil and fatigue. He carries his money to market, where he finds every thing at the ſame price as formerly, but returns with greater quantity and of better kinds, for the uſe of his family. The farmer and gardener, finding that all their commodities are taken off, apply themſelves with alacrity to the raiſing more; and at the ſame time can afford to take better and more clothes from their tradeſmen, whoſe price is the ſame as formerly, and their induſtry only whetted by ſo much new gain. It is eaſy to trace the money in its progreſs through the whole commonwealth; where we ſhall find, that it muſt firſt quicken the diligence of every individual, before it increaſe the price of labor.

And that the ſpecie may increaſe to a conſiderable pitch, before it have this latter effect, appears, amongſt other inſtances, from the frequent operations of the French king on the money, where it was always found, that the augmenting of the numerary value did not produce a proportional riſe of the prices, at leaſt for ſome time. In the laſt year of Louis XIV. money was raiſed three-ſevenths, but prices augmented only one. Corn in France is now ſold at the ſame price, or for the ſame number of livres, it was in 1683; though ſilver was then at 30 livres the mark, and is now at 50 *. Not to mention the great addition of gold and ſilver which may have come into that kingdom ſince the former period.

From the whole of this reaſoning, we may conclude, that it is of no manner of conſequence, with regard to the domeſtic happineſs of a ſtate, whether money

* See NOTE [C].

be in a greater or leſs quantity. The good policy of the magiſtrate conſiſts only in keeping it, if poſſible, ſtill increaſing; becauſe, by that means he keeps alive a ſpirit of induſtry in the nation, and increaſes the ſtock of labor, in which conſiſts all real power and riches. A nation, whoſe money decreaſes, is actually, at that time, weaker and more miſerable than another nation which poſſeſſes no more money, but is on the increaſing hand. This will be eaſily accounted for, if we conſider, that the alterations in the quantity of money, either on one ſide or the other, are not immediately attended with proportionable alterations in the price of commodities. There is always an interval before matters be adjuſted to their new ſituation; and this interval is as pernicious to induſtry, when gold and ſilver are diminiſhing, as it is advantageous when theſe metals are increaſing. The workman has not the ſame employment from the manufacturer and merchant; though he pays the ſame price for every thing in the market. The farmer cannot diſpoſe of his corn and cattle; though he muſt pay the ſame rent to his landlord. The poverty, and beggary, and ſloth, which muſt enſue, are eaſily foreſeen.

II. The ſecond obſervation which I propoſed to make with regard to money, may be explained after the following manner: There are ſome kingdoms, and many provinces in Europe (and all of them were once in the ſame condition), where money is ſo ſcarce, that the landlord can get none at all from his tenants; but is obliged to take his rent in kind, and either to conſume it himſelf, or tranſport it to

places where he may find a market. In thoſe countries, the prince can levy few or no taxes but in the ſame manner: And as he will receive ſmall benefit from impoſitions ſo paid, it is evident that ſuch a kingdom has little force even at home; and cannot maintain fleets and armies to the ſame extent, as if every part of it abounded in gold and ſilver. There is ſurely a greater diſproportion between the force of Germany at preſent, and what it was three centuries ago [5], than there is in its induſtry, people, and manufactures. The Auſtrian dominions in the empire are in general well peopled and well cultivated, and are of great extent; but have not a proportionable weight in the balance of Europe; proceeding, as is commonly ſuppoſed, from the ſcarcity of money. How do all theſe facts agree with that principle of reaſon, that the quantity of gold and ſilver is in itſelf altogether indifferent? According to that principle, wherever a ſovereign has numbers of ſubjects, and theſe have plenty of commodities, he ſhould of courſe be great and powerful, and they rich and happy, independent of the greater or leſſer abundance of the precious metals. Theſe admit of diviſions and ſubdiviſions to a great extent; and where the pieces might become ſo ſmall as to be in danger of being loſt, it is eaſy to mix the gold or ſilver with a baſer metal, as is practiſed in ſome countries of Europe; and by that means raiſe the pieces

[5] The Italians gave to the Emperor Maximilian the nickname of Pocchi-danari. None of the enterpriſes of that prince ever ſucceeded for want of money.

to a bulk more ſenſible and convenient. They ſtill ſerve the ſame purpoſes of exchange, whatever their number may be, or whatever color they may be ſuppoſed to have.

To theſe difficulties I anſwer, that the effect here ſuppoſed to flow from ſcarcity of money, really ariſes from the manners and cuſtoms of the people; and that we miſtake; as is too uſual, a collateral effect for a cauſe. The contradiction is only apparent; but it requires ſome thought and reflection to diſcover the principles, by which we can reconcile *reaſon* to *experience*.

It ſeems a maxim almoſt ſelfevident, that the prices of every thing depend on the proportion between commodities and money, and that any conſiderable alteration on either, has the ſame effect, either of heightening or lowering the price. Increaſe the commodities, they become cheaper; increaſe the money, they riſe in their value. As, on the other hand, a diminution of the former, and that of the latter, have contrary tendencies.

It is alſo evident, that the prices do not ſo much depend on the abſolute quantity of commodities and that of money, which are in a nation, as on that of the commodities which come or may come to market, and of the money which circulates. If the coin be locked up in cheſts, it is the ſame thing with regard to prices, as if it were annihilated; if the commodities be hoarded in magazines and granaries, a like effect follows. As the money and commodities, in theſe caſes, never meet, they cannot affect each other. Were we, at any time, to form conjectures concerning

the price of provisions, the corn, which the farmer must reserve for seed and for the maintenance of himself and family, ought never to enter into the estimation. It is only the overplus, compared to the demand, that determines the value.

To apply these principles, we must consider, that, in the first and more uncultivated ages of any state, ere fancy has confounded her wants with those of nature, men, content with the produce of their own fields, or with those rude improvements which they themselves can work upon them, have little occasion for exchange, at least for money, which, by agreement, is the common measure of exchange. The wool of the farmer's own flock, spun in his own family, and wrought by a neighbouring weaver, who receives his payment in corn or wool, suffices for furniture and clothing. The carpenter, the smith, the mason, the tailor, are retained by wages of a like nature; and the landlord himself, dwelling in the neighbourbood, is content to receive his rent in the commodities raised by the farmer. The greater part of these he consumes at home in rustic hospitality: The rest, perhaps, he disposes of for money to the neighbouring town, whence he draws the few materials of expense and luxury.

But after men begin to refine on all these enjoyments, and live not always at home, nor are content with what can be raised in their neighbourhood, there is more exchange and commerce of all kinds, and more money enters into that exchange. The tradesmen will not be paid in corn; because they want something more than barley to eat. The farmer goes

beyond his own parish for the commodities he purchases, and cannot always carry his commodities to the merchant who supplies him. The landlord lives in the capital, or in a foreign country; and demands his rent in gold and silver, which can easily be transported to him. Great undertakers, and manufacturers, and merchants, arise in every commodity; and these can conveniently deal in nothing but in specie. And consequently, in this situation of society, the coin enters into many more contracts, and by that means is much more employed than in the former.

The necessary effect is, that provided the money increase not in the nation, every thing must become much cheaper in times of industry, and refinement, than in rude, uncultivated ages. It is the proportion between the circulating money and the commodities in the market, which determines the prices. Goods that are consumed at home, or exchanged with other goods in the neighbourhood, never come to market; they affect not in the least the current specie; with regard to it they are as if totally annihilated; and consequently this method of using them sinks the proportion on the side of the commodities, and increases the prices. But after money enters into all contracts and sales, and is every where the measure of exchange, the same national cash has a much greater task to perform; all commodities are then in the market; the sphere of circulation is enlarged; it is the same case, as if that individual sum were to serve a larger kingdom; and therefore, the proportion being here lessened on the side of the money, every thing must become cheaper, and the prices gradually fall.

By the moſt exact computations, that have been formed all over Europe, after making allowance for the alteration in the numerary value or the denomination, it is found, that the prices of all things have only riſen three, or, at moſt, four times, ſince the diſcovery of the Weſt Indies. But will any one aſſert, that there is not much more than four times the coin in Europe, that was in the fifteenth century, and the centuries preceding it? The Spaniards and Portugueſe from their mines, the Engliſh, French, and Dutch, by their African trade and by their interlopers in the Weſt Indies, bring home about ſix millions a year, of which not above a third goes to the Eaſt Indies. This ſum alone, in ten years, would probably double the ancient ſtock of money in Europe. And no other ſatisfactory reaſon can be given, why all prices have not riſen to a much more exorbitant height, except that which is derived from a change of cuſtoms and manners. Beſides that more commodities are produced by additional induſtry, the ſame commodities come more to market, after men depart from their ancient ſimplicity of manners. And though this increaſe has not been equal to that of many, it has, however, been conſiderable, and has preſerved the proportion between coin and commodities nearer the ancient ſtandard.

Were the queſtion propoſed, Which of theſe methods of living in the people, the ſimple or refined, is the moſt advantageous to the ſtate or public? I ſhould, without much ſcruple, prefer the latter, in a view to politics at leaſt; and ſhould produce this as an additional reaſon for the encouragement of trade and manufactures.

While men live in the ancient ſimple manner, and ſupply all their neceſſaries from domeſtic induſtry or from the neighbourhood, the ſovereign can levy no taxes in money from a conſiderable part of his ſubjects; and if he will impoſe on them any burdens, he muſt take payment in commodities, with which alone they abound; a method attended with ſuch great and obvious inconveniences, that they need not here be inſiſted on. All the money he can pretend to raiſe, muſt be from his principal cities, where alone it circulates; and theſe, it is evident, cannot afford him ſo much as the whole ſtate could, did gold and ſilver circulate throughout the whole. But beſides this obvious diminution of the revenue, there is another cauſe of the poverty of the public in ſuch a ſituation. Not only the ſovereign receives leſs money, but the ſame money goes not ſo far as in times of induſtry and general commerce. Every thing is dearer, where the gold and ſilver are ſuppoſed equal; and that becauſe fewer commodities come to market, and the whole coin bears a higher proportion to what is to be purchaſed by it; whence alone the prices of every thing are fixed and determined.

Here then we may learn the fallacy of the remark, often to be met with in hiſtorians, and even in common converſation, that any particular ſtate is weak, though fertile, populous, and well cultivated, merely becauſe it wants money. It appears that the want of money can never injure any ſtate within itſelf: For men and commodities are the real ſtrength of any community. It is the ſimple manner of living which here hurts the public, by confining the gold

and

and silver to few hands, and preventing its universal diffusion and circulation. On the contrary, industry and refinements of all kinds incorporate it with the whole state, however small its quantity may be: They digest it into every vein, so to speak; and make it enter into every transaction and contract. No hand is entirely empty of it. And as the prices of every thing fall by that means, the sovereign has a double advantage: He may draw money by his taxes from every part of the state; and what he receives, goes farther in every purchase and payment.

We may infer, from a comparison of prices, that money is not more plentiful in China than it was in Europe three centuries ago: But what immense power is that empire possessed of, if we may judge by the civil and military establishment maintained by it? Polybius[6] tells us, that provisions were so cheap in Italy during his time, that in some places the stated price for a meal at the inn was a *semis* a-head, little more than a farthing! Yet the Roman power had even then subdued the whole known world. About a century before that period, the Carthaginian ambassador said, by way of raillery, that no people lived more sociably amongst themselves than the Romans; for that, in every entertainment, which, as foreign ministers, they received, they still observed the same plate at every table[7]. The absolute quantity of the precious metals is a matter of great indifference. There are only two circumstances of any importance, namely,

[6] Lib. ii. cap. 15.
[7] Plin. lib. xxxiii. cap. 11.

their gradual increaſe, and their thorough concoction and circulation through the ſtate; and the influence of both thoſe circumſtances has here been explained.

In the following Eſſay we ſhall ſee an inſtance of a like fallacy as that above mentioned; where a collateral effect is taken for a cauſe, and where a conſequence is aſcribed to the plenty of money; though it be really owing to a change in the manners and cuſtoms of the people.

ESSAY IV.

OF INTEREST.

NOTHING is eſteemed a more certain ſign of the flouriſhing condition of any nation than the lowneſs of intereſt: And with reaſon; though I believe the cauſe is ſomewhat different from what is commonly apprehended. Lowneſs of intereſt is generally aſcribed to plenty of money. But money, however plentiful, has no other effect, *if fixed*, than to raiſe the price of labor. Silver is more common than gold, and therefore you receive a greater quantity of it for the ſame commodities. But do you pay leſs intereſt for it? Intereſt in Batavia and Jamaica is at 10 *per cent.* in Portugal at 6; though theſe places, as we may learn from the prices of every thing, abound more in gold and ſilver than either London or Amſterdam.

Were all the gold in England annihilated at once, and one-and-twenty ſhillings ſubſtituted in the

place of every guinea, would money be more plentiful or intereſt lower? No ſurely: We ſhould only uſe ſilver inſtead of gold. Were gold rendered as common as ſilver, and ſilver as common as copper; would money be more plentiful or intereſt lower? We may aſſuredly give the ſame anſwer. Our ſhillings would then be yellow, and our halfpence white; and we ſhould have no guineas. No other difference would ever be obſerved; no alteration on commerce, manufactures, navigation, or intereſt; unleſs we imagine, that the color of the metal is of any conſequence.

Now, what is ſo viſible in theſe greater variations of ſcarcity or abundance in the precious metals, muſt hold in all inferior changes. If the multiplying of gold and ſilver fifteen times makes no difference, much leſs can the doubling or tripling them. All augmentation has no other effect than to heighten the price of labor and commodities; and even this variation is little more than that of a name. In the progreſs towards theſe changes, the augmentation may have ſome influence, by exciting induſtry; but after the prices are ſettled, ſuitably to the new abundance of gold and ſilver, it has no manner of influence.

An effect always holds proportion with its cauſe. Prices have riſen near four times ſince the diſcovery of the Indies; and it is probable gold and ſilver have multiplied much more: But intereſt has not fallen much above half. The rate of intereſt, therefore, is not derived from the quantity of the precious metals.

Money having chiefly a fictitious value, the greater

or leſs plenty of it is of no conſequence, if we conſider a nation within itſelf; and the quantity of ſpecie, when once fixed, though ever ſo large, has no other effect, than to oblige every one to tell out a greater number of thoſe ſhining bits of metal, for clothes, furniture, or equipage, without increaſing any one convenience of life. If a man borrow money to build a houſe, he then carries home a greater load; becauſe the ſtone, timber, lead, glaſs, &c. with the labor of the maſons and carpenters, are repreſented by a greater quantity of gold and ſilver. But as theſe metals are conſidered chiefly as repreſentations, there can no alteration ariſe, from their bulk or quantity, their weight or color, either upon their real value or their intereſt. The ſame intereſt, in all caſes, bears the ſame proportion to the ſum. And if you lent me ſo much labor and ſo many commodities, by receiving five *per cent.* you always receive proportional labor and commodities, however repreſented, whether by yellow or white coin, whether by a pound or an ounce. It is in vain, therefore, to look for the cauſe of the fall or riſe of intereſt in the greater or leſs quantity of gold and ſilver, which is fixed in any nation.

High intereſt ariſes from *three* circumſtances: A great demand for borrowing; little riches to ſupply that demand; and great profits ariſing from commerce: And theſe circumſtances are a clear proof of the ſmall advance of commerce and induſtry, not of the ſcarcity of gold and ſilver. Low intereſt, on the other hand, proceeds from the three oppoſite circumſtances: A ſmall demand for borrowing; great riches to ſupply that demand, and ſmall profits

arising from commerce. And these circumstances are all connected together, and proceed from the increase of industry and commerce, not of gold and silver. We shall endeavour to prove these points; and shall begin with the causes and the effects of a great or small demand for borrowing.

When a people have emerged ever so little from a savage state, and their numbers have increased beyond the original multitude, there must immediately arise an inequality of property; and while some possess large tracts of land, others are confined within narrow limits, and some are entirely without any landed property. Those who possess more land than they can labor, employ those who possess none, and agree to receive a determined part of the product. Thus the *landed* interest is immediately established; nor is there any settled government, however rude, in which affairs are not on this footing. Of these proprietors of land, some must presently discover themselves to be of different tempers from others; and while one would willingly store up the produce of his land for futurity, another desires to consume at present what should suffice for many years. But as the spending of a settled revenue is a way of life entirely without occupation; men have so much need of somewhat to fix and engage them, that pleasures, such as they are, will be the pursuit of the greater part of the landholders, and the prodigals among them will always be more numerous than the misers. In a state, therefore, where there is nothing but a landed interest, as there is little frugality, the

borrowers muſt be very numerous, and the rate of intereſt muſt hold proportion to it. The difference depends not on the quantity of money, but on the habits and manners which prevail. By this alone the demand for borrowing is increaſed or diminiſhed. Were money ſo plentiful as to make an egg be ſold for ſixpence; ſo long as there are only landed gentry and peaſants in the ſtate, the borrowers muſt be numerous, and intereſt high. The rent for the ſame farm would be heavier and more bulky: But the ſame idleneſs of the landlord, with the higher price of commodities, would diſſipate it in the ſame time, and produce the ſame neceſſity and demand for borrowing.

Nor is the caſe different with regard to the *ſecond* circumſtance which we propoſed to conſider, namely, the great or little riches to ſupply the demand. This effect alſo depends on the habits and way of living of the people, not on the quantity of gold and ſilver. In order to have, in any ſtate, a greater number of lenders, it is not ſufficient nor requiſite, that there be great abundance of the precious metals. It is only requiſite, that the property or command of that quantity, which is in the ſtate, whether great or ſmall, ſhould be collected in particular hands, ſo as to form conſiderable ſums, or compoſe a great monied intereſt. This begets a number of lenders, and ſinks the rate of uſury; and this, I ſhall venture to affirm, depends not on the quantity of ſpecie, but on particular manners and cuſtoms, which make the ſpecie gather into ſeparate ſums or maſſes of conſiderable value.

For ſuppoſe, that, by miracle, every man in Great Britain ſhould have five pounds ſlipt into his pocket in one night; this would much more than double the whole money that is at preſent in the kingdom: yet there would not next day, nor for ſome time, be any more lenders, nor any variation in the intereſt. And were there nothing but landlords and peaſants in the ſtate, this money, however abundant, could never gather into ſums; and would only ſerve to increaſe the prices of every thing, without any farther conſequence. The prodigal landlord diſſipates it, as faſt as he receives it; and the beggarly peaſant has no means, nor view, nor ambition, of obtaining above a bare livelihood. The overplus of borrowers above that of lenders continuing ſtill the ſame, there will follow no reduction of intereſt. That depends upon another principle; and muſt proceed from an increaſe of induſtry and frugality, of arts and commerce.

Every thing uſeful to the life of man ariſes from the ground; but few things ariſe in that condition which is requiſite to render them uſeful. There muſt, therefore, beſide the peaſants and the proprietors of land, be another rank of men, who, receiving from the former the rude materials, work them into their proper form, and retain part for their own uſe and ſubſiſtence. In the infancy of ſociety, theſe contracts between the artiſans and the peaſants, and between one ſpecies of artiſans and another, are commonly entered into immediately by the perſons themſelves, who, being neighbours, are eaſily acquainted with each other's neceſſities, and can

lend their mutual assistance to supply them. But when men's industry increases, and their views enlarge, it is found that the most remote parts of the state can assist each other as well as the more contiguous, and that this intercourse of good offices may be carried on to the greatest extent and intricacy. Hence the origin of *merchants*, one of the most useful races of men, who serve as agents between those parts of the state, that are wholly unacquainted, and are ignorant of each other's necessities. Here are in a city fifty workmen in silk and linen, and a thousand customers; and these two ranks of men, so necessary to each other, can never rightly meet, till one man erects a shop, to which all the workmen and all the customers repair. In this province grass rises in abundance: The inhabitants abound in cheese, and butter, and cattle; but want bread and corn, which in a neighbouring province are in too great abundance for the use of the inhabitants. One man discovers this. He brings corn from the one province, and returns with cattle; and supplying the wants of both, he is, so far, a common benefactor. As the people increase in numbers and industry, the difficulty of their intercourse increases: The business of the agency or merchandize becomes more intricate; and divides, subdivides, compounds, and mixes to a greater variety. In all these transactions, it is necessary and reasonable, that a considerable part of the commodities and labor should belong to the merchant, to whom, in a great measure, they are owing. And these commodities he will sometimes preserve in kind, or more commonly convert into money,

which is their common repreſentation. If gold and ſilver have increaſed in the ſtate together with the induſtry, it will require a great quantity of theſe metals to repreſent a great quantity of commodities and labor. If induſtry alone has increaſed, the prices of every thing muſt ſink, and a ſmall quantity of ſpecie will ſerve as a repreſentation.

There is no craving or demand of the human mind more conſtant and inſatiable than that for exerciſe and employment; and this deſire ſeems the foundation of moſt of our paſſions and purſuits. Deprive a man of all buſineſs and ſerious occupation, he runs reſtleſs from one amuſement to another; and the weight and oppreſſion which he feels from idleneſs, is ſo great, that he forgets the ruin which muſt follow him from his immoderate expenſes. Give him a more harmleſs way of employing his mind or body, he is ſatisfied, and feels no longer that inſatiable thirſt after pleaſure. But if the employment you give him be lucrative, eſpecially if the profit be attached to every particular exertion of induſtry, he has gain ſo often in his eye, that he acquires, by degrees, a paſſion for it, and knows no ſuch pleaſure as that of ſeeing the daily increaſe of his fortune. And this is the reaſon why trade increaſes frugality, and why, among merchants, there is the ſame overplus of miſers above prodigals, as, among the poſſeſſers of land, there is the contrary.

Commerce increaſes induſtry, by conveying it readily from one member of the ſtate to another, and allowing none of it to periſh or become uſeleſs. It increaſes frugality, by giving occupation to men,

and employing them in the arts of gain; which ſoon engage their affection, and remove all reliſh for pleaſure and expenſe. It is an infallible conſequence of all induſtrious profeſſions, to beget frugality, and make the love of gain prevail over the love of pleaſure. Among lawyers and phyſicians who have any practice, there are many more who live within their income, than who exceed it, or even live up to it. But lawyers and phyſicians beget no induſtry; and it is even at the expenſe of others they acquire their riches; ſo that they are ſure to diminiſh the poſſeſſions of ſome of their fellow-citizens, as faſt as they increaſe their own. Merchants, on the contrary, beget induſtry, by ſerving as canals to convey it through every corner of the ſtate: And at the ſame time, by their frugality, they acquire great power over that induſtry, and collect a large property in the labor and commodities, which they are the chief inſtruments in producing. There is no other profeſſion, therefore, except merchandize, which can make the monied intereſt conſiderable, or, in other words, can increaſe induſtry, and by alſo increaſing frugality, give a great demand of that induſtry to particular members of the ſociety. Without commerce, the ſtate muſt conſiſt chiefly of landed gentry, whoſe prodigality and expenſe make a continual demand for borrowing; and of peaſants, who have no ſums to ſupply that demand. The money never gathers into large ſtocks or ſums, which can be lent at intereſt. It is diſperſed into numberleſs hands, who either ſquander it in idle ſhow and magnificence, or employ it in the purchaſe of the

common neceſſaries of life. Commerce alone aſſembles it into conſiderable ſums; and this effect it has merely from the induſtry which it begets, and the frugality which it inſpires, independent of that particular quantity of precious metal which may circulate in the ſtate.

Thus an increaſe of commerce, by a neceſſary conſequence, raiſes a great number of lenders, and by that means produces lowneſs of intereſt. We muſt now conſider how far this increaſe of commerce diminiſhes the profits ariſing from that profeſſion, and gives riſe to the *third* circumſtance requiſite to produce lowneſs of intereſt.

It may be proper to obſerve on this head, that low intereſt and low profits of merchandize, are two events that mutually forward each other, and are both originally derived from that extenſive commerce which produces opulent merchants, and renders the monied intereſt conſiderable. Where merchants poſſeſs great ſtocks, whether repreſented by few or many pieces of metal, it muſt frequently happen, that, when they either become tired of buſineſs, or leave heirs unwilling or unfit to engage in commerce, a great proportion of theſe riches naturally ſeeks an annual and ſecure revenue. The plenty diminiſhes the price, and makes the lenders accept of a low intereſt. This conſideration obliges many to keep their ſtock employed in trade, and rather be content with low profits, than diſpoſe of their money at an undervalue. On the other hand, when commerce has become extenſive, and employs large ſtocks, there muſt ariſe rivalſhips among the merchants, which

diminiſh the profits of trade, at the ſame time that they increaſe the trade itſelf. The low profits of merchandize induce the merchants to accept more willingly of a low intereſt, when they leave off buſineſs, and begin to indulge themſelves in eaſe and indolence. It is needleſs, therefore, to inquire which of theſe circumſtances, to wit, *low intereſt* or *low profits*, is the cauſe, and which the effect. They both ariſe from an extenſive commerce, and mutually forward each other. No man will accept of low profits, where he can have high intereſt; and no man will accept of low intereſt, where he can have high profits. An extenſive commerce, by producing large ſtocks, diminiſhes both intereſt and profits; and is always aſſiſted in its diminution of the one by the proportional ſinking of the other. I may add, that, as low profits ariſe from the increaſe of commerce and induſtry, they ſerve in their turn to its farther increaſe, by rendering the commodities cheaper, encouraging the conſumption, and heightening the induſtry. And thus, if we conſider the whole connexion of cauſes and effects, intereſt is the barometer of the ſtate, and its lowneſs is a ſign almoſt infallible of the flouriſhing condition of a people. It proves the increaſe of induſtry, and its prompt circulation through the whole ſtate, little inferior to a demonſtration. And though, perhaps, it may not be impoſſible but a ſudden and a great check to commerce may have a momentary effect of the ſame kind, by throwing ſo many ſtocks out of trade; it muſt be attended with ſuch miſery and want of employment in the poor, that, beſides its ſhort duration,

it will not be poſſible to miſtake the one caſe for the other.

Thoſe who have aſſerted, that the plenty of money was the cauſe of low intereſt, ſeem to have taken a collateral effect for a cauſe; ſince the ſame induſtry which ſinks the intereſt, commonly acquires great abundance of the precious metals. A variety of fine manufactures, with vigilant enterpriſing merchants, will ſoon draw money to a ſtate, if it be any where to be found in the world. The ſame cauſe, by multiplying the conveniences of life, and increaſing induſtry, collects great riches into the hands of perſons, who are not proprietors of land, and produces by that means a lowneſs of intereſt: But though both theſe effects, plenty of money and low intereſt, naturally ariſe from commerce and induſtry, they are altogether independent of each other. For ſuppoſe a nation removed into the *Pacific* ocean, without any foreign commerce, or any knowledge of navigation; ſuppoſe, that this nation poſſeſſes always the ſame ſtock of coin, but is continually increaſing in its numbers and induſtry: It is evident, that the price of every commodity muſt gradually diminiſh in that kingdom; ſince it is the proportion between money and any ſpecies of goods which fixes their mutual value; and upon the preſent ſuppoſition, the conveniences of life become every day more abundant, without any alteration in the current ſpecie. A leſs quantity of money, therefore, among this people, will make a rich man, during the times of induſtry, than would ſuffice to that purpoſe in ignorant and ſlothful ages. Leſs money will build a

houſe, portion a daughter, buy an eſtate, ſupport a manufactory, or maintain a family and equipage. Theſe are the uſes for which men borrow money; and therefore, the greater or leſs quantity of it in a ſtate has no influence on the intereſt: But it is evident, that the greater or leſs ſtock of labor and commodities muſt have a great influence; ſince we really and in effect borrow theſe when we take money upon intereſt. It is true, when commerce is extended all over the globe, the moſt induſtrious nations always abound moſt with the precious metals: So that low intereſt and plenty of money are in fact almoſt inſeparable. But ſtill it is of conſequence to know the principle whence any phenomenon ariſes, and to diſtinguiſh between a cauſe and a concomitant effect. Beſides that the ſpeculation is curious, it may frequently be of uſe in the conduct of public affairs. At leaſt, it muſt be owned, that nothing can be of more uſe than to improve, by practice, the method of reaſoning on theſe ſubjects, which of all others are the moſt important; though they are commonly treated in the looſeſt and moſt careleſs manner.

Another reaſon of this popular miſtake with regard to the cauſe of low intereſt, ſeems to be the inſtance of ſome nations; where, after a ſudden acquiſition of money or of the precious metals, by means of foreign conqueſt, the intereſt has fallen, not only among them, but in all the neighbouring ſtates, as ſoon as that money was diſperſed, and had inſinuated itſelf into every corner. Thus, intereſt in Spain fell near half immediately after the diſcovery of the

West Indies, as we are informed by Garcilasso de la Vega: And it has been ever since gradually sinking in every kingdom of Europe. Interest in Rome, after the conquest of Egypt, fell from 6 to 4 *per cent.* as we learn from Dion [1].

The causes of the sinking of interest, upon such an event, seem different in the conquering country and in the neighbouring states; but in neither of them can we justly ascribe that effect merely to the increase of gold and silver.

In the conquering country, it is natural to imagine, that this new acquisition of money will fall into a few hands, and be gathered into large sums, which seek a secure revenue, either by the purchase of land, or by interest; and consequently the same effect follows, for a little time, as if there had been a great accession of industry and commerce. The increase of lenders above the borrowers sinks the interest; and so much the faster, if those, who have acquired those large sums, find no industry or commerce in the state, and no method of employing their money but by lending it at interest. But after this new mass of gold and silver has been digested, and has circulated through the whole state, affairs will soon return to their former situation; while the landlords and new money-holders, living idly, squander above their income; and the former daily contract debt, and the latter encroach on their stock till its final extinction. The whole money may still be in the state, and make itself felt by the increase of prices: But not being now collected into any large masses or stocks,

[1] Lib. ii.

the diſproportion between the borrowers and lenders is the ſame as formerly, and conſequently the high intereſt returns.

Accordingly we find, in Rome, that ſo early as Tiberius's time, intereſt had again mounted to 6 [2] *per cent.* though no accident had happened to drain the empire of money. In Trajan's time, money lent on mortgages in Italy bore 6 *per cent* [3]; on common ſecurities in Bithynia, 12 [4]. And if intereſt in Spain has not riſen to its old pitch, this can be aſcribed to nothing but the continuance of the ſame cauſe that ſunk it, to wit, the large fortunes continually made in the Indies, which come over to Spain from time to time, and ſupply the demand of the borrowers. By this accidental and extraneous cauſe, more money is to be lent in Spain, that is, more money is collected into large ſums, than would otherwiſe be found in a ſtate, where there are ſo little commerce and induſtry.

As to the reduction of intereſt, which has followed in England, France, and other kingdoms of Europe, that have no mines, it has been gradual; and has not proceeded from the increaſe of money, conſidered merely in itſelf; but from that of induſtry, which is the natural effect of the former increaſe, in that interval, before it raiſes the price of labor and proviſions. For to return to the foregoing ſuppoſition: if the induſtry of England had riſen as much from other cauſes (and that riſe

[2] Columella, lib. iii. cap. 3.
[3] Plinii epiſt. lib. vii. ep. 18.
[4] Id. lib. x. ep. 62.

might

might eaſily have happened, though the ſtock of money had remained the ſame), muſt not all the ſame conſequences have followed which we obſerve at preſent? The ſame people would, in that caſe, be found in the kingdom, the ſame commodities, the ſame induſtry, manufactures, and commerce; and conſequently, the ſame merchants with the ſame ſtocks, that is, with the ſame command over labor and commodities, only repreſented by a ſmaller number of white or yellow pieces, which being a circumſtance of no moment, would only affect the waggoner, porter, and trunk-maker. Luxury, therefore, manufactures, arts, induſtry, frugality, flouriſhing equally as at preſent, it is evident, that intereſt muſt alſo have been as low; ſince that is the neceſſary reſult of all theſe circumſtances; ſo far as they determine the profits of commerce, and the proportion between the borrowers and lenders in any ſtate.

ESSAY V.

OF THE BALANCE OF TRADE.

IT is very uſual, in nations ignorant of the nature of commerce, to prohibit the exportation of commodities, and to preſerve among themſelves whatever they think valuable and uſeful. They do not conſider, that, in this prohibition, they act directly contrary to their intention; and that the more is exported of any commodity, the more will be raiſed at home, of which they themſelves will always have the firſt offer.

It is well known to the learned, that the ancient laws of Athens rendered the exportation of figs criminal; that being ſuppoſed a ſpecies of fruit ſo excellent in Attica, that the Athenians deemed it too delicious for the palate of any foreigner. And in this ridiculous prohibition they were ſo much in earneſt, that informers were thence called *ſycophants* among them, from two Greek words which ſignify *figs* and *diſcoverer* [1]. There are proofs in many old acts of parliament of the ſame ignorance in the nature of commerce, particularly in the reign of Edward III. And to this day, in France, the exportation of corn is almoſt always prohibited; in order, as they ſay, to prevent famines; though it is evident, that nothing contributes more to the frequent famines which ſo much diſtreſs that fertile country.

[1] Plut. *De Curioſitate.*

The ſame jealous fear, with regard to money, has alſo prevailed among ſeveral nations; and it required both reaſon and experience to convince any people, that theſe prohibitions ſerve to no other purpoſe than to raiſe the exchange againſt them, and produce a ſtill greater exportation.

Theſe errors, one may ſay, are groſs and palpable: But there ſtill prevails, even in nations well acquainted with commerce, a ſtrong jealouſy with regard to the balance of trade, and a fear, that all their gold and ſilver may be leaving them. This ſeems to me, almoſt in every caſe, a groundleſs apprehenſion; and I ſhould as ſoon dread, that all our ſprings and rivers ſhould be exhauſted, as that money ſhould abandon a kingdom where there are people and induſtry. Let us carefully preſerve theſe latter advantages; and we need never be apprehenſive of loſing the former.

It is eaſy to obſerve, that all calculations concerning the balance of trade are founded on very uncertain facts and ſuppoſitions. The cuſtom-houſe-books are allowed to be an inſufficient ground of reaſoning; nor is the rate of exchange much better, unleſs we conſider it with all nations, and know alſo the proportions of the ſeveral ſums remitted; which one may ſafely pronounce impoſſible. Every man, who has ever reaſoned on this ſubject, has always proved his theory, whatever it was, by facts and calculations, and by an enumeration of all the commodities ſent to all foreign kingdoms.

The writings of Mr. Gee ſtruck the nation with an univerſal panic, when they ſaw it plainly

demonſtrated, by a detail of particulars, that the balance was againſt them for ſo conſiderable a ſum as muſt leave them without a ſingle ſhilling in five or ſix years. But, luckily, twenty years have ſince elapſed, with an expenſive foreign war; yet it is commonly ſuppoſed, that money is ſtill more plentiful among us than in any former period.

Nothing can be more entertaining on this head than Dr. Swift; an author ſo quick in diſcerning the miſtakes and abſurdities of others. He ſays, in his *Short View of the State of* Ireland, that the whole caſh of that kingdom formerly amounted but to 500,000 *l.*; that out of this the Iriſh remitted every year a neat million to England, and had ſcarcely any other ſource from which they could compenſate themſelves, and little other foreign trade than the importation of French wines, for which they paid ready money. The conſequence of this ſituation, which muſt be owned to be diſadvantageous, was, that, in a courſe of three years, the current money of Ireland, from 500,000 *l.* was reduced to leſs than two. And at preſent, I ſuppoſe, in a courſe of 30 years, it is abſolutely nothing. Yet I know not how that opinion of the advance of riches in Ireland, which gave the Doctor ſo much indignation, ſeems ſtill to continue, and gain ground with every body.

In ſhort, this apprehenſion of the wrong balance of trade, appears of ſuch a nature, that it diſcovers itſelf, wherever one is out of humor with the miniſtry, or is in low ſpirits; and as it can never be refuted by a particular detail of all the exports,

which counterbalance the imports, it may here be proper to form a general argument, that may prove the impoſſibility of this event, as long as we preſerve our people and our induſtry.

Suppoſe four-fifths of all the money in Great Britain to be annihilated in one night, and the nation reduced to the ſame condition, with regard to ſpecie, as in the reigns of the Harrys and Edwards, what would be the conſequence? Muſt not the price of all labor and commodities ſink in proportion, and every thing be ſold as cheap as they were in thoſe ages? What nation could then diſpute with us in any foreign market, or pretend to navigate or to ſell manufactures at the ſame price, which to us would afford ſufficient profit? In how little time, therefore, muſt this bring back the money which we had loſt, and raiſe us to the level of all the neighbouring nations? Where, after we have arrived, we immediately loſe the advantage of the cheapneſs of labor and commodities; and the farther flowing in of money is ſtopped by our fulneſs and repletion.

Again, ſuppoſe, that all the money of Great Britain were multiplied fivefold in a night, muſt not the contrary effect follow? Muſt not all labor and commodities riſe to ſuch an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, became comparatively ſo cheap, that, in ſpite of all the laws which could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out; till we fall to a level with foreigners, and loſe that great ſuperiority of riches, which had laid us under ſuch diſadvantages?

Now, it is evident, that the ſame cauſes, which would correct theſe exorbitant inequalities, were they to happen miraculouſly, muſt prevent their happening in the common courſe of nature, and muſt for ever, in all neighbouring nations, preſerve money nearly proportionable to the art and induſtry of each nation. All water, wherever it communicates, remains always at a level. Aſk naturaliſts the reaſon; they tell you, that, were it to be raiſed in any one place, the ſuperior gravity of that part not being balanced muſt depreſs it, till it meet a counterpoiſe; and that the ſame cauſe, which redreſſes the inequality when it happens, muſt for ever prevent it, without ſome violent external operation [2].

Can one imagine, that it had ever been poſſible, by any laws, or even by any art or induſtry, to have kept all the money in Spain, which the galleons brought from the Indies? Or that all commodities could be ſold in France for a tenth of the price which they would yield on the other ſide of the Pyrenees, without finding their way thither, and draining from that immenſe treaſure? What other reaſon, indeed, is there, why all nations, at preſent, gain in their trade with Spain and Portugal; but becauſe it is impoſſible to heap up money, more

[2] There is another cauſe, though more limited in its operation, which checks the wrong balance of trade, to every particular nation to which the kingdom trades. When we import more goods than we export, the exchange turns againſt us, and this becomes a new encouragement to export; as much as the charge of carriage and inſurance of the money which becomes due would amount to. For the exchange can never riſe but a little higher than that ſum.

than any fluid, beyond its proper level? The ſovereigns of theſe countries have ſhown, that they wanted not inclination to keep their gold and ſilver to themſelves, had it been in any degree practicable.

But as any body of water may be raiſed above the level of the ſurrounding element, if the former has no communication with the latter; ſo in money, if the communication be cut off, by any material or phyſical impediment (for all laws alone are ineffectual), there may, in ſuch a caſe, be a very great inequality of money. Thus the immenſe diſtance of China, together with the monopolies of our India companies, obſtructing the communication, preſerve in Europe the gold and ſilver, eſpecially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in that kingdom. But, notwithſtanding this great obſtruction, the force of the cauſes above mentioned is ſtill evident. The ſkill and ingenuity of Europe in general ſurpaſſes perhaps that of China, with regard to manual arts and manufactures: yet are we never able to trade thither without great diſadvantage. And were it not for the continual recruits which we receive from America, money would ſoon ſink in Europe, and riſe in China, till it came nearly to a level in both places. Nor can any reaſonable man doubt, but that induſtrious nation, were they as near us as Poland or Barbary, would drain us of the overplus of our ſpecie and draw to themſelves a larger ſhare of the Weſt Indian treaſures. We need not have recourſe to a phyſical attraction, in order to explain the

neceſſity of this operation. There is a moral attraction, ariſing from the intereſts and paſſions of men, which is full as potent and infallible.

How is the balance kept in the provinces of every kingdom among themſelves, but by the force of this principle, which makes it impoſſible for money to loſe its level, and either to riſe or ſink beyond the proportion of the labor and commodities which are in each province? Did not long experience make people eaſy on this head, what a fund of gloomy reflections might calculations afford to a melancholy Yorkſhireman, while he computed and magnified the ſums drawn to London by taxes, abſentees, commodities, and found on compariſon the oppoſite articles ſo much inferior? And no doubt, had the *Heptarchy* ſubſiſted in England, the legiſlature of each ſtate had been continually alarmed by the fear of a wrong balance; and as it is probable that the mutual hatred of theſe ſtates would have been extremely violent on account of their cloſe neighbourhood, they would have loaded and oppreſſed all commerce, by a jealous and ſuperfluous caution. Since the Union has removed the barriers between Scotland and England, which of theſe nations gains from the other by this free commerce? Or if the former kingdom has received any increaſe of riches, can it reaſonably be accounted for by any thing but the increaſe of its art and induſtry? It was a common apprehenſion in England, before the Union, as we learn from L'abbé du Bos[3], that

[3] *Les intérêts d'*Angleterre *mal-entendus.*

Scotland would ſoon drain them of their treaſure, were an open trade allowed; and on the other ſide the Tweed a contrary apprehenſion prevailed: With what juſtice in both, time has ſhown.

What happens in ſmall portions of mankind, muſt take place in greater. The provinces of the Roman empire, no doubt, kept their balance with each other, and with Italy, independent of the legiſlature; as much as the ſeveral counties of Great Britain, or the ſeveral pariſhes of each county. And any man who travels over Europe at this day, may ſee, by the prices of commodities, that money, in ſpite of the abſurd jealouſy of princes and ſtates, has brought itſelf nearly to a level; and that the difference between one kingdom and another is not greater in this reſpect, than it is often between different provinces of the ſame kingdom. Men naturally flock to capital cities, ſea-ports, and navigable rivers. There we find more men, more induſtry, more commodities, and conſequently more money; but ſtill the latter difference holds proportion with the former, and the level is preſerved [*].

Our jealouſy and our hatred of France are without bounds: and the former ſentiment, at leaſt, muſt be acknowledged reaſonable and well grounded. Theſe paſſions have occaſioned innumerable barriers and obſtructions upon commerce, where we are accuſed of being commonly the aggreſſors. But what have we gained by the bargain? We loſt the French market for our woollen manufactures, and transferred the commerce of wine to Spain and

[*] See NOTE [D].

Portugal, where we buy worſe liquor at a higher price There are few Engliſhmen who would not think their country abſolutely ruined, were French wines ſold in England ſo cheap and in ſuch abundance as to ſupplant, in ſome meaſure, all ale and homebrewed liquors: But would we lay aſide prejudice, it would not be difficult to prove, that nothing could be more innocent, perhaps advantageous. Each new acre of vineyard planted in France, in order to ſupply England with wine, would make it requiſite for the French to take the produce of an Engliſh acre, ſown in wheat or barley, in order to ſubſiſt themſelves; and it is evident, that we ſhould thereby get command of the better commodity.

There are many edicts of the French king, prohibiting the planting of new vineyards, and ordering all thoſe which are lately planted to be grubbed up: So ſenſible are they, in that country, of the ſuperior value of corn above every other product.

Mareſchal Vauban complains often, and with reaſon, of the abſurd duties which load the entry of thoſe wines of Languedoc, Guienne, and other ſouthern provinces, that are imported into Brittany and Normandy. He entertained no doubt but theſe latter provinces could preſerve their balance, notwithſtanding the open commerce which he recommends. And it is evident, that a few leagues more navigation to England would make no difference; or if it did, that it muſt operate alike on the commodities of both kingdoms.

There is indeed one expedient by which it is poſſible to ſink, and another by which we may raiſe, money beyond its natural level in any kingdom; but theſe caſes, when examined, will be found to reſolve into our general theory, and to bring additional authority to it.

I ſcarcely know any method of ſinking money below its level, but thoſe inſtitutions of banks, funds, and paper-credit, which are ſo much practiſed in this kingdom. Theſe render paper equivalent to money, circulate it throughout the whole ſtate, make it ſupply the place of gold and ſilver, raiſe proportionably the price of labor and commodities, and by that means either baniſh a great part of thoſe precious metals, or prevent their farther increaſe. What can be more ſhort-ſighted than our reaſonings on this head? We fancy, becauſe an individual would be much richer, were his ſtock of money doubled, that the ſame good effect would follow were the money of every one increaſed; not conſidering that this would raiſe as much the price of every commodity, and reduce every man in time to the ſame condition as before. It is only in our public negociations and tranſactions with foreigners, that a greater ſtock of money is advantageous; and as our paper is there abſolutely inſignificant, we feel, by its means, all the ill effects ariſing from a great abundance of money, without reaping any of the advantages [5].

[5] We obſerved in Eſſay III. that money, when increaſing, gives encouragement to induſtry, during the interval between the increaſe of money and riſe of the prices. A good effect of this nature may follow too from paper-credit; but it is dangerous to precipitate matters, at the risk of loſing all by the failing of that credit, as muſt happen upon any violent ſhock in public affairs.

Suppoſe that there are 12 millions of paper which circulate in the kingdom as money (for we are not to imagine that all our enormous funds are employed in that ſhape), and ſuppoſe the real caſh of the kingdom to be 18 millions: Here is a ſtate which is found by experience to be able to hold a ſtock of 30 millions. I ſay, if it be able to hold it, it muſt of neceſſity have acquired it in gold and ſilver, had we not obſtructed the entrance of theſe metals by this new invention of paper. *Whence would it have acquired that ſum?* From all the kingdoms of the world. *But why?* Becauſe, if you remove theſe 12 millions, money in this ſtate is below its level, compared with our neighbours; and we muſt immediately draw from all of them, till we be full and faturated, ſo to ſpeak, and can hold no more. By our preſent politics we are as careful to ſtuff the nation with this fine commodity of bank-bills and chequer-notes, as if we were afraid of being overburdened with the precious metals.

It is not to be doubted, but the great plenty of bullion in France, is in a great meaſure owing to the want of paper-credit. The French have no banks: Merchants bills do not there circulate as with us: Uſury or lending on intereſt is not directly permitted; ſo that many have large ſums in their coffers: Great quantities of plate are uſed in private houſes; and all the churches are full of it. By this means, proviſions and labor ſtill remain cheaper among them, than in nations that are not half ſo rich in gold and ſilver. The advantages of this ſituation, in point of trade as well as in great public emergencies, are too evident to be diſputed.

The ſame faſhion a few years ago prevailed in Genoa, which ſtill has place in England and Holland, of uſing ſervices of China-ware inſtead of plate; but the ſenate, foreſeeing the conſequence, prohibited the uſe of that brittle commodity beyond a certain extent; while the uſe of ſilver-plate was left unlimited. And I ſuppoſe, in their late diſtreſſes, they felt the good effect of this ordinance. Our tax on plate is, perhaps, in this view, ſomewhat impolitic.

Before the introduction of paper money into our colonies, they had gold and ſilver ſufficient for their circulation. Since the introduction of that commodity, the leaſt inconveniency that has followed is the total baniſhment of the precious metals. And after the abolition of paper, can it be doubted but money will return, while theſe colonies poſſeſs manufactures and commodities, the only thing valuable in commerce, and for whoſe ſake alone all men deſire money?

What pity Lycurgus did not think of paper-credit, when he wanted to baniſh gold and ſilver from Sparta! It would have ſerved his purpoſe better than the lumps of iron he made uſe of as money; and would alſo have prevented more effectually all commerce with ſtrangers, as being of ſo much leſs real and intrinſic value.

It muſt, however, be confeſſed, that, as all theſe queſtions of trade and money are extremely complicated, there are certain lights in which this ſubject may be placed, ſo as to repreſent the advantages of paper-credit and banks to be ſuperior to their diſadvantages. That they baniſh ſpecie and

bullion from a ſtate is undoubtedly true; and whoever looks no farther than this circumſtance does well to condemn them; but ſpecie and bullion are not of ſo great conſequence as not to admit of a compenſation, and even an overbalance, from the increaſe of induſtry and of credit, which may be promoted by the right uſe of paper-money. It is well known of what advantage it is to a merchant to be able to diſcount his bills upon occaſion; and every thing that facilitates this ſpecies of traffic is favorable to the general commerce of a ſtate. But private bankers are enabled to give ſuch credit by the credit they receive from the depoſiting of money in their ſhops; and the bank of England in the ſame manner, from the liberty it has to iſſue its notes in all payments. There was an invention of this kind, which was fallen upon ſome years ago by the banks of Edinburgh; and which, as it is one of the moſt ingenious ideas that has been executed in commerce, has alſo been thought advantageous to Scotland. It is there called a Bank-Credit; and is of this nature. A man goes to the bank, and finds ſurety to the amount, we ſhall ſuppoſe, of a thouſand pounds. This money, or any part of it, he has the liberty of drawing out whenever he pleaſes, and he pays only the ordinary intereſt for it while it is in his hands. He may, when he pleaſes, repay any ſum, ſo ſmall as twenty pounds, and the intereſt is diſcounted from the very day of the repayment. The advantages reſulting from this contrivance are manifold. As a man may find ſurety nearly to the amount of his ſubſtance,

and his bank-credit is equivalent to ready money, a merchant does hereby in a manner coin his houſes, his houſehold-furniture, the goods in his warehouſe, the foreign debts due to him, his ſhips at ſea; and can, upon occaſion, employ them in all payments, as if they were the current money of the country. If a man borrow a thouſand pounds from a private hand, beſides that it is not always to be found when required, he pays intereſt for it, whether he be uſing it or not: His bank-credit coſts him nothing except during the very moment in which it is of ſervice to him: And this circumſtance is of equal advantage as if he had borrowed money at much lower intereſt. Merchants, likewiſe, from this invention, acquire a great facility in ſupporting each other's credit, which is a conſiderable ſecurity againſt bankruptcies. A man, when his own bank-credit is exhauſted, goes to any of his neighbours who is not in the ſame condition, and he gets the money, which he replaces at his convenience.

After this practice had taken place during ſome years at Edinburgh, ſeveral companies of merchants at Glaſgow carried the matter farther. They aſſociated themſelves into different banks, and iſſued notes ſo low as ten ſhillings, which they uſed in all payments for goods, manufactures, tradeſmen's labor of all kinds; and theſe notes, from the eſtabliſhed credit of the companies, paſſed as money in all payments throughout the country. By this means a ſtock of five thouſand pounds was able to perform the ſame operations as if it were ſix or ſeven; and

merchants were thereby enabled to trade to a greater extent, and to require leſs profit in all their tranſactions. But whatever other advantages reſult from theſe inventions, it muſt ſtill be allowed that, beſides giving too great facility to credit, which is dangerous, they baniſh the precious metals; and nothing can be a more evident proof of it, than a compariſon of the paſt and preſent condition of Scotland in that particular. It was found, upon the recoinage made after the Union, that there was near a million of ſpecie in that country: But notwithſtanding the great increaſe of riches, commerce, and manufactures of all kinds, it is thought that, even where there is no extraordinary drain made by England, the current ſpecie will not now amount to a third of that ſum.

But as our projects of paper-credit are almoſt the only expedient by which we can ſink money below its level; ſo, in my opinion, the only expedient by which we can raiſe money above it, is a practice which we ſhould all exclaim againſt as deſtructive, namely, the gathering of large ſums into a public treaſure, locking them up, and abſolutely preventing their circulation. The fluid, not communicating with the neighbouring element, may, by ſuch an artifice, be raiſed to what height we pleaſe. To prove this, we need only return to our firſt ſuppoſition, of annihilating the half or any part of our caſh; where we found, that the immediate conſequence of ſuch an event would be the attraction of an equal ſum from all the neighbouring kingdoms. Nor does there ſeem to be any neceſſary bounds ſet

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by the nature of things to this practice of hoarding. A ſmall city, like Geneva, continuing this policy for ages, might ingroſs nine-tenths of the money in Europe. There ſeems, indeed, in the nature of man, an invincible obſtacle to that immenſe growth of riches. A weak ſtate, with an enormous treaſure, will ſoon become a prey to ſome of its poorer, but more powerful, neighbours. A great ſtate would diſſipate its wealth in dangerous and ill-concerted projects; and probably deſtroy, with it, what is much more valuable, the induſtry, morals, and numbers of its people. The fluid, in this caſe, raiſed to too great a height, burſts and deſtroys the veſſel that contains it; and mixing itſelf with the ſurrounding element, ſoon falls to its proper level.

So little are we commonly acquainted with this principle, that though all hiſtorians agree in relating uniformly ſo recent an event, as the immenſe treaſure amaſſed by Harry VII. (which they make amount to 2,700,000 pounds), we rather reject their concurring teſtimony, than admit of a fact which agrees ſo ill with our inveterate prejudices. It is indeed probable, that this ſum might be three-fourths of all the money in England. But where is the difficulty in conceiving, that ſuch a ſum might be amaſſed in twenty years, by a cunning, rapacious, frugal, and almoſt abſolute monarch? Nor is it probable, that the diminution of circulating money was ever ſenſibly felt by the people, or ever did them any prejudice. The ſinking of the prices of all commodities would immediately replace it,

by giving England the advantage in its commerce with the neighbouring kingdoms.

Have we not an inſtance, in the ſmall republic of Athens with is allies, who, in about fifty years, between the Median and Peloponneſian wars, amaſſed a ſum not much inferior to that of Harry VII? For all the Greek hiſtorians [6] and orators [7] agree, that the Athenians collected in the citadel more than 10,000 talents, which they afterwards diſſipated to their own ruin, in raſh and imprudent enterpriſes. But when this money was ſet a running, and began to communicate with the ſurrounding fluid; what was the conſequence? Did it remain in the ſtate? No. For we find, by the memorable *cenſus* mentioned by Demoſthenes [8] and Polybius [9], that in about fifty years afterwards, the whole value of the republic, comprehending lands, houſes, commodities, ſlaves, and money, was leſs than 6000 talents.

What an ambitious, high-ſpirited people was this, to collect and keep in their treaſury, with a view to conqueſts, a ſum, which it was every day in the power of the citizens, by a ſingle vote, to diſtribute among themſelves, and which would have gone near to triple the riches of every individual! For we muſt obſerve, that the numbers and private riches of the Athenians are ſaid, by ancient writers, to have been no greater at the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, than at the beginning of the Macedonian.

Money was little more plentiful in Greece during the age of Philip and Perſeus, than in England

[6] Thucydides, lib. ii. and Diod. Sic. lib. xii.

[7] *Vid.* Æſchinis *et* Demoſthenis *Epiſt.*

[8] Περι Συμμοριας.

[9] Lib. ii. cap. 62.

during that of Harry VII: Yet theſe two monarchs in thirty years [10] collected from the ſmall kingdom of Macedon, a larger treaſure than that of the Engliſh monarch. Paulus Æmilius brought to Rome about 1,700,000 pounds ſterling [11]: Pliny ſays 2,400,000 [12]. And that was but a part of the Macedonian treaſure. The reſt was diſſipated by the reſiſtance and flight of Perſeus [13].

We may learn from Stanian, that the canton of Bern had 300,000 pounds lent at intereſt, and had above ſix times as much in their treaſury. Here then is a ſum hoarded of 1,800,000 pounds *Sterling*, which is at leaſt quadruple what ſhould naturally circulate in ſuch a petty ſtate; and yet no one, who travels in the Païs de Vaux, or any part of that canton, obſerves any want of money more than could be ſuppoſed in a country of that extent, ſoil, and ſituation. On the contrary, there are ſcarce any inland-provinces in the continent of France or Germany, where the inhabitants are at this time ſo opulent, though that canton has vaſtly increaſed its treaſure ſince 1714, the time when Stanian wrote his judicious account of Switzerland [14].

The account given by Appian [15] of the treaſure of

[10] Titi Livii, lib. xiv. cap. 40. [11] Vel. Paterc. lib. i. cap. 9.

[12] Lib. xxxiii. cap. 3. [13] Titi Livii, *ibid.*

[14] The poverty which Stanian ſpeaks of, is only to be ſeen in the moſt mountainous cantons, where there is no commodity to bring money. And even there the people are not poorer than in the dioceſe of Saltsburgh on the one hand, or Savoy on the other.

[15] *Proem.*

the Ptolemies, is ſo prodigious, that one cannot admit of it; and ſo much the leſs, becauſe the hiſtorian ſays, that the other ſucceſſors of Alexander were alſo frugal, and had many of them treaſures not much inferior. For this ſaving humor of the neighbouring princes muſt neceſſarily have checked the frugality of the Egyptian monarchs, according to the foregoing theory. The ſum he mentions is 740,000 talents, or 191,166,666 pounds 13 ſhil. and 4 pence, according to Dr. Arbuthnot's computation. And yet Appian ſays, that he extracted his account from the public records; and he was himſelf a native of Alexandria.

From theſe principles we may learn what judgement we ought to form of thoſe numberleſs bars, obſtructions, and impoſts, which all nations of Europe, and none more than England, have put upon trade; from an exorbitant deſire of amaſſing money, which never will heap up beyond its level, while it circulates; or from an ill-grounded apprehenſion of loſing their ſpecie, which never will ſink below it. Could any thing ſcatter our riches, it would be ſuch impolitic contrivances. But this general, ill effect, however, reſults from them, that they deprive neighbouring nations of that free communication and exchange which the Author of the world has intended, by giving them ſoils, climates, and geniuſes, ſo different from each other.

Our modern politics embrace the only method of baniſhing money, the uſing of paper-credit; they reject the only method of amaſſing it, the practice

of hoarding; and they adopt a hundred contrivances which ſerve to no purpoſe but to check induſtry, and rob ourſelves and our neighbours of the common benefits of art and nature.

All taxes, however, upon foreign commodities, are not to be regarded as prejudicial or uſeleſs, but thoſe only which are founded on the jealouſy above-mentioned. A tax on German linen encourages home-manufactures, and thereby multiplies our people and induſtry. A tax on brandy increaſes the ſale of rum, and ſupports our ſouthern colonies. And as it is neceſſary that impoſts ſhould be levied for the ſupport of government, it may be thought more convenient to lay them on foreign commodities, which can eaſily be intercepted at the port, and ſubjected to the impoſt. We ought, however, always to remember the maxim of Dr. Swift, That, in the arithmetic of the cuſtoms, two and two make not four, but often make only one. It can ſcarcely be doubted, but if the duties on wine were lowered to a third, they would yield much more to the government than at preſent: Our people might thereby afford to drink commonly a better and more wholeſome liquor; and no prejudice would enſue to the balance of trade, of which we are ſo jealous. The manufacture of ale beyond the agriculture is but inconſiderable, and gives employment to few hands. The tranſport of wine and corn would not be much inferior.

But are there not frequent inſtances, you will ſay, of ſtates and kingdoms which were formerly rich and opulent, and are now poor and beggarly? Has not

the money left them, with which they formerly abounded? I anſwer, If they loſe their trade, induſtry, and people, they cannot expect to keep their gold and ſilver: for theſe precious metals will hold proportion to the former advantages. When Liſbon and Amſterdam got the Eaſt-India trade from Venice and Genoa, they alſo got the profits and money which aroſe from it. Where the ſeat of government is tranſferred, where expenſive armies are maintained at a diſtance, where great funds are poſſeſſed by foreigners; there naturally follows from theſe cauſes a diminution of the ſpecie. But theſe, we may obſerve, are violent and forcible methods of carrying away money, and are in time commonly attended with the tranſport of people and induſtry: But where theſe remain, and the drain is not continued, the money always finds its way back again, by a hundred canals, of which we have no notion or ſuſpicion. What immenſe treaſures have been ſpent, by ſo many nations, in Flanders, ſince the revolution, in the courſe of three long wars? More money perhaps than the half of what is at preſent in Europe: But what has now become of it? Is it in the narrow compaſs of the Auſtrian provinces? No, ſurely: It is moſt of it returned to the ſeveral countries whence it came, and has followed that art and induſtry, by which at firſt it was acquired. For above a thouſand years, the money of Europe has been flowing to Rome, by an open and ſenſible current; but it has been emptied by many ſecret and inſenſible canals: And the want of induſtry and commerce renders at preſent the papal dominions the pooreſt territory in all Italy.

In ſhort, a government has great reaſon to preſerve with care its people and its manufactures. Its money, it may ſafely truſt to the courſe of human affairs, without fear or jealouſy. Or if it ever give attention to this latter circumſtance, it ought only to be ſo far as it affects the former.

ESSAY VI.

OF THE JEALOUSY OF TRADE.

HAVING endeavoured to remove one ſpecies of ill-founded jealouſy, which is ſo prevalent among commercial nations, it may not be amiſs to mention another, which ſeems equally groundleſs. Nothing is more uſual among ſtates which have made ſome advances in commerce, than to look on the progreſs of their neighbours with a ſuſpicious eye, to conſider all trading ſtates as their rivals, and to ſuppoſe that it is impoſſible for any of them to flouriſh, but at their expenſe. In oppoſition to this narrow and malignant opinion, I will venture to aſſert, that the increaſe of riches and commerce in any one nation, inſtead of hurting, commonly promotes the riches and commerce of all its neighbours; and that a ſtate can ſcarcely carry its trade and induſtry very far, where all the ſurrounding ſtates are buried in ignorance, ſloth, and barbariſm.

It is obvious, that the domeſtic induſtry of a people cannot be hurt by the greateſt proſperity of their neighbours; and as this branch of commerce is

undoubtedly the moſt important in any extenſive kingdom, we are ſo far removed from all reaſon of jealouſy. But I go farther, and obſerve, that where an open communication is preſerved among nations, it is impoſſible but the domeſtic induſtry of every one muſt receive an increaſe from the improvements of the others. Compare the ſituation of Great Britain at preſent with what it was two centuries ago. All the arts both of agriculture and manufactures were then extremely rude and imperfect. Every improvement, which we have ſince made, has ariſen from our imitation of foreigners; and we ought ſo far to eſteem it happy, that they had previouſly made advances in arts and ingenuity. But this intercourſe is ſtill upheld to our great advantage: notwithſtanding the advanced ſtate of our manufactures, we daily adopt, in every art, the inventions and improvements of our neighbours. The commodity is firſt imported from abroad, to our great diſcontent, while we imagine that it drains us of our money: Afterwards, the art itſelf is gradually imported, to our viſible advantage: yet we continue ſtill to repine, that our neighbours ſhould poſſeſs any art, induſtry, and invention; forgetting that, had they not firſt inſtructed us, we ſhould have been at preſent barbarians; and did they not ſtill continue their inſtructions, the arts muſt fall into a ſtate of languor, and loſe that emulation and novelty which contribute ſo much to their advancement.

The increaſe of domeſtic induſtry lays the foundation of foreign commerce. Where a great number of commodities are raiſed and perfected for the

home-market, there will always be found ſome which can be exported with advantage. But if our neighbours have no art or cultivation, they cannot take them; becauſe they will have nothing to give in exchange. In this reſpect, ſtates are in the ſame condition as individuals. A ſingle man can ſcarcely be induſtrious, where all his fellow-citizens are idle. The riches of the ſeveral members of a community contribute to increaſe my riches, whatever profeſſion I may follow. They conſume the produce of my induſtry, and afford me the produce of theirs in return.

Nor needs any ſtate entertain apprehenſions, that their neighbours will improve to ſuch a degree in every art and manufacture, as to have no demand from them. Nature, by giving a diverſity of geniuſes, climates, and ſoils, to different nations, has ſecured their mutual intercourſe and commerce, as long as they all remain induſtrious and civilized. Nay, the more the arts increaſe in any ſtate, the more will be its demands from its induſtrious neighbours. The inhabitants, having become opulent and ſkilful, deſire to have every commodity in the utmoſt perfection; and as they have plenty of commodities to give in exchange, they make large importations from every foreign country. The induſtry of the nations, from whom they import, receives encouragement: Their own is alſo increaſed, by the ſale of the commodities which they give in exchange.

But what if a nation has any ſtaple commodity, ſuch as the woollen manufacture is in England? Muſt not the interfering of our neighbours in that

manufacture be a loſs to us? I anſwer, that when any commodity is denominated the ſtaple of a kingdom, it is ſuppoſed that this kingdom has ſome peculiar and natural advantages for raiſing the commodity; and if, notwithſtanding theſe advantages, they loſe ſuch a manufacture, they ought to blame their own idleneſs, or bad government, not the induſtry of their neighbours. It ought alſo to be conſidered, that by the increaſe of induſtry among the neighbouring nations, the conſumption of every particular ſpecies of commodity is alſo increaſed; and though foreign manufactures interfere with them in the market, the demand for their product may ſtill continue, or even increaſe; and ſhould it diminiſh, ought the conſequence to be eſteemed ſo fatal? If the ſpirit of induſtry be preſerved, it may eaſily be diverted from one branch to another; and the manufactures of wool, for inſtance, be employed in linen, ſilk, iron, or any other commodities, for which there appears to be a demand. We need not apprehend, that all the objects of induſtry will be exhauſted, or that our manufacturers, while they remain on an equal footing with thoſe of our neighbours, will be in danger of wanting employment. The emulation among rival nations ſerves rather to keep induſtry alive in all of them; and any people is happier who poſſeſs a variety of manufactures, than if they enjoyed one ſingle great manufacture, in which they are all employed. Their ſituation is leſs precarious; and they will feel leſs ſenſibly thoſe revolutions and uncertainties, to which every particular branch of commerce will always be expoſed.

The only commercial ſtate that ought to dread the improvements and induſtry of their neighbours, is ſuch a one as the Dutch, who, enjoying no extent of land, nor poſſeſſing any number of native commodities, flouriſh only by their being the brokers, and factors, and carriers, of others. Such a people may naturally apprehend, that as ſoon as the neighbouring ſtates come to know and purſue their intereſt, they will take into their own hands the management of their affairs, and deprive their brokers of that profit which they formerly reaped from it. But though this conſequence may naturally be dreaded, it is very long before it takes place; and by art and induſtry it may be warded off for many generations, if not wholly eluded. The advantage of ſuperior ſtocks and correſpondence is ſo great, that it is not eaſily overcome; and as all the tranſactions increaſe by the increaſe of induſtry in the neighbouring ſtates, even a people whoſe commerce ſtands on this precarious baſis, may at firſt reap a conſiderable profit from the flouriſhing condition of their neighbours. The Dutch, having mortgaged all their revenues, make not ſuch a figure in political tranſactions as formerly; but their commerce is ſurely equal to what it was in the middle of the laſt century, when they were reckoned among the great powers of Europe.

Were our narrow and malignant politics to meet with ſucceſs, we ſhould reduce all our neighbouring nations to the ſame ſtate of ſloth and ignorance that prevails in Morocco and the coaſt of Barbary: But what would be the conſequence? They could ſend us no commodities: They could take none

from us: Our domeſtic commerce itſelf would languiſh for want of emulation, example, and inſtruction; and we ourſelves ſhould ſoon fall into the ſame abject condition to which we had reduced them. I ſhall therefore venture to acknowledge, that, not only as a man, but as a Britiſh ſubject, I pray for the flouriſhing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy, and even France itſelf. I am at leaſt certain, that Great Britain, and all thoſe nations, would flouriſh more, did their ſovereigns and miniſters adopt ſuch enlarged and benevolent ſentiments towards each other.

ESSAY VII.

OF THE BALANCE OF POWER.

IT is a queſtion, whether the *idea* of the balance of power be owing entirely to modern policy, or whether the *phraſe* only has been invented in theſe latter ages. It is certain that Xenophon[1], in his inſtitution of Cyrus, repreſents the combination of the Aſiatic powers to have ariſen from a jealouſy of the increaſing force of the Medes and Perſians; and though that elegant compoſition ſhould be ſuppoſed altogether a romance, this ſentiment, aſcribed by the author to the eaſtern princes, is at leaſt a proof of the prevailing notion of ancient times.

In all the politics of Greece, the anxiety, with regard to the balance of power, is apparent, and is expreſsly pointed out to us, even by the ancient

[1] Lib. i.

hiſtorians. Thucydides [2] repreſents the league, which was formed againſt Athens, and which produced the Peloponneſian war as entirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of Athens, when the Thebans and Lacedemonians diſputed for ſovereignty, we find, that the Athenians (as well as many other republics) always threw themſelves into the lighter ſcale, and endeavoured to preſerve the balance. They ſupported Thebes againſt Sparta, till the great victory gained by Epaminondas at Leuctra; after which they immediately went over to the conquered, from generoſity, as they pretended, but in reality from their jealouſy of the conquerors [3].

Whoever will read Demoſthenes's oration for the Megalopolitans, may ſee the utmoſt refinements on this principle, that ever entered into the head of a Venetian or Engliſh ſpeculiſt. And upon the firſt riſe of the Macedonian power, this orator immediately diſcovered the danger, ſounded the alarm throughout all Greece, and at laſt aſſembled that confederacy under the banners of Athens, which fought the great and deciſive battle of Chæronea.

It is true, the Grecian wars are regarded by hiſtorians as wars of emulation rather than of politics; and each ſtate ſeems to have had more in view the honor of leading the reſt, than any well-grounded hopes of authority and dominion. If we conſider, indeed, the ſmall number of inhabitants in any

[2] Lib. i.
[3] Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. lib. vi. & vii.

one republic, compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming ſieges in thoſe times, and the extraordinary bravery and diſcipline of every freeman among that noble people; we ſhall conclude, that the balance of power was, of itſelf, ſufficiently ſecured in Greece, and needed not to have been guarded with that caution which may be requiſite in other ages. But whether we aſcribe the ſhifting of ſides in all the Great republics to *jealous emulation* or *cautious politics*, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was ſure to meet with a confederacy againſt it, and that often compoſed of its former friends and allies.

The ſame principle, call it envy or prudence, which produced the *Oſtraciſm* of Athens, and *Petaliſm* of Syracuſe, and expelled every citizen whoſe fame or power overtopped the reſt; the ſame principle, I ſay, naturally diſcovered itſelf in foreign politics, and ſoon raiſed enemies to the leading ſtate, however moderate in the exerciſe of its authority.

The Perſian monarch was really in his force a petty prince compared to the Grecian republics; and therefore it behoved him, from views of ſafety more than from emulation, to intereſt himſelf in their quarrels, and to ſupport the weaker ſide in every conteſt. This was the advice given by Alcibiades to Tiſſaphernes [4], and it prolonged, near a century the date of the Perſian empire; till the neglect of it for a moment, after the firſt

[4] Thucyd. lib. viii.

appearance of the aſpiring genius of Philip, brought that lofty and frail edifice to the ground, with a rapidity of which there are few inſtances in the hiſtory of mankind.

The ſucceſſors of Alexander ſhowed great jealouſy of the balance of power; a jealouſy founded on true politics and prudence, and which preſerved diſtinct for ſeveral ages the partition made after the death of that famous conqueror. The fortune and ambition of Antigonus[5] threatened them anew with a univerſal monarchy; but their combination, and their victory at Ipſus ſaved them. And in ſubſequent times, we find, that as the Eaſtern princes conſidered the Greeks and Macedonians as the only real military force with whom they had any intercourſe, they kept always a watchful eye over that part of the world. The Ptolemies, in particular, ſupported firſt Aratus and the Acheans, and then Cleomenes king of Sparta, from no other view than as a counterbalance to the Macedonian monarchs. For this is the account which Polybius gives of the Egyptian politics[6].

The reaſon, why it is ſuppoſed that the ancients were entirely ignorant of the *balance of power*, ſeems to be drawn from the Roman hiſtory more than the Grecian; and as the tranſactions of the former are generally more familiar to us, we have thence formed all our concluſions. It muſt be owned, that the Romans never met with any ſuch

[5] Diod. Sic. lib. xx. [6] Lib. ii. cap. 51.

general combination or confederacy againſt them, as might naturally have been expected from their rapid conqueſts and declared ambition; but were allowed peaceably to ſubdue their neighbours, one after another, till they extended their dominion over the whole known world. Not to mention the fabulous hiſtory of their Italic wars; there was, upon Hannibal's invaſion of the Roman ſtate, a remarkable criſis, which ought to have called up the attention of all civilized nations. It appeared afterwards (nor was it difficult to be obſerved at the time)[7] that this was a conteſt for univerſal empire; yet no prince or ſtate ſeems to have been in the leaſt alarmed about the event or iſſue of the quarrel. Philip of Macedon remained neuter till he ſaw the victories of Hannibal; and then moſt imprudently formed an alliance with the conqueror, upon terms ſtill more imprudent. He ſtipulated, that he was to aſſiſt the Carthaginian ſtate in their conqueſt of Italy: after which they engaged to ſend over forces into Greece, to aſſiſt him in ſubduing the Grecian commonwealths[8].

The Rhodian and Achaean republics are much celebrated by ancient hiſtorians for their wiſdom and ſound policy; yet both of them aſſiſted the Romans in their wars againſt Philip and Antiochus. And what may be eſteemed ſtill a ſtronger proof,

[7] It was obſerved by ſome, as appears by the ſpeech of Ageſilaus of Naupactum, in the general congreſs of Greece. See Polyb. lib. v. cap. 104.

[8] Titi Livii, lib. xxiii. cap. 33.

that

that this maxim was not generally known in thoſe ages; no ancient author has remarked the imprudence of theſe meaſures, nor has even blamed that abſurd treaty above-mentioned, made by Philip with the Carthaginians. Princes and ſtateſmen, in all ages, may, before-hand, be blinded in their reaſonings with regard to events; but it is ſomewhat extraordinary, that hiſtorians, afterwards, ſhould not form a ſounder judgment of them.

Maſſiniſſa, Attalus, Pruſias, in gratifying their private paſſions, were, all of them, the inſtruments of the Roman greatneſs; and never ſeem to have ſuſpected, that they were forging their own chains, while they advanced the conqueſts of their ally. A ſimple treaty and agreement between Maſſiniſſa and the Carthaginians, ſo much required by mutual intereſt, barred the Romans from all entrance into Africa, and preſerved liberty to mankind.

The only prince we meet with in the Roman hiſtory, who ſeems to have underſtood the balance of power, is Hiero king of Syracuſe. Though the ally of Rome, he ſent aſſiſtance to the Carthaginians during the war of the auxiliaries; "Eſteeming "it requiſite," ſays Polybius', "both in order to "retain his dominions in Sicily, and to preſerve "the Roman friendſhip, that Carthage ſhould "be ſafe; leſt by its fall the remaining power "ſhould be able, without contraſt or oppoſition, "to execute every purpoſe and undertaking. And

' Lib. i. cap. 83.

Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München

" here he acted with great wisdom and prudence;
" For that is never, on any account, to be over-
" looked; nor ought such a force ever to be
" thrown into one hand, as to incapacitate the
" neighbouring states from defending their rights
" against it." Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express terms.

In short, the maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, so many marks of deep penetration and discernment. If it was not so generally known and acknowledged as at present, it had, at least, an influence on all the wiser and more experienced princes and politicians. And indeed, even at present, however generally known and acknowledged among speculative reasoners, it has not, in practice, an authority much more extensive among those who govern the world.

After the fall of the Roman empire, the form of government, established by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great measure, for farther conquests, and long maintained each state in its proper boundaries. But when vassalage and the feudal militia were abolished, mankind were anew alarmed by the danger of universal monarchy, from the union of so many kingdoms and principalities in the person of the Emperor Charles. But the power of the house of Austria, founded on extensive but divided dominions, and their riches derived chiefly from mines of gold

and ſilver, were more likely to decay, of themſelves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raiſed againſt them. In leſs than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was ſhattered, their opulence diſſipated their ſplendor eclipſed. A new power ſucceeded, more formidable to the liberties of Europe, poſſeſſing all the advantages of the former; and laboring under none of its defects, except a ſhare of that ſpirit of bigotry and perſecution, with which the houſe of Auſtria was ſo long, and ſtill is ſo much, infatuated.

In the general wars maintained againſt this ambitious power, Great Britain has ſtood foremoſt; and ſhe ſtill maintains her ſtation. Beſide her advantages of riches and ſituation, her people are animated with ſuch a national ſpirit, and are ſo fully ſenſible of the bleſſings of their government, that we may hope their vigor never will languiſh in ſo neceſſary and ſo juſt a cauſe. On the contrary, if we may judge by the paſt, their paſſionate ardor ſeems rather to require ſome moderation; and they have oftener erred from a laudable exceſs than from a blamable deficiency.

In the *firſt* place, we ſeem to have been more poſſeſſed with the ancient Greek ſpirit of jealous emulation, than actuated by the prudent views of modern politics. Our wars with France have been begun with juſtice, and even, perhaps, from neceſſity; but have always been too far puſhed from obſtinacy and paſſion. The ſame peace, which was afterwards made at Ryſwick in 1697,

was offered ſo early as the year ninety-two; that concluded at Utrecht in 1712 might have been finiſhed on as good conditions at Gertruytenberg in the year eight; and we might have given at Frankfort, in 1743, the ſame terms which we were glad to accept of at Aix-la-Chapelle in the year forty-eight. Here then we ſee, that above half of our wars with France, and all our public debts, are owing more to our own imprudent vehemence, than to the ambition of our neighbours.

In the *ſecond* place, we are ſo declared in our oppoſition to French power, and ſo alert in defence of our allies, that they always reckon upon our force as upon their own: and expecting to carry on war at our expenſe, refuſe all reaſonable terms of accommodation. *Habent ſubjectos, tanquam ſuos; viles, ut alienos.* All the world knows, that the factious vote of the Houſe of Commons, in the beginning of the laſt parliament, with the profeſſed humor of the nation, made the Queen of Hungary inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with Pruſſia, which would immediately have reſtored the general tranquillity of Europe.

In the *third* place, we are ſuch true combatants, that, when once engaged, we loſe all concern for ourſelves and our poſterity, and conſider only, how we may beſt annoy the enemy. To mortgage our revenues at ſo deep a rate, in wars, where we were only acceſſaries, was ſurely the moſt fatal deluſion that a nation, which had any pretenſion to politics and prudence, has ever yet been guilty of. That

remedy of funding, if it be a remedy, and not rather a poiſon, ought in all reaſon, to be reſerved to the laſt extremity; and no evil, but the greateſt and moſt urgent, ſhould ever induce us to embrace ſo dangerous an expedient.

Theſe exceſſes, to which we have been carried, are prejudicial; and may, perhaps, in time, become ſtill more prejudicial another way, by begetting, as is uſual, the oppoſite extreme, and rendering us totally careleſs and ſupine with regard to the fate of Europe. The Athenians, from the moſt buſtling, intriguing, warlike people of Greece, finding their error in thruſting themſelves into every quarrel, abandoned all attention to foreign affairs; and in no conteſt ever took part on either ſide, except by their flatteries and complaiſance to the victor.

Enormous monarchies are, probably, deſtructive to human nature; in their progreſs, in their continuance [10], and even in their downfal, which never can be very diſtant from their eſtabliſhment. The military genius, which aggrandized the monarchy, ſoon leaves the court, the capital, and the centre of ſuch a government; while the wars are carried on at a great diſtance, and intereſt ſo ſmall a part of the ſtate. The ancient nobility, whoſe affections attach them to their ſovereign, live all at court; and never will accept of military employments, which would carry them to remote and

[10] If the Roman empire was of advantage, it could only proceed from this, that mankind were generally in a very diſorderly, uncivilized condition, before its eſtabliſhment.

barbarous frontiers, where they are distant both from their pleasures and their fortune. The arms of the state must, therefore, be intrusted to mercenary stangers, without zeal, without attachment, without honor; ready on every occasion to turn them against the prince, and join each desperate malecontent, who offers pay and plunder. This is the necessary progress of human affairs: Thus human nature checks itself in its airy elevation: Thus ambition blindly labors for the destruction of the conqueror, of his family, and of every thing near and dear to him. The Bourbons, trusting to the support of their brave, faithful, and affectionate nobility, would push their advantage, without reserve or limitation. These, while fired with glory and emulation, can bear the fatigues and dangers of war; but never would submit to languish in the garrisons of Hungary or Lithuania, forgot at court, and sacrificed to the intrigues of every minion or mistress who approaches the prince. The troops are filled with Cravates and Tartars, Hussars and Cossacs; intermingled, perhaps, with a few soldiers of fortune from the better provinces: And the melancholy fate of the Roman emperors, from the same cause, is renewed over and over again, till the final dissolution of the monarchy.

ESSAY VIII.

OF TAXES.

THERE is a prevailing maxim among ſome reaſoners, *that every new tax creates a new ability in the ſubject to beat it, and that each increaſe of public burdens increaſes proportionably the induſtry of the people.* This maxim is of ſuch a nature as is moſt likely to be abuſed; and is ſo much the more dangerous, as its truth cannot be altogether denied: but it muſt be owned, when kept within certain bounds, to have ſome foundation in reaſon and experience.

When a tax is laid upon commodities, which are conſumed by the common people, the neceſſary conſequence may ſeem to be, either that the poor muſt retrench ſomething from their way of living, or raiſe their wages, ſo as to make the burden of the tax fall entirely upon the rich. But there is a third conſequence, which often follows upon taxes, namely, that the poor increaſe their induſtry, perform more work, and live as well as before, without demanding more for their labor. Where taxes are moderate, are laid on gradually, and affect not the neceſſaries of life, this conſequence naturally follows; and it is certain, that ſuch difficulties often ſerve to excite the induſtry of a people, and render them more opulent and laborious, than others who enjoy the greateſt advantages. For we may obſerve, as a parallel inſtance, that the moſt commercial nations have

not always poſſeſſed the greateſt extent of fertile land; but, on the contrary, that they have labored under many natural diſadvantages. Tyre, Athens, Carthage, Rhodes, Genoa, Venice, Holland, are ſtrong examples to this purpoſe. And in all hiſtory, we find only three inſtances of large and fertile countries, which have poſſeſſed much trade; the Netherlands, England and France. The two former ſeem to have been allured by the advantages of their maritime ſituation, and the neceſſity they lay under of frequenting foreign ports, in order to procure what their own climate refuſed them. And as to France, trade has come late into that kingdom, and ſeems to have been the effect of reflection and obſervation in an ingenious and enterpriſing people, who remarked the riches acquired by ſuch of the neighbouring nations as cultivated navigation and commerce.

The places mentioned by Cicero[1], as poſſeſſed of the greateſt commerce in his time, are Alexandria, Colchus, Tyre, Sidon, Andros, Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, Leſbos, Smirna, Miletum, Coos. All theſe, except Alexandria, were either ſmall iſlands or narrow territories. And that city owed its trade entirely to the happineſs of its ſituation.

Since therefore ſome natural neceſſities or diſadvantages may be thought favorable to induſtry, why may not artificial burdens have the ſame effect? Sir William Temple[2], we may obſerve,

[1] Epiſt. ad Att. lib. ix. ep. 11.
[2] Account of the Netherlands, chap. 6.

aſcribes the induſtry of the Dutch entirely to neceſſity, proceeding from their natural diſadvantages; and illuſtrates his doctrine by a ſtriking compariſon with Ireland; "where," ſays he, "by "the largeneſs and plenty of the ſoil, and ſcarcity "of people, all things neceſſary to life are ſo "cheap, that an induſtrious man, by two days "labor, may gain enough to feed him the reſt "of the week. Which I take to be a very plain "ground of the lazineſs attributed to the people. "For men naturally prefer eaſe before labor, and "will not take pains if they can live idle; though "when, by neceſſity, they have been inured to "it, they cannot leave it, being grown a cuſtom "neceſſary to their health, and to their very "entertainment. Nor perhaps is the change "harder, from conſtant eaſe to labor, than from "conſtant labor to eaſe." After which the author proceeds to confirm his doctrine, by enumerating, as above, the places where trade has moſt flouriſhed, in ancient and modern times; and which are commonly obſerved to be ſuch narrow confined territories, as beget a neceſſity for induſtry.

The beſt taxes are ſuch as are levied upon conſumption, eſpecially thoſe of luxury; becauſe ſuch taxes are leaſt felt by the people. They ſeem, in ſome meaſure, voluntary; ſince a man may chuſe how far he will uſe the commodity which is taxed: They are paid gradually and inſenſibly: they naturally produce ſobriety and frugality, if judiciouſly impoſed: And being confounded with the natural

price of the commodity, they are ſcarcely perceived by the conſumers. Their only diſadvantage is, that they are expenſive in the levying.

Taxes upon poſſeſſions are levied without expenſe; but have every other diſadvantage. Moſt ſtates, however, are obliged to have recourſe to them, in order to ſupply the deficiencies of the other.

But the moſt pernicious of all taxes are the arbitrary. They are commonly converted, by their management, into puniſhments on induſtry; and alſo, by their unavoidable inequality, are more grievous, than by the real burden which they impoſe. It is ſurpriſing, therefore, to ſee them have place among any civilized people.

In general, all poll-taxes, even when not arbitrary, which they commonly are, may be eſteemed dangerous: Becauſe it is ſo eaſy for the ſovereign to add a little more, and a little more, to the ſum demanded, that theſe taxes are apt to become altogether oppreſſive and intolerable. On the other hand, a duty upon commodities checks itſelf; and a prince will ſoon find, that an increaſe of the impoſt is no increaſe of his revenue. It is not eaſy, therefore, for a people to be altogether ruined by ſuch taxes.

Hiſtorians inform us, that one of the chief cauſes of the deſtruction of the Roman ſtate, was the alteration which Conſtantine introduced into the finances, by ſubſtituting an univerſal poll-tax, in lieu of almoſt all the tithes, cuſtoms, and exciſes, which formerly compoſed the revenue of the *empire*. The people, in all the provinces, were ſo grinded

and oppreſſed by the *publicans*, that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians; whoſe dominion, as they had fewer neceſſities and leſs art, was found preferable to the refined tyranny of the Romans.

It is an opinion, zealouſly promoted by ſome political writers, that, ſince all taxes, as they pretend, fall ultimately upon land, it were better to lay them originally there, and aboliſh every duty upon conſumptions. But it is denied, that all taxes fall ultimately upon land. If a duty be laid upon any commodity, conſumed by an artiſan, he has two obvious expedients for paying it; he may retrench ſomewhat of his expenſe, or he may increaſe his labor. Both theſe reſources are more eaſy and natural, than that of heightening his wages. We ſee, that, in years of ſcarcity, the weaver either conſumes leſs or labors more, or employs both theſe expedients of frugality and induſtry, by which he is enabled to reach the end of the year. Is is but juſt that he ſhould ſubject himſelf to the ſame hardſhips, if they deſerve the name, for the ſake of the public, which gives him protection. By what contrivance can he raiſe the price of his labor? The manufacturer who employs him will not give him more: Neither can he; becauſe the merchant, who exports the cloth, cannot raiſe its price, being limited by the price which it yields in foreign markets. Every man, to be ſure, is deſirous of puſhing off from himſelf the burden of any tax which is impoſed, and of laying it upon others: But as every man has the ſame inclination, and is upon the defenſive; no ſet of men can

be ſuppoſed to prevail altogether iu this conteſt: and why the landed gentleman ſhould be the victim of the whole, and ſhould not be able to defend himſelf, as well as others are, I cannot readily imagine. All tradeſmen, indeed, would willingly prey upon him, and divide him among them, if they could: But this inclination they always have, though no taxes were levied; and the ſame methods, by which he guards againſt the impoſition of tradeſmen before taxes, will ſerve him afterwards; and make them ſhare the burden with him. They muſt be very heavy taxes, indeed, and very injudiciouſly levied, which the artiſan will not of himſelf be enabled to pay, by ſuperior induſtry and frugality, without raiſing the price of his labor.

I ſhall conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that we have, with regard to taxes, an inſtance of what frequently happens in political inſtitutions, that the conſequences of things are diametrically oppoſite to what we ſhould expect on the firſt appearance. It is regarded as a fundamental maxim of the Turkiſh government, that the *Grand Signior*, though abſolute maſter of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impoſe a new tax; and every Ottoman prince, who has made ſuch an attempt, either has been obliged to retract, or has found the fatal effects of his perſeverance. One would imagine, that this prejudice or eſtabliſhed opinion were the firmeſt barrier in the world againſt oppreſſion; yet it is certain, that its effect is quite contrary. The emperor, having no regular method of increaſing his revenue, muſt allow all the baſhaws and governors

to oppreſs and abuſe the ſubjects; and theſe he ſqueezes after their return from their government. Whereas, if he could impoſe a new tax, like our European princes, his intereſt would ſo far be united with that of his people, that he would immediately feel the bad effects of theſe diſorderly levies of money; and would find, that a pound, raiſed by a general impoſition, would have leſs pernicious effects, than a ſhilling taken in ſo unequal and arbitrary a manner.

ESSAY IX.

OF PUBLIC CREDIT.

IT appears to have been the common practice of antiquity, to make proviſion, during peace, for the neceſſities of war, and to hoard up treaſures beforehand, as the inſtruments either of conqueſt or defence; without truſting to extraordinary impoſitions, much leſs to borrowing, in times of diſorder and confuſion. Beſides the immenſe ſums above mentioned [1], which were amaſſed by Athens, and by the Ptolemies, and other ſucceſſors of Alexander; we learn from Plato [2], that the frugal Lacedemonians had alſo collected a great treaſure; and Arrian [3] and Plutarch [4] take notice of the riches which Alexander

[1] Eſſay V. [2] Alcib. 1. [3] Lib. 3.

[4] Plut. *in vita* Alex. He makes theſe treaſures amount to 80,000 talents, or about 15 millions Sterl. Quintus Curtius (lib. v. cap. 2.) ſays, that Alexander found in Suſa above 50,000 talents.

got poſſeſſion of on the conqueſt of Suſa and Ecbatana, and which were reſerved, ſome of them, from the time of Cyrus. If I remember right, the ſcripture alſo mentions the treaſure of Hezekiah and the Jewiſh princes; as profane hiſtory does that of Philip and Perſeus, kings of Macedon. The ancient republics of Gaul had commonly large ſums in reſerve [5]. Every one knows the treaſure ſeized in Rome by Julius Cæſar, during the civil wars; and we find afterwards, that the wiſer emperors, Auguſtus, Tiberius, Veſpaſian, Severus, &c. always diſcovered the prudent foreſight of ſaving great ſums againſt any public exigency.

On the contrary, our modern expedient, which has become very general, is to mortgage the public revenues, and to truſt that poſterity will pay off the incumbrances contracted by their anceſtors: and they, having before their eyes ſo good an example of their wiſe fathers, have the ſame prudent reliance on *their* poſterity; who at laſt, from neceſſity more than choice, are obliged to place the ſame confidence in a new poſterity. But not to waſte time in declaiming againſt a practice which appears ruinous beyond all controverſy, it ſeems pretty apparent, that the ancient maxims are, in this reſpect, more prudent than the modern; even though the latter had been confined within ſome reaſonable bounds, and had ever, in any inſtance, been attended with ſuch frugality, in time of peace, as to diſcharge the debts incurred by an expenſive war. For why ſhould the caſe be ſo

[5] Strabo, lib. iv.

different between the public and an individual, as to make us eſtabliſh different maxims of conduct for each? If the funds of the former be greater, its neceſſary expenſes are proportionably larger; if its reſources be more numerous, they are not infinite; and as its frame ſhould be calculated for a much longer duration than the date of a ſingle life, or even of a family, it ſhould embrace maxims, large, durable, and generous, agreeably to the ſuppoſed extent of its exiſtence. To truſt to chances and temporary expedients, is, indeed, what the neceſſity of human affairs frequently renders unavoidable; but whoever voluntarily depend on ſuch reſources, have not neceſſity, but their own folly, to accuſe for their misfortunes, when any ſuch befal them.

If the abuſes of treaſures be dangerous, either by engaging the ſtate in raſh enterpriſes, or making it neglect military diſcipline, in confidence of its riches; the abuſes of mortgaging are more certain and inevitable; poverty, impotence, and ſubjection to foreign powers.

According to modern policy, war is attended with every deſtructive circumſtance; loſs of men, increaſe of taxes, decay of commerce, diſſipation of money, devaſtation by ſea and land. According to ancient maxims, the opening of the public treaſure, as it produced an uncommon affluence of gold and ſilver, ſerved as a temporary encouragement to induſtry, and attoned, in ſome degree, for the inevitable calamities of war.

It is very tempting to a miniſter to employ ſuch an expedient, as enables him to make a great figure

during his adminiſtration, without overburdening the people with taxes, or exciting any immediate clamors againſt himſelf. The practice, therefore, of contracting debt, will almoſt infallibly be abuſed in every government. It would ſcarcely be more imprudent to give a prodigal ſon a credit in every banker's ſhop in London, than to empower a ſtateſman to draw bills, in this manner, upon poſterity.

What then ſhall we ſay to the new paradox, that public incumbrances are of themſelves advantageous, independent of the neceſſity of contracting them; and that any ſtate, even though it were not preſſed by a foreign enemy, could not poſſibly have embraced a wiſer expedient for promoting commerce and riches, than to create funds, and debts, and taxes, without limitation? Reaſonings, ſuch as theſe, might naturally have paſſed for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like the panegyrics on ſolly and a fever, on Buſiris and Nero, had we not ſeen ſuch abſurd maxims patronized by great miniſters, and by a whole party among us.

Let us examine the conſequences of public debts, both in our domeſtic management, by their influence on commerce and induſtry; and in our foreign tranſactions, by their effect on wars and negociations.

Public ſecurities are with us become a kind of money, and paſs as readily at the current price as gold or ſilver. Wherever any profitable undertaking offers itſelf, how expenſive ſoever, there are never wanting hands enow to embrace it: nor need a trader, who has ſums in the public ſtocks, fear to launch out into the moſt extenſive trade; ſince he

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is poſſeſſed of funds which will anſwer the moſt ſudden demand that can be made upon him. No merchant thinks it neceſſary to keep by him any conſiderable caſh. Bank-ſtock, or India-bonds, eſpecially the latter, ſerve all the ſame purpoſes; becauſe he can diſpoſe of them, or pledge them to a banker, in a quarter of an hour; and at the ſame time they are not idle, even when in his eſcritoir, but bring him in a conſtant revenue. In ſhort, our national debts furniſh merchants with a ſpecies of money, that is continually multiplying in their hands, and produces ſure gain, beſides the profits of their commerce. This muſt enable them to trade upon leſs profit. The ſmall profit of the merchant renders the commodity cheaper, cauſes a greater conſumption, quickens the labor of the common people, and helps to ſpread arts and induſtry throughout the whole ſociety.

There are alſo, we may obſerve, in England, and in all ſtates, which have both commerce and public debts, a ſet of men, who are half merchants, half ſtock-holders, and may be ſuppoſed willing to trade for ſmall profits; becauſe commerce is not their principal or ſole ſupport, and their revenues in the funds are a ſure reſource for themſelves and their families. Were there no funds, great merchants would have no expedient for realizing or ſecuring any part of their profit, but by making purchaſes of land; and land has many diſadvantages in compariſon of funds. Requiring more care and inſpection, it divides the time and attention of the merchant; upon any tempting offer or extraordinary accident in trade, it is not ſo eaſily converted into money; and as it attracts too

much, both by the many natural pleaſures it affords, and the authority it gives, it ſoon converts the citizen into the country-gentleman. More men, therefore, with large ſtocks and incomes, may naturally be ſuppoſed to continue in trade, where there are public debts; and this, it muſt be owned, is of ſome advantage to commerce, by diminiſhing its profits promoting circulation, and encouraging induſtry.

But, in oppoſition to theſe two favorable circumſtances, perhaps of no very great importance, weigh the many diſadvantages which attend our public debts, in the whole *interior* economy of the ſtate; you will find no compariſon between the ill and the good which reſult from them.

Firſt, It is certain, that national debts cauſe a mighty confluence of people and riches to the capital, by the great ſums levied in the provinces to pay the intereſt; and perhaps, too, by the advantages in trade above mentioned, which they give the merchants in the capital above the reſt of the kingdom. The queſtion is, whether, in our caſe, it be for the public intereſt, that ſo many privileges ſhould be conferred on London, which has already arrived at ſuch an enormous ſize, and ſeems ſtill increaſing? Some men are apprehenſive of the conſequences. For my own part, I cannot forbear thinking, that, though the head is undoubtedly too large for the body, yet that great city is ſo happily ſituated; that its exceſſive bulk cauſes leſs inconvenience than even a ſmaller capital to a greater kingdom. There is more difference between the prices of all proviſions in Paris and Languedoc, than between thoſe in London and

Yorkſhire. The immenſe greatneſs, indeed, of London, under a government which admits not of diſcretionary power, renders the people factious, mutinous, ſeditious, and even perhaps rebellious. But to this evil, the national debts themſelves tend to provide a remedy. The firſt viſible eruption, or even immediate danger of public diſorders, muſt alarm all the ſtock-holders, whoſe property is the moſt precarious of any; and will make them fly to the ſupport of government, whether menaced by Jacobitiſh violence or democratical frenzy.

Secondly, Public ſtocks, being a kind of paper-credit, have all the diſadvantages attending that ſpecies of money. They baniſh gold and ſilver from the moſt conſiderable commerce of the ſtate, reduce them to common circulation, and by that means render all proviſions and labor dearer than otherwiſe they would be.

Thirdly, The taxes, which are levied to pay the intereſts of theſe debts, are apt either to heighten the price of labor, or be an oppreſſion on the poorer ſort.

Fourthly, As foreigners poſſeſs a great ſhare of our national funds, they render the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occaſion the tranſport of our people and our induſtry.

Fifthly, The greater part of the public ſtock being always in the hands of idle people, who live on their revenue, our funds, in that view, give great encouragement to an uſeleſs and inactive life.

But though the injury that ariſes to commerce and induſtry from our public funds, will appear upon

balancing the whole, not inconſiderable, it is trivial in compariſon of the prejudice that reſults to the ſtate conſidered as a body politic, which muſt ſupport itſelf in the ſociety of nations, and have various tranſactions with other ſtates in wars and negociations. The ill there is pure and unmixed, without any favorable circumſtance to atone for it; and it is an ill too of a nature the higheſt and moſt important.

We have, indeed, been told, that the public is no weaker upon account of its debts, ſince they are moſtly due among ourſelves, and bring as much property to one as they take from another. It is like transferring money from the right hand to the left, which leaves the perſon neither richer nor poorer than before. Such looſe reaſonings and ſpecious compariſons will always paſs, where we judge not upon principles. I aſk, Is it poſſible, in the nature of things, to overburden a nation with taxes, even where the ſovereign reſides among them? The very doubt ſeems extravagant; ſince it is requiſite, in every community, that there be a certain proportion obſerved between the laborious and the idle part of it. But if all our preſent taxes be mortgaged, muſt we not invent new ones? And may not this matter be carried to a length that is ruinous and deſtructive?

In every nation, there are always ſome methods of levying money more eaſy than others, agreeably to the way of living of the people, and the commodities they make uſe of. In Great Britain, the exciſes upon malt and beer afford a large revenue, becauſe the operations of malting and brewing are tedious, and are impoſſible to be concealed; and at the ſame

time, theſe commodities are not ſo abſolutely neceſſary to life, as that the raiſing of their price would very much affect the poorer ſort. Theſe taxes being all mortgaged, what difficulty to find new ones! what vexation and ruin of the poor!

Duties upon conſumptions are more equal and eaſy than thoſe upon poſſeſſions. What a loſs to the public, that the former are all exhauſted, and that we muſt have recourſe to the more grievous method of levying taxes!

Were all the proprietors of land only ſtewards to the public, muſt not neceſſity force them to practiſe all the arts of oppreſſion uſed by ſtewards; where the abſence or negligence of the proprietor render them ſecure againſt inquiry?

It will ſcarcely be aſſerted, that no bounds ought ever to be ſet to national debts; and that the public would be no weaker, were twelve or fifteen ſhillings in the pound, land-tax, mortgaged, with all the preſent cuſtoms and exciſes. There is ſomething, therefore, in the caſe, beſide the mere transferring of property from the one hand to another. In 500 years, the poſterity of thoſe now in the coaches, and of thoſe upon the boxes, will probably have changed places, without affecting the public by theſe revolutions.

Suppoſe the public once fairly brought to that condition, to which it is haſtening with ſuch amazing rapidity; ſuppoſe the land to be taxed eighteen or nineteen ſhillings in the pound; for it can never bear the whole twenty; ſuppoſe all the exciſes and cuſtoms to be ſcrewed up to the utmoſt which the nation can bear, without entirely loſing its commerce

and induſtry; and ſuppoſe that all thoſe funds armortgaged to perpetuity, and that the invention and wit of all our projectors can find no new impoſition, which may ſerve as the foundation of a new loan; and let us conſider the neceſſary conſequences of this ſituation. Though the imperfect ſtate of our political knowledge, and the narrow capacities of men, make it difficult to foretel the effects which will reſult from any untried meaſure, the ſeeds of ruin are here ſcattered with ſuch profuſion as not to eſcape the eye of the moſt careleſs obſerver.

In this unnatural ſtate of ſociety, the only perſons, who poſſeſs any revenue beyond the immediate effects of their induſtry, are the ſtock-holders, who draw almoſt all the rent of the land and houſes, beſides the produce of all the cuſtoms and exciſes. These are men, who have no connexions with the ſtate, who can enjoy their revenue in any part of the globe in which they chuſe to reſide, who will naturally bury themſelves in the capital, or in great cities; and who will ſink into the lethargy of a ſtupid and pampered luxury, without ſpirit, ambition, or enjoyment. Adieu to all ideas of nobility, gentry, and family. The ſtocks can be transferred in an inſtant; and being in ſuch a fluctuating ſtate, will ſeldom be tranſmitted during three generations from father to ſon. Or were they to remain ever ſo long in one family, they convey no hereditary authority or credit to the poſſeſſor; and by this means, the ſeveral ranks of men, which form a kind of independent magiſtracy in a ſtate, inſtituted by the hand of nature, are entirely loſt; and every man in authority derives his influence from

the commiſſion alone of the ſovereign. No expedient remains for preventing or ſuppreſſing inſurrections, but mercenary armies: No expedient at all remains for reſiſting tyranny: Elections are ſwayed by bribery and corruption alone: And the middle power between king and people being totally removed, a grievous deſpotiſm muſt infallibly prevail. The landholders, deſpiſed for their poverty, and hated for their oppreſſions, will be utterly unable to make any oppoſition to it.

Though a reſolution ſhould be formed by the legiſlature never to impoſe any tax which hurts commerce and diſcourages induſtry, it will be impoſſible for men, in ſubjects of ſuch extreme delicacy, to reaſon ſo juſtly as never to be miſtaken; or amidſt difficulties ſo urgent, never to be ſeduced from their reſolution. The continual fluctuations in commerce require continual alterations in the nature of the taxes, which expoſes the legiſlature every moment to the danger both of wilful and involuntary error. And any great blow given to trade, whether by injudicious taxes, or by other accidents, throws the whole ſyſtem of government into confuſion.

But what expedient can the public now employ, even ſuppoſing trade to continue in the moſt flouriſhing condition, in order to ſupport its foreign wars and enterpriſes, and to defend its own honor and intereſt, or thoſe of its allies? I do not aſk how the public is to exert ſuch a prodigious power as it has maintained during our late wars, where we have ſo much exceeded, not only our own natural ſtrength, but even that of the greateſt empires. This

extravagance is the abuſe complained of as the ſource of all the dangers to which we are at preſent expoſed. But ſince we muſt ſuppoſe great commerce and opulence to remain, even after every fund is mortgaged, theſe riches muſt be defended by proportional power; and whence is the public to derive the revenue which ſupports it? It muſt plainly be from a continual taxation of the annuitants, or which is the ſame thing, from mortgaging anew, on every exigency, a certain part of their annuities; and thus making them contribute to their own defence, and to that of the nation. But the difficulties attending this ſyſtem of policy, will eaſily appear, whether we ſuppoſe the king to have become abſolute maſter, or to be ſtill controlled by national councils, in which the annuitants themſelves muſt neceſſarily bear the principal ſway.

If the prince has become abſolute, as may naturally be expected from this ſituation of affairs, it is ſo eaſy for him to increaſe his exactions upon the annuitants, which amount only to the retaining money in his own hands, that this ſpecies of property would ſoon loſe all its credit, and the whole income of every individual in the ſtate muſt lie entirely at the mercy of the ſovereign: A degree of deſpotiſm which no oriental monarchy has ever yet attained. If, on the contrary, the conſent of the annuitants be requiſite for every taxation, they will never be perſuaded to contribute ſufficiently even to the ſupport of government; as the diminution of their revenue muſt in that caſe be very ſenſible, would not be diſguiſed under the appearance of a branch of exciſe or cuſtoms, and would not be

ſhared by any other order of the ſtate, who are already ſuppoſed to be taxed to the utmoſt. There are inſtances, in ſome republics, of a hundredth penny, and ſometimes of the fiftieth, being given to the ſupport of the ſtate: but this is always an extraordinary exertion of power, and can never become the foundation of a conſtant national defence. We have always found, where a government has mortgaged all its revenues, that it neceſſarily ſinks into a ſtate of languor, inactivity, and impotence.

Such are the inconveniences, which may reaſonably be foreſeen, of this ſituation, to which Great-Britain is viſibly tending. Not to mention the numberleſs inconveniences which cannot be foreſeen, and which muſt reſult from ſo monſtrous a ſituation as that of making the public the chief or ſole proprietor of land, beſides inveſting it with every branch of cuſtoms and exciſe, which the fertile imagination of miniſters and projectors have been able to invent.

I muſt confeſs, that there is a ſtrange ſupineneſs, from long cuſtom, creeped into all ranks of men, with regard to public debts, not unlike what divines ſo vehemently complain of with regard to their religious doctrines. We all own, that the moſt ſanguine imagination cannot hope either that this, or any future miniſtry, will be poſſeſſed of ſuch rigid and ſteady frugality, as to makea conſiderable progreſs in the payment of our debts; or that the ſituation of foreign affairs will, for any long time, allow them leiſure and tranquillity for ſuch an undertaking. *What then is to become of us?* Were we ever ſo good Chriſtians, and

ever ſo reſigned to Providence, this, methinks, were a curious queſtion even conſidered as a ſpeculative one, and what it might not be altogether impoſſible to form ſome conjectural ſolution of. The events here will depend little upon the contingencies of battles, negociations, intrigues, and factions. There ſeems to be a natural progreſs of things, which may guide our reaſoning. As it would have required but a moderate ſhare of prudence, when we firſt began this practice of mortgaging, to have foretold, from the nature of men and of miniſters, that things would neceſſarily be carried to the length we ſee; ſo now, that they have at laſt happily reached it, it may not be difficult to gueſs at the conſequences. It muſt, indeed, be one of theſe two events; either the nation muſt deſtroy public credit, or public credit will deſtroy the nation. It is impoſſible that they can both ſubſiſt, after the manner they have hitherto been managed, in this, as well as in ſome other countries.

There was, indeed, a ſcheme for the payment of our debts, which was propoſed by an excellent citizen, Mr. Hutchinſon, above thirty years ago, and which was much approved of by ſome men of ſenſe, but never was likely to take effect. He aſſerted, that there was a fallacy in imagining that the public owed this debt; for that really every individual owed a proportional ſhare of it, and paid, in his taxes, a proportional ſhare of the intereſt, beſide the expenſe of levying theſe taxes. Had we not better, then, ſays he, make a diſtribution of the debt among ourſelves, and each of us contribute a ſum ſuitable to his property, and by that means diſcharge at once all our funds

and public mortgages? He ſeems not to have conſidered, that the laborious poor pay a conſiderable part of the taxes by their annual conſumptions, though they could not advance, at once, a proportional part of the ſum required. Not to mention, that property in money and ſtock in trade might eaſily be concealed or diſguiſed; and that viſible property in lands and houſes would really at laſt anſwer for the whole: An inequality and oppreſſion which never would be ſubmitted to. But though this project is not likely to take place, it is not altogether improbable, that, when the nation becomes heartily ſick of their debts, and is cruelly oppreſſed by them, ſome daring projector may ariſe with viſionary ſchemes for their diſcharge. And as public credit will begin, by that time, to be a little frail, the leaſt touch will deſtroy it, as happened in France during the regency; and in this manner it will *die of the doctor.*

But it is more probable, that the breach of national faith will be the neceſſary effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities, or even perhaps of victories and conqueſts. I muſt confeſs, when I ſee princes and ſtates fighting and quarrelling amidſt their debts, funds, and public mortgages, it always brings to my mind a match of cudgel-playing fought in a *China* ſhop. How can it be expected, that ſovereigns will ſpare a ſpecies of property, which is pernicious to themſelves and to the public, when they have ſo little compaſſion on lives and properties that are uſeful to both? Let the time come (and ſurely it will come) when the new funds, created for the exigencies of the year, are not ſubſcribed to, and raiſe not

the money projected. Suppoſe, either that the caſh of the nation is exhauſted; or that our faith, which has hitherto been ſo ample, begins to fail us. Suppoſe, that, in this diſtreſs, the nation is threatened with an invaſion; a rebellion is ſuſpected or broken out at home; a ſquadron cannot be equipped for want of pay, victuals, or repairs; or even a foreign ſubſidy cannot be advanced. What muſt a prince or miniſter do in ſuch an emergence? The right of ſelf-preſervation is unalienable in every individual, much more in every community: And the folly of our ſtateſmen muſt then be greater than the folly of thoſe who firſt contracted debt, or, what is more, than that of thoſe who truſted or continue to truſt this ſecurity, if theſe ſtateſmen have the means of ſafety in their hands, and do not employ them. The funds, created and mortgaged, will by that time bring in a large yearly revenue, ſufficient for the defence and ſecurity of the nation: Money is perhaps lying in the exchequer ready for the diſcharge of the quarterly intereſt: Neceſſity calls, fear urges, reaſon exhorts, compaſſion alone exclaims: The money will immediately be ſeized for the current ſervice, under the moſt ſolemn proteſtations, perhaps, of being immediately replaced: But no more is requiſite. The whole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thouſands in its ruins. And this, I think, may be called the *natural death* of public credit: For to this period it tends as naturally as an animal body to its diſſolution and deſtruction.

So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that, notwithſtanding ſuch a violent ſhock to public

credit, as a voluntary bankruptcy in England would occaſion, it would not probably be long ere credit would again revive in as flouriſhing a condition as before. The preſent king of France, during the late war, borrowed money at a lower intereſt than ever his grandfather did; and as low as the Britiſh parliament, comparing the natural rate of intereſt in both kingdoms. And though men are commonly more governed by what they have ſeen, than by what they foreſee, with whatever certainty; yet promiſes, proteſtations, fair appearances, with the allurements of preſent intereſt, have ſuch powerful influence as few are able to reſiſt. Mankind are, in all ages, caught by the ſame baits: The ſame tricks, played over and over again, ſtill trepan them. The heights of popularity and patriotiſm are ſtill the beaten road to power and tyranny; flattery to treachery; ſtanding armies to arbitrary government; and the glory of God to the temporal intereſt of the clergy. The fear of an everlaſting deſtruction of credit; allowing it to be an evil, is a needleſs bugbear. A prudent man in reality, would rather lend to the public immediately after we had taken a ſpunge to our debts than at preſent; as much as an opulent knave, even though one could not force him to pay, is a preferable debtor to an honeſt bankrupt: For the former, in order to carry on buſineſs, may find it his intereſt to diſcharge his debts, where they are not exorbitant; the latter has is not in his power. The reaſoning of Tacitus [a], as it is eternally true, is

[a] *Hiſt. lib.* iii.

very applicable to our preſent caſe. *Sed vulgus ad magnitudinem beneficiorum aderat; Stultiſſimus quiſque pecuniis mercabatur: Apud ſapientes caſſa habebantur, quæ neque dari neque accipi, ſalva republica, poterant.* The public is a debtor, whom no man can oblige to pay. The only check which the creditors have upon her, is the intereſt of preſerving credit; an intereſt which may eaſily be overbalanced by a great debt, and by a difficult and extraordinary emergence, even ſuppoſing that credit irrevocable. Not to mention, that a preſent neceſſity often forces ſtates into meaſures which are, ſtrictly ſpeaking, againſt their intereſt.

Theſe two events, ſuppoſed above, are calamitous, but not the moſt calamitous. Thouſands are thereby ſacrificed to the ſafety of millions: But we are not without danger, that the contrary event may take place, and that millions may be ſacrificed for ever to the temporary ſafety of thouſands [7]. Our popular government, perhaps, will render it difficult or dangerous for a miniſter to venture on ſo deſperate an expedient as that of a voluntary bankruptcy: And though the houſe of Lords be altogether compoſed of proprietors of land, and the houſe of Commons chiefly; and conſequently neither of them can be ſuppoſed to have great property in the funds; yet the connexions of the members may be ſo great with the proprietors, as to render them more tenacious of public faith, than prudence, policy, or even juſtice, ſtrictly ſpeaking, requires: And

[7] See NOTE [E].

perhaps too, our foreign enemies may be ſo politic as to diſcover, that our ſafety lies in deſpair, and may not, therefore, ſhow the danger, open and bare-faced, till it be inevitable. The balance of power in Europe, our grandfathers, our fathers, and we, have all deemed too unequal to be preſerved without our attention and aſſiſtance: But our children, weary of the ſtruggle, and fettered with incumbrances, may ſit down ſecure, and ſee their neighbours oppreſſed and conquered; till, at laſt, they themſelves and their creditors lie both at the mercy of the conqueror; and this may probably enough be denominated the *violent death* of our public credit.

Theſe ſeem to be the events which are not very remote, and which reaſon foreſees as clearly almoſt as ſhe can do any thing that lies in the womb of time. And though the ancients maintained, that, in order to reach the gift of prophecy, a certain divine fury or madneſs was requiſite, one may ſafely affirm, that, in order to deliver ſuch prophecies as theſe, no more is neceſſary than merely to be in one's ſenſes, free from the influence of popular madneſs and deluſion.

ESSAY X.

OF SOME REMARKABLE CUSTOMS.

I SHALL obſerve three remarkable cuſtoms in three celebrated governments; and ſhall conclude from the whole, that all general maxims in politics ought to be eſtabliſhed with great caution; and that irregular and extraordinary appearances are frequently diſcovered in the moral, as well as in the phyſical world. The former perhaps, we can better account for, after they happen, from ſprings and principles, of which every one has within himſelf, or from obſervation, the ſtrongeſt aſſurance and conviction: But it is often fully as impoſſible for human prudence, before-hand, to foreſee and foretel them.

I. One would think it eſſential to every ſupreme council or aſſembly, which debates, that entire liberty of ſpeech ſhould be granted to every member, and that all motions or reaſonings ſhould be received, which can any wiſe tend to illuſtrate the point under deliberation. One would conclude, with ſtill greater aſſurance, that, after a motion was made, which was voted and approved by that aſſembly in which the legiſlative power is lodged, the member who made the motion muſt for ever be exempted from future trial or inquiry. But no political maxim can, at firſt ſight, appear more indiſputable, than that he muſt, at leaſt, be ſecured from all inferior juriſdiction; and that nothing leſs than the ſame

ſupreme

ſupreme legiſlative aſſembly, in their ſubſequent meetings, could make him accountable for thoſe motions and harangues, to which they had before given their approbation. But theſe axioms, however irrefragable they may appear, have all failed in the Athenian government, from cauſes and principles too, which appear almoſt inevitable.

By the γραφη παρανομων, or *indictment of illegality*, (though it has not been remarked by antiquaries or commentators), any man was tried and puniſhed in a common court of judicature, for any law which had paſſed upon his motion in the aſſembly of the people, if that law appeared to the court unjuſt, or prejudicial to the public. Thus Demoſthenes, finding that ſhip-money was levied irregularly, and that the poor bore the ſame burden as the rich in equipping gallies, corrected this inequality by a very uſeful law, which proportioned the expenſe to the revenue and income of each individual. He moved for this law in the aſſembly; he proved its advantages [1]; he convinced the people, the only legiſlature in Athens; the law paſſed, and was carried into execution: Yet was he tried in a criminal court for that law, upon the complaint of the rich, who reſented the alteration that he had introduced into the finances [2]. He was indeed acquitted, upon proving anew the uſefulneſs of his law.

Cteſiphon moved in the aſſembly of the people, that particular honors ſhould be conferred on Demoſthenes, as on a citizen affectionate and uſeful to

[1] His harangue for it is ſtill extant; περι Συμμοριας.

[2] Pro Cteſiphonte.

the commonwealth: The people, convinced of this truth, voted thoſe honors: Yet was Cteſiphon tried by the γραφη παρανομων. It was aſſerted, among other topics, that Demoſthenes was not a good citizen, nor affectionate to the commonwealth: And the orator was called upon to defend his friend, and conſequently himſelf; which he executed by that ſublime piece of eloquence, that has ever ſince been the admiration of mankind.

After the battle of Chæronea, a law was paſſed upon the motion of Hyperides, giving liberty to ſlaves, and enrolling them in the troops [3]. On account of this law, the orator was afterwards tried by the indictment above mentioned, and defended himſelf, among other topics, by that ſtroke, celebrated by Plutarch and Longinus. *It was not I*, ſaid he, *that moved for this law: It was the neceſſities of war; it was the battle of* Chæronea. The orations of Demoſthenes abound with many inſtances of trials of this nature, and prove clearly, that nothing was more commonly practiſed.

The Athenian Democracy was ſuch a tumultuous government as we can ſcarcely form a notion of in the preſent age of the world. The whole collective body of the people voted in every law, without any limitation of property, without any diſtinction of rank, without control from any magiſtracy or

[3] Plutarchus *in vita decem oratorum.* Demoſthenes gives a different account of this law. *Contra* Ariſtogiton. *orat.* II. He ſays, that its purport was, to render the ατιμοι επιτιμοι, or to reſtore the privilege of bearing offices in thoſe who had been declared incapable. Perhaps theſe were both clauſes of the ſame law.

ſenate [4]; and conſequently without regard to order, juſtice, or prudence. The Athenians ſoon became ſenſible of the miſchiefs attending this conſtitution: But being averſe to checking themſelves by any rule or reſtriction, they reſolved, at leaſt, to check their demagogues or counſellors, by the fear of future puniſhment and inquiry. They accordingly inſtituted this remarkable law; a law eſteemed ſo eſſential to their form of government, that Æſchines inſiſts on it as a known truth, that, were it aboliſhed or neglected, it were impoſſible for the Democracy to ſubſiſt [5].

The people feared not any ill conſequence to liberty from the authority of the criminal courts; becauſe theſe were nothing but very numerous juries, choſen by lot from among the people. And they juſtly conſidered themſelves as in a ſtate of perpetual pupilage; where they had an authority, after they came to the uſe of reaſon, not only to retract and control whatever had been determined, but to puniſh any guardian for meaſures which they had embraced by his perſuaſion. The ſame law had place in Thebes [6]; and for the ſame reaſon.

[4] The ſenate of the Bean was only a leſs numerous mob, choſen by lot from among the people; and their authority was not great.

[5] In Cteſiphontem. It is remarkable, that the firſt ſtep after the diſſolution of the Democracy by Critias and the Thirty, was to annul the γραφη παρανομων, as we learn from Demoſthenes κατα Τιμοκ. The orator in this oration gives us the words of the law, eſtabliſhing the γραφη παρανομων, pag. 297. *ex edit.* Aldi. And he accounts for it, from the ſame principles we here reaſon upon.

[6] Plut. *in vita* Pelop.

It appears to have been a usual practice in Athens, on the establishment of any law esteemed very useful or popular, to prohibit for ever its abrogation and repeal. Thus the demagogue, who diverted all the public revenues to the support of shows and spectacles, made it criminal so much as to move for a repeal of this law [7]. Thus Leptines moved for a law, not only to recal all the immunities formerly granted, but to deprive the people for the future of the power of granting any more [8]. Thus all bills of attainder [9] were forbid, or laws that affected one Athenian, without extending to the whole commonwealth. These absurd clauses, by which the legislature vainly attempted to bind itself for ever, proceeded from an universal sense in the people of their own levity and inconstancy.

II. A wheel within a wheel, such as we observe in the German empire, is considered by Lord Shaftesbury [10] as an absurdity in politics: But what must we say to two equal wheels, which govern the same political machine, without any mutual check, control, or subordination; and yet preserve the greatest harmony and accord? To establish two distinct legislatures, each of which possesses full and absolute authority within itself, and stands in no need of the other's assistance, in order to give validity to its acts; this may appear before-hand altogether impracticable, as long as men are actuated by the passions of ambition, emulation, and avarice, which have

[7] Demost. *Olynth.* 1, 2.
[8] Demost. *contra* Lept.
[9] Demost. *contra* Aristocratem.
[10] Essay on the freedom of wit and humor, part 3. §. 2.

hitherto been their chief governing principles. And ſhould I aſſert, that the ſtate I have in my eye was divided into two diſtinct factions, each of which predominated in a diſtinct legiſlature, and yet produced no claſhing in theſe independent powers; the ſuppoſition may appear incredible. And if, to augment the paradox, I ſhould affirm, that this disjointed, irregular government was the moſt active, triumphant, and illuſtrious commonwealth, that ever yet appeared; I ſhould certainly be told, that ſuch a political chimera was as abſurd as any viſion of prieſts or poets. But there is no need for ſearching long, in order to prove the reality of the foregoing ſuppoſitions; for this was actually the caſe with the Roman republic.

The legiſlative power was there lodged in the *comitia centuriata* and *comitia tributa*. In the former, it is well known, the people voted according to their *cenſus*; ſo that when the firſt claſs was unanimous, though it contained not, perhaps, the hundredth part of the commonwealth, it determined the whole; and, with the authority of the ſenate, eſtabliſhed a law. In the latter, every vote was equal; and as the authority of the ſenate was not there requiſite, the lower people entirely prevailed, and gave law to the whole ſtate. In all party-diviſions, at firſt between the Patricians and Plebeians, afterwards between the nobles and the people, the intereſt of the Ariſtocracy was predominant in the firſt legiſlature; that of the Democracy in the ſecond: The one could always deſtroy what the other had eſtabliſhed: Nay, the

one, by a ſudden and unforeſeen motion, might take the ſtart of the other, and totally annihilate its rival, by a vote, which, from the nature of the conſtitution, had the full authority of a law. But no ſuch conteſt is obſerved in the hiſtory of Rome: No inſtance of a quarrel between the two legiſlatures; though many between the parties that governed in each. Whence aroſe this concord, which may ſeem ſo extraordinary?

The legiſlature eſtabliſhed in Rome, by the authority of Servius Tullius, was the *comitia centuriata*, which after the expulſion of the kings, rendered the government, for ſome time, very ariſtocratical. But the people, having numbers and force on their ſide, and being elated with frequent conqueſts and victories in their foreign wars, always prevailed when puſhed to extremity, and firſt extorted from the ſenate the magiſtracy of the tribunes, and next the legiſlative power of the *comitia tributa*. It then behoved the nobles to be more careful than ever not to provoke the people. For beſide the force which the latter were always poſſeſſed of, they had now got poſſeſſion of legal authority, and could inſtantly break in pieces any order or inſtitution which directly oppoſed them. By intrigue, by influence, by money, by combination, and by the reſpect paid to their characters, the nobles might often prevail, and direct the whole machine of government: But had they openly ſet their *comitia centuriata* in oppoſition to the *tributa*, they had ſoon loſt the advantage of that inſtitution, together with their conſuls, prætors, ediles,

and all the magiſtrates elected by it. But the *comitia tributa*, not having the ſame reaſon for reſpecting the *centuriata*, frequently repealed laws favorable to the Ariſtocracy: They limited the authority of the nobles, protected the people from oppreſſion, and controlled the actions of the ſenate and magiſtracy. The *centuriata* found it convenient always to ſubmit; and though equal in authority, yet being inferior in power, durſt never directly give any ſhock to the other legiſlature, either by repealing its laws, or eſtabliſhing laws which it foreſaw would ſoon be repealed by it.

No inſtance is found of any oppoſition or ſtruggle between theſe *comitia*, except one ſlight attempt of this kind mentioned by Appian in the third book of his civil wars. Mark Anthony, reſolving to deprive Decimus Brutus of the government of Ciſalpine Gaul, railed the *Forum*, and called one of the *comitia*, in order to prevent the meeting of the other, which had been ordered by the ſenate. But affairs were then fallen into ſuch confuſion, and the Roman conſtitution was ſo near its final diſſolution, that no inference can be drawn from ſuch an expedient. This conteſt, beſides, was founded more on form than party. It was the ſenate who ordered the *comitia tributa*, that they might obſtruct the meeting of the *centuriata*, which by the conſtitution, or at leaſt forms of the government, could alone diſpoſe of provinces.

Cicero was recalled by the *comitia centuriata*, though baniſhed by the *tributa*, that is, by a *plebiſcitum*. But his baniſhment, we may obſerve, never

was conſidered as a legal deed, ariſing from the free choice and inclination of the people. It was always aſcribed to the violence alone of Clodius, and to the diſorders introduced by him into the government.

III. The *third* cuſtom, which we purpoſe to remark, regards England; and though it be not ſo important as thoſe which we have pointed out in Athens and Rome, is no leſs ſingular and unexpected. It is a maxim in politics, which we readily admit as undiſputed and univerſal, that a power, however great, when granted by law to an eminent magiſtrate, is not ſo dangerous to liberty, as an authority, however inconſiderable, which he acquires from violence and uſurpation. For, beſides that the law always limits every power which it beſtows, the very receiving it as a conceſſion eſtabliſhes the authority whence it is derived, and preſerves the harmony of the conſtitution. By the ſame right that one prerogative is aſſumed without law, another may alſo be claimed, and another, with ſtill greater facility; while the firſt uſurpations both ſerve as precedents to the following, and give force to maintain them. Hence the heroiſm of Hampden's conduct, who ſuſtained the whole violence of royal proſecution, rather than pay a tax of twenty ſhillings not impoſed by parliament; hence the care of all Engliſh patriots to guard againſt the firſt encroachments of the crown; and hence alone the exiſtence, at this day, of Engliſh liberty.

There is, however, one occaſion, where the parliament has departed from this maxim; and that is, in the *preſſing of ſeamen.* The exerciſe of an irregular power is here tacitly permitted in the crown; and though it has frequently been under deliberation, how that power might be rendered legal, and granted, under proper reſtrictions, to the ſovereign, no ſafe expedient could ever be propoſed for that purpoſe; and the danger to liberty always appeared greater from law than from uſurpation. While this power is exerciſed to no other end than to man the navy, men willingly ſubmit to it, from a ſenſe of its uſe and neceſſity; and the ſailors, who are alone affected by it, find no body to ſupport them, in claiming the rights and privileges, which the law grants, without diſtinction, to all Engliſh ſubjects. But were this power, on any occaſion, made an inſtrument of faction or miniſterial tyranny, the oppoſite faction, and indeed all lovers of their country, would immediately take the alarm, and ſupport the injured party; the liberty of Engliſhmen would be aſſerted; juries would be implacable; and the tools of tyranny, acting both againſt law and equity, would meet with the ſevereſt vengeance. On the other hand, were the parliament to grant ſuch an authority, they would probably fall into one of theſe two inconveniences: They would either beſtow it under ſo many reſtrictions as would make it loſe its effect, by cramping the authority of the crown; or they would render it ſo large and comprehenſive, as might give occaſion to great abuſes, for which we could, in that caſe, have no

remedy. The very irregularity of the practice, at preſent, prevents its abuſes, by affording ſo eaſy a remedy againſt them.

I pretend not, by this reaſoning, to exclude all poſſibility of contriving a regiſter for ſeamen, which might man the navy, without being dangerous to liberty. I only obſerve, that no ſatisfactory ſcheme of that nature has yet been propoſed. Rather than adopt any project hitherto invented, we continue a practice ſeemingly the moſt abſurd and unaccountable. Authority, in times of full internal peace and concord, is armed againſt law. A continued violence is permitted in the crown, amidſt the greateſt jealouſy and watchfulneſs in the people; nay proceeding from thoſe very principles: Liberty, in a country of the higheſt liberty, is left entirely to its own defence, without any countenance or protection: The wild ſtate of nature is renewed, in one of the moſt civilized ſocieties of mankind: And great violence and diſorder are committed with impunity; while the one party pleads obedience to the ſupreme magiſtrate, the other, the ſanction of fundamental laws.

ESSAY XI.

OF THE POPULOUSNESS OF ANCIENT NATIONS.

THERE is very little ground, either from reaſon or obſervation, to conclude the world eternal or incorruptible. The continual and rapid motion of matter, the violent revolutions with which every part is agitated, the changes remarked in the heavens, the plain traces as well as tradition of an univerſal deluge, or general convulſion of the elements; all theſe prove ſtrongly the mortality of this fabric of the world, and its paſſage, by corruption or diſſolution, from one ſtate or order to another. It muſt therefore, as well as each individual form which it contains, have its infancy, youth, manhood, and old age; and it is probable, that, in all theſe variations, man, equally with every animal and vegetable, will partake. In the flouriſhing age of the world, it may be expected, that the human ſpecies ſhould poſſeſs greater vigor both of mind and body, more proſperous health, higher ſpirits, longer life, and a ſtronger inclination and power of generation. But if the general ſyſtem of things, and human ſociety of courſe, have any ſuch gradual revolutions, they are too ſlow to be diſcernible in that ſhort period which is comprehended by hiſtory and tradition. Stature and force of body, length of life, even courage and extent of genius, ſeem hitherto to have been naturally, in all ages, pretty much

the ſame. The arts and ſciences, indeed have flouriſhed in one period, and have decayed in another: But we may obſerve, that, at the time when they roſe to greateſt perfection among one people, they were perhaps totally unknown to all the neighbouring nations; and though they univerſally decayed in one age, yet in a ſucceeding generation they again revived, and diffuſed themſelves over the world. As far, therefore, as obſervation reaches, there is no univerſal difference diſcernible in the human ſpecies; and though it were allowed, that the univerſe, like an animal body, had a natural progreſs from infancy to old age; yet as it muſt ſtill be uncertain, whether, at preſent, it be advancing to its point of perfection, or declining from it, we cannot thence preſuppoſe any decay in human nature[1]. To prove, therefore, or account for that ſuperior populouſneſs of antiquity, which is commonly ſuppoſed, by the imaginary youth or vigor of the world, will ſcarcely be admitted by any juſt reaſoner. Theſe *general phyſical* cauſes ought entirely to be excluded from this queſtion.

There are indeed ſome more *particular phyſical* cauſes of importance. Diſeaſes are mentioned in antiquity, which are almoſt unknown to modern medicine; and new diſeaſes have ariſen and propagated themſelves, of which there are no traces in ancient hiſtory. In this particular we may obſerve, upon compariſon, that the diſadvantage is much on the ſide of the moderns. Not to mention ſome others of leſs moment; the ſmall-pox commits ſuch ravages, as would almoſt alone account for the great ſuperiority

[1] See NOTE [F].

aſcribed to ancient times. The tenth or the twelfth part of mankind, deſtroyed every generation, ſhould make a vaſt difference, it may be thought, in the numbers of the people; and when joined to venereal diſtempers, a new plague diffuſed every where, this diſeaſe is perhaps equivalent, by its conſtant operation, to the three great ſcourges of mankind, war, peſtilence, and famine. Were it certain, therefore, that ancient times were more populous than the preſent, and could no moral cauſes be aſſigned for ſo great a change; theſe phyſical cauſes alone, in the opinion of many, would be ſufficient to give us ſatisfaction on that head.

But is it certain, that antiquity was ſo much more populous, as is pretended? The extravagancies of Voſſius, with regard to this ſubject, are well known. But an author of much greater genius and diſcernment has ventured to affirm, that according to the beſt computations which theſe ſubjects will admit of, there are not now, on the face of the earth, the fiftieth part of mankind, which exiſted in the time of Julius Cæſar [2]. It may eaſily be obſerved, that the compariſon, in this caſe, muſt be imperfect, even though we confine ourſelves to the ſcene of ancient hiſtory; Europe, and the nations round the Mediterranean. We know not exactly the numbers of any European kingdom, or even city, at preſent: How can we pretend to calculate thoſe of ancient cities and ſtates, where hiſtorians have left us ſuch imperfect traces? For my part, the matter appears to me ſo uncertain, that, as I intend to throw together

[2] *Lettres* Perſanes. See alſo *L'Eſprit de Loix*, liv. xxiii. cap. 17, 18, 19.

ſome reflections on that head, I ſhall intermingle the inquiry concerning *cauſes* with that concerning *facts;* which ought never to be admitted, where the facts can be aſcertained with any tolerable aſſurance. We ſhall, *firſt*, conſider whether it be probable, from what we know of the ſituation of ſociety in both periods, that antiquity muſt have been more populous; *ſecondly*, whether in reality it was ſo. If I can make it appear, that the concluſion is not ſo certain as is pretended, in favor of antiquity, it is all I aſpire to.

In general, we may obſerve, that the queſtion, with regard to the comparative populouſneſs of ages or kingdoms, implies important conſequences, and commonly determines concerning the preference of their whole police, their manners, and the conſtitution of their government. For as there is in all men, both male and female, a deſire and power of generation, more active than is ever univerſally exerted, the reſtraints which they lie under, muſt proceed from ſome difficulties in their ſituation, which it belongs to a wiſe legiſlature carefully to obſerve and remove. Almoſt every man, who thinks he can maintain a family, will have one; and the human ſpecies at this rate of propagation, would more than double every generation. How faſt do mankind multiply in every colony or new ſettlement, where it is an eaſy matter to provide for a family; and where men are nowiſe ſtraitened or confined, as in long eſtabliſhed governments? Hiſtory tells us frequently of plagues, which have ſwept away the third or fourth part of a people: Yet in a generation or two, the deſtruction

was not perceived; and the ſociety had again acquired their former number. The lands were again cultivated, the houſes built, the commodities raiſed, the riches acquired, enabled the people, who eſcaped, immediately to marry, and to rear families, which ſupplied the place of thoſe who had periſhed [3]. And for a like reaſon, every wiſe, juſt, and mild government, by rendering the condition of its ſubjects eaſy and ſecure, will always abound moſt in people, as well as in commodities and riches. A country, indeed, whoſe climate and ſoil are fitted for vines, will naturally be more populous than one which produces corn only; and that more populous than one which is only fitted for paſturage. In general, warm climates, as the neceſſities of the inhabitants are fewer, and vegetation more powerful, are likely to be moſt populous: But if every thing elſe be equal, it ſeems natural to expect, that, wherever there are moſt happineſs and virtue, and the wiſeſt inſtitutions, there will alſo be moſt people.

The queſtion, therefore, concerning the populouſneſs of ancient and modern times, being allowed of great importance, it will be requiſite, if we would bring it to ſome determination, to compare both the *domeſtic* and *political* ſituation of theſe two periods,

[3] This too is a good reaſon why the ſmall-pox does not depopulate countries ſo much as may at firſt ſight be imagined. Where there is room for more people, they will always ariſe, even without the aſſiſtance of naturalization-bills. It is remarked by Don Geronimo de Uſtariz, that the provinces of Spain, which ſend moſt people to the Indies, are moſt populous; which proceeds from their ſuperior riches.

in order to judge of the facts by their moral cauſes; which is the *firſt* view in which we propoſed to conſider them.

The chief difference between the *domeſtic* economy of the ancients and that of the moderns conſiſts in the practice of ſlavery which prevailed among the former, and which has been aboliſhed for ſome centuries throughout the greater part of Europe. Some paſſionate admirers of the ancients, and zealous partiſans of civil liberty (for theſe ſentiments, as they are, both of them in the main, extremely juſt, are found to be almoſt inſeparable), cannot forbear regretting the loſs of this inſtitution; and whilſt they brand all ſubmiſſion to the government of a ſingle perſon with the harſh denomination of ſlavery, they would gladly reduce the greater part of mankind to real ſlavery and ſubjection: but to one who conſiders coolly on the ſubject, it will appear, that human nature, in general, really enjoys more liberty at preſent, in the moſt arbitrary government of Europe, than it ever did during the moſt flouriſhing period of ancient times. As much as ſubmiſſion to a petty prince, whoſe dominions extent not beyond a ſingle city, is more grievous than obedience to a great monarch; ſo much is domeſtic ſlavery more cruel and oppreſſive than any civil ſubjection whatſoever. The more the maſter is removed from us in place and rank, the greater liberty we enjoy; the leſs are our actions inſpected and controlled; and the fainter that cruel compariſon becomes between our own ſubjection, and the freedom, and even dominion of another. The remains which are found

of

of domeſtic ſlavery, in the American colonies, and among ſome European nations, would never ſurely create a deſire of rendering it more univerſal. The little humanity commonly obſerved in perſons accuſtomed, from their infancy, to exerciſe ſo great authority over their fellow-creatures, and to trample upon human nature, were ſufficient alone to diſguſt us with that unbounded dominion. Nor can a more probable reaſon be aſſigned for the ſevere, I might ſay, barbarous manners of ancient times, than the practice of domeſtic ſlavery; by which every man of rank was rendered a petty tyrant, and educated amidſt the flattery, ſubmiſſion, and low debaſement of his ſlaves.

According to ancient practice, all checks were on the inferior, to reſtrain him to the duty of ſubmiſſion; none on the ſuperior, to engage him to the reciprocal duties of gentleneſs and humanity. In modern times, a bad ſervant finds not eaſily a good maſter, nor a bad maſter a good ſervant; and the checks are mutual, ſuitably to the inviolable and eternal laws of reaſon and equity.

The cuſtom of expoſing old, uſeleſs, or ſick ſlaves in an iſland on the Tyber, there to ſtarve, ſeems to have been pretty common in Rome; and whoever recovered, after having been ſo expoſed, had his liberty given him by an edict of the emperor Claudius; in which it was likewiſe forbidden to kill any ſlave merely for old age or ſickneſs [4]: But ſuppoſing that this edict was ſtrictly obeyed, would it better the

[4] Suetonius in vita Claudii.

domeſtic treatment of ſlaves, or render their lives much more comfortable? We may imagine what others would practiſe, when it was the profeſſed maxim of the elder Cato, to ſell his ſuperannuated ſlaves for any price, rather than maintain what he eſteemed a uſeleſs burden [5].

The *ergaſtula*, or dungeons, where ſlaves in chains were forced to work, were very common all over Italy. Columella adviſes [6], that they be always built under ground; and recommends [7] it as the duty of a careful overſeer, to call over every day the names of theſe ſlaves, like the muſtering of a regiment or ſhip's company, in order to know preſently when any of them had deſerted. A proof of the frequency of theſe *ergaſtula*, and of the great number of ſlaves uſually confined in them.

A chained ſlave for a porter, was uſual in Rome, as appears from Ovid [8], and other authors [9]. Had not theſe people ſhaken off all ſenſe of compaſſion towards that unhappy part of their ſpecies, would they have preſented their friends, at the firſt entrance, with ſuch an image of the ſeverity of the maſter, and miſery of the ſlave?

Nothing ſo common in all trials, even of civil cauſes, as to call for the evidence of ſlaves; which was always extorted by the moſt exquiſite torments. Demoſthenes ſays [10], that, where it was poſſible to produce, for the ſame fact, either freemen or ſlaves

[5] Plut. in vita Catonis. [6] Lib. i. cap. 6.
[7] Id. lib. xi. cap. i. [8] Amor. lib. i. eleg. 6.
[9] Sueton. *de claris rhetor.* So alſo the ancient poet, *Janitoris tintinnire impedimenta audio.* [10] In *Oniterem orat.* 1.

as witneſſes, the judges always preferred the torturing of ſlaves as a more certain evidence [11].

Seneca draws a picture of that diſorderly luxury which changes day into night, and night into day, and inverts every ſtated hour of every office in life. Among other circumſtances, ſuch as diſplacing the meals and times of bathing; he mentions, that, regularly about the third hour of the night, the neighbours of one, who indulges this falſe refinement, hear the noiſe of whips and laſhes, and upon inquiry, find that he is then taking an account of the conduct of his ſervants, and giving them due correction and diſcipline. This is not remarked as an inſtance of cruelty, but only of diſorder, which, even in actions the moſt uſual and methodical, changes the fixed hours that an eſtabliſhed cuſtom had aſſigned for them [12].

But our preſent buſineſs is only to conſider the influence of ſlavery on the populouſneſs of a ſtate. It is pretended, that, in this particular, the ancient practice had infinitely the advantage, and was the chief cauſe of that extreme populouſneſs which is ſuppoſed in thoſe times. At preſent, all maſters diſcourage the marrying of their male-ſervants, and admit not by any means the marriage of the female, who are then ſuppoſed altogether incapacitated for their ſervice. But where the property of the ſervants is lodged in the maſter, their marriage forms his riches, and brings him a ſucceſſion of ſlaves that ſupply the place of thoſe

[11] The ſame practice was very common in Rome; but Cicero ſeems not to think this evidence ſo certain as the teſtimony of free citizens, *Pro Cælio.*

[12] See NOTE [G].

whom age and infirmity have disabled. He encourages, therefore, their propagation as much as that of his cattle; rears the young with the same care; and educates them to some art or calling, which may render them more useful or valuable to him. The opulent are, by this policy, interested in the being at least, though not in the well-being, of the poor; and enrich themselves, by increasing the number and industry of those who are subjected to them. Each man, being a sovereign in his own family, has the same interest with regard to it, as the prince with regard to the state; and has not, like the prince, any opposite motives of ambition or vain-glory, which may lead him to depopulate his little sovereignty. All of it is, at all times, under his eye; and he has leisure to inspect the most minute detail of the marriage and education of his subjects [13].

Such are the consequences of domestic slavery, according to the first aspect and appearance of things: But if we enter more deeply into the subject, we shall perhaps find reason to retract our hasty determinations. The comparison is shocking between the management of human creatures and that of cattle; but being extremely just, when applied to the present subject, it may be proper to trace the consequences

13 We may here observe, that if domestic slavery really increased populousness; it would be an exception to the general rule, that the happiness of any society and its populousness are necessary attendants. A master from humor or interest, may make his slaves very unhappy; yet be careful, from interest, to increase their number. Their marriage is not a matter of choice with them, more than any other action of their life.

of it. At the capital, near all great cities, in all populous, rich, induſtrious provinces, few cattle are bred. Proviſions, lodging, attendance, labor, are there dear: and men find their account better in buying the cattle, after they come to a certain age, from the remoter and cheaper countries. Theſe are conſequently the only breeding countries for cattle; and by a parity of reaſon, for men too, when the latter are put on the ſame footing with the former. To rear a child in London till he could be ſerviceable, would coſt much dearer, than to buy one of the ſame age from Scotland or Ireland, where he had been bred in a cottage, covered with rags, and fed on oat-meal or potatoes. Thoſe who had ſlaves, therefore, in all the richer and more populous countries, would diſcourage the pregnancy of the females, and either prevent or deſtroy the birth. The human ſpecies would periſh in thoſe places where it ought to increaſe the faſteſt; and a perpetual recruit be wanted from the poorer and more deſert provinces. Such a continued drain would tend mightily to depopulate the ſtate, and render great cities ten times more deſtructive than with us, where every man is maſter of himſelf; and provides for his children from the powerful inſtinct of nature, not the calculations of ſordid intereſt. If London, at preſent, without much increaſing, needs a yearly recruit from the country of 5000 people, as is uſually computed, what muſt it require, if the greater part of the tradeſmen and common people were ſlaves, and were hindered from breeding by their avaricious maſters?

All ancient authors tell us, that there was a perpetual flux of ſlaves to Italy from the remoter provinces, particularly Syria, Cilicia [14], Cappadocia, and the leſſer Aſia, Thrace, and Ægypt; Yet the number of people did not increaſe in Italy; and writers complain of the continual decay of induſtry and agriculture [15]. Where then is that extreme fertility of the Roman ſlaves, which is commonly ſuppoſed? So far from multiplying, they could not, it ſeems, ſo much as keep up the ſtock without immenſe recruits: And though great numbers were continually manumitted and converted into Roman citizens, the numbers even of theſe did not increaſe [16], till the freedom of the city was communicated to foreign provinces.

The term for a ſlave, born and bred in the family, was *verna* [17]; and theſe ſlaves ſeem to have been entitled by cuſtom to privileges and indulgences beyond others; a ſufficient reaſon why the maſters would not be fond of rearing many of that kind [18]. Whoever

[14] Ten thouſand ſlaves in a day have often been ſold for the uſe of the Romans at Delus in Cilicia. Strabo, lib. xiv.

[15] Columella, lib. i. *proœm.* et cap. 2. et 7. Varro, lib. iii. cap. i. Horat. lib. ii. od. 15. Tacit. *annal.* lib. iii. cap. 54. Sueton. *in vita* Aug. cap. xlii. Plin. lib. xviii. cap. 13.

[16] *Minore indies plebe ingenua*, ſays Tacitus, *ann.* lib. xiv. cap. 7.

[17] See Note [H].

[18] *Verna* is uſed by Roman writers as a word equivalent to *ſcurra*, on account of the petulance and impudence of thoſe ſlaves. Mart. lib. i. ep. 42. Horace alſo mentions the *vernæ procaces*; and Petronius, cap. 24. *vernula urbanitas.* Seneca, *de provid.* cap. 1. *vernularum licentia.*

is acquainted with the maxims of our planters, will acknowledge the juſtneſs of this obſervation [19].

Atticus is much praiſed by his hiſtorian, for the care which he took in recruiting his family from the ſlaves born in it [20]: May we not thence infer, that this practice was not then very common?

The names of ſlaves in the Greek comedies, Syrus, Myſus, Geta, Thrax, Davus, Lydus, Phryx, *&c.* afford a preſumption, that, at Athens at leaſt, moſt of the ſlaves were imported from foreign countries. The Athenians, ſays Strabo [21], gave to their ſlaves, either the names of the nations whence they were bought, as Lydus, Syrus; or the names that were moſt common among thoſe nations, as Manes or Midas to a Phrygian, Tibias to a Paphlagonian.

[19] It is computed in the Weſt-Indies, that a ſtock of ſlaves grow worſe five *per cent.* every year, unleſs new ſlaves be bought to recruit them. They are not able to keep up their number, even in thoſe warm countries, where clothes and proviſions are ſo eaſily got. How much more muſt this happen in European countries, and in or near great cities? I ſhall add, that, from the experience of our planters, ſlavery is as little advantageous to the maſter as to the ſlave, wherever hired ſervants can be procured. A man is obliged to clothe and feed his ſlave; and he does no more for his ſervant: The price of the firſt purchaſe is, therefore, ſo much loſs to him: not to mention, that the fear of puniſhment will never draw ſo much labor from a ſlave, as the dread of being turned off, and not getting another ſervice, will from a free-man.

[20] Corn. Nepos in vita Attici. We may remark, that Atticus's eſtate lay chiefly in Epirus; which, being a remote, deſolate place, would render it profitable for him to rear ſlaves there.

[21] Lib. vii.

Demoſthenes, having mentioned a law which forbad any man to ſtrike the ſlave of another, praiſes the humanity of this law; and adds, that, if the barbarians, from whom the ſlaves were bought, had information that their countrymen met with ſuch gentle treatment, they would entertain a great eſteem for the Athenians [22]. Iſocrates too [23] inſinuates, that the ſlaves of the Greeks were generally or very commonly barbarians. Ariſtotle in his Politics [24] plainly ſuppoſes, that a ſlave is always a foreigner. The ancient comic writers repreſented the ſlaves as ſpeaking a barbarous language [25]. This was an imitation of nature.

It is well known that Demoſthenes, in his nonage, had been defrauded of a large fortune by his tutors, and that afterwards he recovered, by a proſecution at law, the value of his patrimony. His orations, on that occaſion, ſtill remain, and contain an exact detail of the whole ſubſtance left by his father [26], in money, merchandiſe, houſes, and ſlaves, together with the value of each particular. Among the reſt were 52 ſlaves, handicraftſmen, namely, 32 ſword-cutlers, and 20 cabinet-makers [27]; all males; not a word of any wives, children, or family, which they certainly would have had, had it been a

[22] In Midiam, p. 221. ex edit. Aldi.

[23] Panegyr.

[24] Lib. vii. cap. 10. ſub fin.

[25] Ariſtoph. Equites, l. 17. The ancient ſcholiaſt remarks on this paſſage βαρβαριζει ως δουλος.

[26] In *Amphobium orat.* 1.

[27] Κλινοποιοι, makers of thoſe beds which the ancients lay upon at meals.

common practice at Athens to breed from the ſlaves: And the value of the whole muſt have much depended on that circumſtance. No female-ſlaves are even ſo much as mentioned, except ſome houſe-maids, who belonged to his mother. This argument has great force, if it be not altogether concluſive.

Conſider this paſſage of Plutarch [28], ſpeaking of the Elder Cato. "He had a great number of ſlaves, "whom he took care to buy at the ſales of pri-"ſoners of war; and he choſe the young, that they "might eaſily be accuſtomed to any diet or man-"ner of life, and be inſtructed in any buſineſs or "labor, as men teach any thing to young dogs or "horſes. — And eſteeming love the chief ſource of "all diſorders, he allowed the male-ſlaves to have "a commerce with the females in his family, upon "paying a certain ſum for this privilege: But he "ſtrictly prohibited all intrigues out of his family." Are there any ſymptoms in this narration of that care which is ſuppoſed in the ancients, of the marriage and propagation of their ſlaves? If that was a common practice, founded on general intereſt, it would ſurely have been embraced by Cato, who was a great economiſt, and lived in times when the ancient frugality and ſimplicity of manners were ſtill in credit and reputation.

It is expreſsly remarked by the writers of the Roman law that ſcarcely any ever purchaſe ſlaves with a view of breeding from them [29].

[28] In vita Catonis.
[29] See NOTE [I].

Our lackies and houſe-maids, I own, do not ſerve much to multiply their ſpecies: But the ancients, beſides thoſe who attended on their perſon, had almoſt all their labor performed, and even manufactures executed, by ſlaves, who lived, many of them, in their family; and ſome great men poſſeſſed to the number of 10,000. If there be any ſuſpicion, therefore, that this inſtitution was unfavorable to propagation (and the ſame reaſon, at leaſt in part, holds with regard to ancient ſlaves as modern ſervants), how deſtructive muſt ſlavery have proved?

Hiſtory mentions a Roman nobleman, who had 400 ſlaves under the ſame roof with him: and having been aſſaſſinated at home by the furious revenge of one of them, the law was executed with rigor, and all without exception were put to death [30]. Many other Roman noblemen had families equally, or more numerous; and I believe every one will allow, that this would ſcarcely be practicable, were we to ſuppoſe all the ſlaves married, and the females to be breeders [31].

So early as the poet Heſiod [32], married ſlaves, whether male or female, were eſteemed inconvenient. How much more, where families had increaſed to ſuch an enormous ſize as in Rome, and

[30] Tacit. *ann.* l. xiv. cap. 43.

[31] The ſlaves in the great houſes had little rooms aſſigned them, called *cellæ*. Whence the name of cell was transferred to the monks room in a convent. See farther on this head. Juſt. Lipſius, Saturn. i. cap. 14. Theſe form ſtrong preſumptions againſt the marriage and propagation of the family-ſlaves.

[32] Opera et Dies, lib. ii. l. 24. alſo l. 220.

where the ancient ſimplicity of manners was baniſhed from all ranks of people?

Xenophon in his Economics, where he gives directions for the management of a farm, recommends a ſtrict care and attention of laying the male and the female-ſlaves at a diſtance from each other. He ſeems not to ſuppoſe that they are ever married. The only ſlaves among the Greeks that appear to have continued their own race, were the Helotes, who had houſes apart, and were more the ſlaves of the public than of individuals [33].

The ſame author [34] tells us, thas Nicias's overſeer, by agreement with his maſter, was obliged to pay him an obolus a day for each ſlave; beſides maintaining them, and keeping up the number. Had the ancient ſlaves been all breeders, this laſt circumſtance of the contract had been ſuperfluous.

The ancients talk ſo frequently of a fixed, ſtated portion of proviſions aſſigned to each ſlave [35], that we are naturally led to conclude, that ſlaves lived almoſt all ſingle, and received that portion as a kind of board-wages.

The practice, indeed, of marrying ſlaves ſeems not to have been very common, even among the country-laborers, where it is more naturally to be expected. Cato [36], enumerating the ſlaves requiſite to labor a vineyard of a hundred acres, makes them

[33] Strabo, lib. viii.

[34] De ratione redituum.

[35] See Cato, de re ruſtica, cap. 56. Donatus, in Phormion. l. 1. 9. Senecæ epiſt. 80.

[36] De re ruſt. cap. 10, 11.

amount to 15; the overſeer and his wife, *villicus* and *villica*, and 13 male-ſlaves; for an olive-plantation of 240 acres, the overſeer and his wife, and 11 male-ſlaves; and ſo in proportion to a greater or leſs plantation or vineyard.

Varro [37], quoting this paſſage of Cato, allows his computation to be juſt in every reſpect, except the laſt. For as it is requiſite, ſays he, to have an overſeer and his wife, whether the vineyard or plantation be great or ſmall, this muſt alter the exactneſs of the proportion. Had Cato's computation been erroneous in any other reſpect, it had certainly been corrected by Varro, who ſeems fond of diſcovering ſo trivial an error.

The ſame author [38] as well as Columella [39], recommends it as requiſite to give a wife to the overſeer, in order to attach him the more ſtrongly to his maſter's ſervice. This was therefore a peculiar indulgence granted to a ſlave, in whom ſo great confidence was repoſed.

In the ſame place, Varro mentions it as an uſeful precaution, not to buy too many ſlaves from the ſame nation, leſt they beget factions and ſeditions in the family: A preſumption, that in Italy, the greater part, even of the country-laboring-ſlaves (for he ſpeaks of no other), were brought from the remoter provinces. All the world knows, that the family-ſlaves in Rome, who were inſtruments of ſhow and luxury, were commonly imported from the eaſt. *Hoc profecere*, ſays Pliny, ſpeaking of the jealous care of maſters, *mancipiorum legiones, et in*

[37] Lib. i. cap. 18. [38] Lib. i. cap. 17. [39] Lib. i. cap. 18.

domo turba externa, ac ſervorum quoque cauſa nomenclator adhibendus [40].

It is indeed recommended by Varro [41], to propagate young ſhepherds in the family from the old ones. For as grazing farms were commonly in remote and cheap places, and each ſhepherd lived in a cottage a-part, his marriage and increaſe were not liable to the ſame inconveniences as in dearer places, and where many ſervants lived in the family; which was univerſally the caſe in ſuch of the Roman farms as produced wine or corn. If we conſider this exception with regard to ſhepherds, and weigh the reaſons of it, it will ſerve for a ſtrong confirmation of all our foregoing ſuſpicions [42].

Columella [43], I own, adviſes the maſter to give a reward, and even liberty to a female-ſlave, that had reared him above three children: A proof, that ſometimes the ancients propagated from their ſlaves; which, indeed, cannot be denied. Were it otherwiſe, the practice of ſlavery being ſo common in antiquity, muſt have been deſtructive to a degree which no expedient could repair. All I pretend to infer from theſe reaſonings is, that ſlavery is in general diſadvantageous both to the happineſs and populouſneſs of mankind, and that its place is much better ſupplied by the practice of hired ſervants.

[40] Lib. xxxiii. cap. 1. So likewiſe Tacitus, *annal.* lib. xiv. 44.

[41] Lib. ii. cap. 10.

[42] Paſtoris duri, eſt hic filius, ille bubulci. Juven. ſat. II. 151.

[43] Lib. i. cap. 8.

The laws, or as ſome writers call them, the ſeditions of the Gracchi, were occaſioned by their obſerving the increaſe of ſlaves over Italy, and the diminution of free citizens. Appian [44] aſcribes this increaſe to the propagation of the ſlaves: Plutarch [45] to the purchaſing of barbarians who were chained and impriſoned βαρβαρικὰ δεσμωτηρια [46]. It is to be preſumed that both cauſes concurred.

Sicily, ſays Florus [47], was full of *ergaſtula*, and was cultivated by laborers in chains. Eunus and Athenio excited the ſervile war, by breaking up theſe monſtrous priſons, and giving liberty to 60,000 ſlaves. The younger Pompey augmented his army in Spain by the ſame expedient [48]. If the country-laborers, throughout the Roman empire, were ſo generally in this ſituation, and if it was difficult or impoſſible to find ſeparate lodgings for the families

[44] De bel. civ. lib. i. [45] In vita Tib. & C. Gracchi.

[45] To the ſame purpoſe is that paſſage of the elder Seneca, ex controverſia 5. lib. v. "Arata quondam populis rura, ſingulorum ergaſtulorum ſunt; latiuſque nunc villici, quam olim reges, imperant. At nunc eadem," ſays Pliny, "vincti pedes, damnatæ manus, inſcripti vultus exercent." Lib. xviii. cap. 3. So alſo Martial.

"Et ſonet innumera compede Tuſcus ager." Lib. ix. ep. 23.

And Lucan. "Tum longos jungere fines
Agrorum, et quondam duro ſulcata Camilli,
Vomere et antiquas Curiorum paſſa ligones,
Longa ſub ignotis extendere rura colonis." Lib. i.

"Vincto foſſore coluntur
Heſperiæ ſegetes——" Lib. vii.

[47] Lib. iii. cap. 19. [48] Id. lib. iv. cap. 8.

of the city-ſervants, how unfavorable to propagation, as well as to humanity, muſt the inſtitution of domeſtic ſlavery be eſteemed?

Conſtantinople, at preſent, requires the ſame recruits or ſlaves from all the provinces that Rome did of old; and theſe provinces are of conſequence far from being populous.

Egypt, according to Monſ. Maillet, ſends continual colonies of black ſlaves to the other parts of the Turkiſh empire; and receives annually an equal return of white: The one brought from the inland-parts of Africa; the other from Mingrelia, Circaſſia, and Tartary.

Our modern convents are, no doubt, bad inſtitutions: But there is reaſon to ſuſpect, that anciently every great family in Italy, and probably in other parts of the world, was a ſpecies of convent. And though we have reaſon to condemn all theſe popiſh inſtitutions as nurſeries of ſuperſtition, burdenſome to the public, and oppreſſive to the poor priſoners, male as well as female; yet may it be queſtioned whether they be ſo deſtructive to the populouſneſs of a ſtate as is commonly imagined. Were the land which belongs to a convent beſtowed to a nobleman, he would ſpend its revenue on dogs, horſes, grooms, footmen, cooks, and houſe-maids; and his family would not furniſh many more citizens than the convent.

The common reaſon why any parent thruſts his daughters into nunneries, is, that he may not be over-burdened with too numerous a family; but the ancients had a method almoſt as innocent, and more

effectual to that purpoſe, to wit, expoſing their children in early infancy. This practice was very common; and is not ſpoken of by any author of thoſe times with the horror it deſerves, or ſcarcely [49] even with diſapprobation. Plutarch, the humane, good-natured Plutarch [50], mentions it as a merit in Attalus, king of Pergamus, that he murdered, or, if you will, expoſed all his own children, in order to leave his crown to the ſon of his brother Eumenes; ſignalizing in this manner his gratitude and affection to Eumenes, who had left him his heir preferably to that ſon. It was Solon, the moſt celebrated of the ſages of Greece, that gave parents permiſſion by law to kill their children [51].

Shall we then allow theſe two circumſtances to compenſate each other, to wit, monaſtic vows, and the expoſing of children, and to be unfavorable, in equal degrees, to the propagation of mankind? I doubt the advantage is here on the ſide of antiquity. Perhaps, by an odd connexion of cauſes, the barbarous practice of the ancients might rather render thoſe times more populous. By removing the terrors of too numerous a family, it would engage many people in marriage; and ſuch is the force of natural affection, that very few, in compariſon, would have reſolution enough, when it came to the puſh, to carry into execution their former intentions.

[49] Tacitus blames it. De morib. Germ.

[50] De fraterno amore. Seneca alſo approves of the expoſing of ſickly, infirm children. De ira, lib. 1. cap. 15.

[51] Sext. Emp. lib. iii. cap. 24.

China,

China, the only country where this practice of expoſing children prevails at preſent, is the moſt populous country we know of; and every man is married before he is twenty. Such early marriages could ſcarcely be general, had not men the proſpect of ſo eaſy a method of getting rid of their children. I own, that Plutarch [52] ſpeaks of it as a very general maxim of the poor to expoſe their children; and as the rich were then averſe to marriage, on account of the courtſhip they met with from thoſe who expected legacies from them, the public muſt have been in a bad ſituation between them".

Of all ſciences there is none, where firſt appearances are more deceitful than in politics. Hoſpitals for foundlings ſeem favorable to the increaſe of numbers; and perhaps may be ſo, when kept under proper reſtrictions. But when they open the door to every one, without diſtinctions, they have probably a contrary effect, and are pernicious to the ſtate. It is computed, that every ninth child born at Paris is ſent to the hoſpital; though it ſeems certain, according to the common courſe of human affairs, that it is not a hundredth child whoſe parents are altogether incapacitated to rear and educate him. The great difference for health, induſtry, and morals, between an education in an hoſpital and that in a private family, ſhould induce us not to make the entrance into the former too eaſy and engaging. To kill one's own child is ſhocking to nature, and muſt therefore be ſomewhat unuſual; but to

[52] De amore prolis.
[53] See NOTE [K].

turn over the care of him upon others, is very tempting to the natural indolence of mankind.

Having conſidered the domeſtic life and manners of the ancients, compared to thoſe of the moderns; where, in the main, we ſeem rather ſuperior, ſo far as the preſent queſtion is concerned; we ſhall now examine the *political* cuſtoms and inſtitutions of both ages, and weigh their influence in retarding or forwarding the propagation of mankind.

Before the increaſe of the Roman power, or rather till its full eſtabliſhment, almoſt all the nations which are the ſcene of ancient hiſtory, were divided into ſmall territories or petty commonwealths, where of courſe a great equality of fortune prevailed, and the centre of the government was always very near its frontiers.

This was the ſituation of affairs not only in Greece and Italy, but alſo in Spain, Gaul, Germany, Afric, and a great part of the Leſſer Aſia: And it muſt be owned, that no inſtitution could be more favorable to the propagation of mankind. For, though a man of an overgrown fortune, not being able to conſume more than another, muſt ſhare it with thoſe who ſerve and attend him; yet their poſſeſſion being precarious, they have not the ſame encouragement to marry, as if each had a ſmall fortune, ſecure and independent. Enormous cities are, beſides, deſtructive to ſociety, beget vice and diſorder of all kinds, ſtarve the remoter provinces, and even ſtarve themſelves, by the prices to which they raiſe all proviſions. Where each man had his little houſe and field to himſelf, and each county had its capital,

free and independent; what a happy ſituation of mankind! How favorable to induſtry and agriculture; to marriage and propagation! The prolific virtue of men, were it to act in its full extent, without that reſtraint which property and neceſſity impoſe on it, would double the number every generation: And nothing ſurely can give it more liberty, than ſuch ſmall commonwealths, and ſuch an equality of fortune among the citizens. All ſmall ſtates naturally produce equality of fortune, becauſe they afford no opportunities of great increaſe; but ſmall commonwealths much more, by that diviſion of power and authority which is eſſential to them.

When Xenophon [54] returned after the famous expedition with Cyrus, he hired himſelf and 6000 of the Greeks into the ſervice of Seuthes, a prince of Thrace; and the articles of his agreement were, that each ſoldier ſhould receive a *daric* a month, each captain two *darics*, and he himſelf, as general, four: A regulation of pay which would not a little ſurpriſe our modern officers.

Demoſthenes and Æſchines, with eight more, were ſent ambaſſadors to Philip of Macedon, and their appointments for above four months were a thouſand *drachmas*, which is leſs than a *drachma* a-day for each ambaſſador [55]. But a *drachma* a-day, nay ſometimes two [56], was the pay of a common foot-ſoldier.

[54] *De exp.* Cyr. lib. vii.
[55] Demoſt. *de falſa leg.* He calls it a conſiderable ſum.
[56] Thucyd. lib. iii.

A centurion among the Romans had only double pay to a private man in Polybius's time [57]; and we accordingly find the gratuities after a triumph regulated by that proportion [58]. But Mark Anthony and the triumvirate gave the centurions five times the reward of the other [59]. So much had the increaſe of the commonwealth increaſed the inequality among the citizens [60].

It muſt be owned, that the ſituation of affairs in modern times, with regard to civil liberty, as well as equality of fortune, is not near ſo favorable, either to the propagation or happineſs of mankind. Europe is ſhared out moſtly into great monarchies; and ſuch parts of it as are divided into ſmall territories, are commonly governed by abſolute princes, who ruin their people by a mimicry of the greater monarchs, in the ſplendor of their court and number of their forces. Swiſſerland alone and Holland reſemble the ancient republics; and though the former is far from poſſeſſing any advantage either of ſoil, climate, or commerce, yet the numbers of people with which it abounds, notwithſtanding their inliſting themſelves into every ſervice in Europe, prove ſufficiently the advantages of their political inſtitutions.

The ancient republics derived their chief or only ſecurity from the numbers of their citizens. The

[57] Lib. vi. cap. 37.

[58] Tit. Liv. lib. xli. cap. 7. 13 *et alibi paſſim.*

[59] Appian. *De bell. civ.* lib. iv.

[60] Cæſar gave the centurions ten times the gratuity of the common ſoldiers. *De bello Gallico*, lib viii. In the Rhodian cartel, mentioned afterwards, no diſtinction in the ranſom was made on account of ranks in the army.

Trachinians having loſt great numbers of their people, the remainder, inſtead of enriching themſelves by the inheritance of their fellow-citizens, applied to Sparta, their metropolis, for a new ſtock of inhabitants. The Spartans immediately collected ten thouſand men; among whom the old citizens divided the lands of which the former proprietors had periſhed [61].

After Timoleon had baniſhed Dionyſius from Syracuſe, and had ſettled the affairs of Sicily, finding the cities of Syracuſe and Sellinuntium extremely depopulated by tyranny, war, and faction, he invited over from Greece ſome new inhabitants to repeople them [62]. Immediately forty thouſand men (Plutarch [63] ſays ſixty thouſand) offered themſelves; and he diſtributed ſo many lots of land among them, to the great ſatisfaction of the ancient inhabitants: A proof at once of the maxims of ancient policy, which affected populouſneſs more than riches; and of the good effects of theſe maxims, in the extreme populouſneſs of that ſmall country Greece, which could at once ſupply ſo great a colony. The caſe was not much different with the Romans in early times. He is a pernicious citizen, ſaid M. Curius, who cannot be content with ſeven [64] acres. Such ideas of equality could not fail of producing great number of people.

We muſt now conſider what diſadvantages the ancients lay under with regard to populouſneſs, and what checks they received from their political

[61] Diod. Sic. lib. xii. Thucyd. lib. iii.
[62] Diod. Sic. lib. xvi. [63] *In vita* Timol.
[64] See NOTE [L].

maxims and inſtitutions. There are commonly compenſations in every human condition; and though theſe compenſations be not always perfectly equal, yet they ſerve, at leaſt, to reſtrain the prevailing principle. To compare them and eſtimate their influence, is indeed difficult, even where they take place in the ſame age, and in neighbouring countries: But where ſeveral ages have intervened, and only ſcattered lights are afforded us by ancient authors, what can we do but amuſe by talking *pro* and *con*, on an intereſting ſubject, and thereby correcting all haſty and violent determinations?

Firſt, We may obſerve, that the ancient republics were almoſt in perpetual war; a natural effect of their martial ſpirit, their love of liberty, their mutual emulation, and that hatred which generally prevails among nations that live in cloſe neighbourhood. Now, war in a ſmall ſtate is much more deſtructive than in a great one; both becauſe all the inhabitants, in the former caſe, muſt ſerve in the armies; and becauſe the whole ſtate is frontier, and is all expoſed to the inroads of the enemy.

The maxims of ancient war were much more deſtructive than thoſe of modern; chiefly by that diſtribution of plunder in which the ſoldiers were indulged. The private men in our armies are ſuch a low ſet of people, that we find any abundance, beyond their ſimple pay, breeds confuſion and diſorder among them, and a total diſſolution of diſcipline. The very wretchedneſs and meanneſs of thoſe who

fill the modern armies, render them leſs deſtructive to the countries which they invade: One inſtance, among many, of the deceitfulneſs of firſt appearances in all political reaſonings [65].

Ancient battles were much more bloody, by the very nature of the weapons employed in them. The ancients drew up their men 16 or 20, ſometimes 50, men deep, which made a narrow front: and it was not difficult to find a field, in which both armies might be marſhalled, and might engage with each other. Even where any body of the troops was kept off by hedges, hillocks, woods, or hollow ways, the battle was not ſo ſoon decided between the contending parties, but that the others had time to overcome the difficulties which oppoſed them, and take part in the engagement. And as the whole army was thus engaged, and each man cloſely buckled to his antagoniſt, the battles were commonly very bloody, and great ſlaughter was made on both ſides, eſpecially on the vanquiſhed. The long, thin lines, required by the fire-arms, and the quick deciſion of the fray, render our modern engagements but partial rencounters; and enable the general, who is foiled in the beginning of the day, to draw off the greater part of his army ſound and entire.

[65] The ancient ſoldiers, being free citizens, above the loweſt rank, were all married. Our modern ſoldiers are either forced to live unmarried, or their marriages turn to ſmall account towards the increaſe of mankind. A circumſtance which ought, perhaps, to be taken into conſideration, as of ſome conſequence in favor of the ancients.

The battles of antiquity, both by their duration and their reſemblance to ſingle combats, were wrought up to a degree of fury quite unknown to latter ages. Nothing could then engage the combatants to give quarter but the hopes of profit, by making ſlaves of their priſoners. In civil war, as we learn from Tacitus [66], the battles were the moſt bloody, becauſe the priſoners were not ſlaves.

What a ſtout reſiſtance muſt be made, where the vanquiſhed expected ſo hard a fate! How inveterate the rage, where the maxims of war were, in every reſpect, ſo bloody and ſevere!

Inſtances are frequent, in ancient hiſtory, of cities beſieged, whoſe inhabitants, rather than open their gates, murdered their wives and children, and ruſhed themſelves on a voluntary death, ſweetened perhaps by a little proſpect of revenge upon the enemy. Greeks [67], as well as Barbarians, have often been wrought up to this degree of fury. And the ſame determined ſpirit and cruelty muſt, in other inſtances leſs remarkable, have been deſtructive to human ſociety, in thoſe petty commonwealths which lived in cloſe neighbourhood, and were engaged in perpetual wars and contentions.

Sometimes the wars in Greece, ſays Plutarch [68], were carried on entirely by inroads, and robberies, and piracies. Such a method of war muſt be more

[66] Hiſt. lib. ii. cap. 44.

[67] As Abydus, mentioned by Livy, lib. xxxi. cap. 17, 18. and Polyb. lib. xvi. As alſo the Xanthians, Appian. *de bell. civil.* lib. iv.

[68] In *vita* Arati.

deſtructive in ſmall ſtates, than the bloodieſt battles and ſieges.

By the laws of the twelve tables, poſſeſſion during two years formed a preſcription for land; one year for moveables [69]: An indication, that there was not in Italy, at that time, much more order, tranquillity, and ſettled police, than there is at preſent among the Tartars.

The only cartel I remember in ancient hiſtory, is that between Demetrius Poliorcetes and the Rhodians; when it was agreed, that a free citizen ſhould be reſtored for 1000 *drachmas*, a ſlave bearing arms for 500 [70].

But, *ſecondly*, It appears that ancient manners were more unfavorable than the modern, not only in times of war, but alſo in times of peace; and that too in every reſpect, except the love of civil liberty and of equality, which is, I own, of conſiderable importance. To exclude faction from a free government, is very difficult, if not altogether impracticable; but ſuch inveterate rage between the factions, and ſuch bloody maxims, are found, in modern times, amongſt religious parties alone. In ancient hiſtory we may always obſerve, where one party prevailed, whether the nobles or people (for I can obſerve no difference in this reſpect [71]), that they immediately butchered

[69] Inſt. lib. ii. cap. 6. [70] Diod. Sicul. lib. xx.

[71] Lyſias, who was himſelf of the popular faction, and very narrowly eſcaped from the thirty tyrants, ſays, that the Democracy was as violent a government as the Oligarchy. *Orat. 24. de ſtatu popul.*

all of the oppoſite party who fell into their hands, and baniſhed ſuch as had been ſo fortunate as to eſcape their fury. No form of proceſs, no law, no trial, no pardon. A fourth, a third, perhaps near half of the city, was ſlaughtered, or expelled, every revolution; and the exiles always joined foreign enemies, and did all the miſchief poſſible to their fellow-citizens; till fortune put it in their power to take full revenge by a new revolution. And as theſe were frequent in ſuch violent governments, the diſorder, diffidence, jealouſy, enmity, which muſt prevail, are not eaſy for us to imagine in this age of the world.

There are only two revolutions I can recollect in ancient hiſtory, which paſſed without great ſeverity, and great effuſion of blood in maſſacres and aſſaſſinations, namely, the reſtoration of the Athenian Democracy by Thraſybulus, and the ſubduing of the Roman republic by Cæſar. We learn from ancient hiſtory, that Thraſybulus paſſed a general amneſty for all paſt offences; and firſt introduced that word, as well as practice, into Greece [72]. It appears, however, from many orations of Lyſias [73], that the chief, and even ſome of the ſubaltern offenders, in the preceding tyranny, were tried, and capitally puniſhed. And as to Cæſar's clemency, though much celebrated, it would not gain great applauſe in the preſent age. He butchered, for inſtance, all Cato's ſenate, when he became maſter of Utica [74]; and

[72] Cicero, Philip. 1.

[73] As *orat.* 11. *contra* Eratoſt. *orat.* 12. *contra* Agorat. *orat.* 15. *pro* Mantith.

[74] Appian. *de bell. civ.* lib. ii.

theſe, we may readily believe, were not the moſt worthleſs of the party. All thoſe who had borne arms againſt that uſurper, were attainted; and, by Hirtius's law, declared incapable of all public offices.

Theſe people were extremely fond of liberty; but ſeem not to have underſtood it very well. When the thirty tyrants firſt eſtabliſhed their dominion at Athens, they began with ſeizing all the ſycophants and informers, who had been ſo troubleſome during the Democracy, and putting them to death by an arbitrary ſentence and execution. *Every man*, ſays Salluſt [75] and Lyſias [76] *was rejoiced at theſe puniſhments*; not conſidering, that liberty was from that moment annihilated.

The utmoſt energy of the nervous ſtyle of Thucydides, and the copiouſneſs and expreſſion of the Greek language, ſeem to ſink under that hiſtorian, when he attempts to deſcribe the diſorders which aroſe from faction throughout all the Grecian commonwealths. You would imagine, that he ſtill labors with a thought greater than he can find words to communicate. And he concludes his pathetic deſcription with an obſervation, which is at once refined and ſolid: "In theſe conteſts," ſays he, "thoſe who were "the dulleſt, and moſt ſtupid, and had the leaſt fore-"ſight, commonly prevailed. For being conſcious "of this weakneſs, and dreading to be over-reached "by thoſe of greater penetration, they went to work "haſtily, without premeditation, by the ſword and

[75] See Cæſar's ſpeech *de bell. Catil.*

[76] *Orat.* 24. And in *orat.* 29. he mentions the factious ſpirit of the popular aſſemblies as the only cauſe why theſe illegal puniſhments ſhould diſpleaſe.

" poniard, and thereby got the ſtart of their anta-
" goniſts, who were forming fine ſchemes and pro-
" jects for their deſtruction [77]."

Not to mention Dionyſius [78] the elder, who is computed to have butchered in cool blood above 10,000 of his fellow-citizens; or Agathocles [79], Nabis [80], and others, ſtill more bloody than he; the tranſactions, even in free governments, were extremely violent and deſtructive. At Athens, the thirty tyrants and the nobles, in a twelvemonth, murdered, without trial, about 1200 of the people, and baniſhed above the half of the citizens that remained [81]. In Argos, near the ſame time, the people killed 1200 of the nobles; and afterwards their own demagogues, becauſe they had refuſed to carry their proſecutions farther [82]. The people alſo in Corcyra killed 1500 of the nobles, and baniſhed a thouſand [83]. Theſe numbers will appear the more ſurpriſing, if we conſider the extreme ſmallneſs of theſe ſtates. But all ancient hiſtory is full of ſuch inſtances [84].

When Alexander ordered all the exiles to be reſtored throughout all the cities, it was found, that

[77] Lib. iii.

[78] Plut. *de virt. et fort.* Alex.

[79] Diod. Sic. lib. xviii. xix.

[80] Tit. liv. xxxi. xxxiii. xxxiv.

[81] Diod. Sic. lib. xiv. Iſocrates ſays, there were only 5000 baniſhed. He makes the number of thoſe killed amount to 1500. Areop. Æſchines *contra* Cteſiph. aſſigns preciſely the ſame number. Seneca, (*de tranq. anim.* cap. v.) ſays 13000.

[82] Diod. Sic. lib. xv.

[83] Diod. Sic. lib. xiii.

[84] See NOTE [M].

the whole amounted to 20,000 men[85]; the remains probably of ſtill greater ſlaughters and maſſacres. What an aſtoniſhing multitude in ſo narrow a country as ancient Greece! And what domeſtic confuſion, jealouſy, partiality, revenge, heart-burnings, muſt tear thoſe cities, where factions were wrought up to ſuch a degree of fury and deſpair!

It would be eaſier, ſays Iſocrates to Philip, to raiſe an army in Greece at preſent from the vagabonds than from the cities.

Even when affairs came not to ſuch extremities (which they failed not to do almoſt in every city twice or thrice every century), property was rendered very precarious by the maxims of ancient government. Xenophon, in the banquet of Socrates, gives us a natural, unaffected deſcription of the tyranny of the Athenian people. "In my poverty, "ſays Charmides, "I am much more happy than I ever was "while poſſeſſed of riches; as much as it is happier "to be in ſecurity than in terrors, free than a ſlave, "to receive than to pay court, to be truſted than ſuſ-"pected. Formerly I was obliged to careſs every "informer; ſome impoſition was continually laid "upon me; and it was never allowed me to travel, "or be abſent from the city. At preſent, when I am "poor, I look big, and threaten others. The rich are "afraid of me, and ſhow every kind of civility and "reſpect; and I am become a kind of tyrant in the "city[86]."

In one of the pleadings of Lyſias[87], the orator very

[85] Diod. Sic. lib. xviii.

[86] Pag. 885. *ex edit.* Leunclav.

[87] *Orat.* 29. *in* Nicom.

coolly ſpeaks of it, by the bye, as a maxim of the Athenian people, that, whenever they wanted money, they put to death ſome of the rich citizens as well as ſtrangers, for the ſake of the forfeiture. In mentioning this, he ſeems not to have any intention of blaming them; ſtill leſs of provoking them, who were his audience and judges.

Whether a man was a citizen or a ſtranger among that people, it ſeems indeed requiſite, either that he ſhould impoveriſh himſelf, or that the people would impoveriſh him, and perhaps kill him into the bargain. The orator laſt mentioned gives a pleaſant account of an eſtate laid out in the public ſervice [88]; that is, above the third of it in raree-ſhows and figured dances.

I need not inſiſt on the Greek tyrannies, which were altogether horrible. Even the mixed monarchies, by which moſt of the ancient ſtates of Greece were governed, before the introduction of republics, were very unſettled. Scarcely any city but Athens, ſays Iſocrates, could ſhow a ſucceſſion of kings for four or five generations [89].

Beſides many other obvious reaſons for the inſtability of ancient monarchies, the equal diviſion of property among the brothers in private families, muſt, by a neceſſary conſequence, contribute to unſettle and diſturb the ſtate. The univerſal preference given to the elder by modern laws, though it increaſes the inequality of fortunes, has, however, this good effect, that it accuſtoms men to the ſame idea in public

[88] See NOTE [N].

[89] Panath.

ſucceſſion, and cuts off all claim and pretenſion of the younger.

The new ſettled colony of Heraclea, falling immediately into faction, applied to Sparta, who ſent Heripidas with full authority to quiet their diſſenſions. This man, not provoked by any oppoſition, not inflamed by party-rage, knew no better expedient than immediately putting to death about 500 of the citizens [90]. A ſtrong proof how deeply rooted theſe violent maxims of government were throughout all Greece.

If ſuch was the diſpoſition of men's minds among that refined people, what may be expected in the commonwealths of Italy, Afric, Spain, and Gaul, which were denominated barbarous? Why otherwiſe did the Greeks ſo much value themſelves on their humanity, gentleneſs, and moderation, above all other nations? This reaſoning ſeems very natural; but unluckily the hiſtory of the Roman commonwealth in its earlier times, if we give credit to the received accounts, preſents an oppoſite concluſion. No blood was ever ſhed in any ſedition at Rome, till the murder of the Gracchi. Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus [91], obſerving the ſingular humanity of the Roman people in this particular, makes uſe of it as an argument, that they were originally of Grecian extraction: whence we may conclude, that the factions and revolutions in the barbarous republics were uſually more violent than even thoſe of Greece above mentioned.

[90] Diod. Sic. lib. xix.

[91] Lib. 1.

If the Romans were ſo late in coming to blows, they made ample compenſation after they had once entered upon the bloody ſcene; and Appian's hiſtory of their civil wars contains the moſt frightful picture of maſſacres, proſcriptions, and forfeitures, that ever was preſented to the world. What pleaſes moſt in that hiſtorian, is, that he ſeems to feel a proper reſentment of theſe barbarous proceedings; and talks not with that provoking coolneſs and indifference, which cuſtom had produced in many of the Greek hiſtorians [92].

The maxims of ancient politics contain, in general, ſo little humanity and moderation, that it ſeems ſuperfluous to give any particular reaſon for the acts of violence committed at any particular period. Yet I cannot forbear obſerving, that the laws, in the later period of the Roman commonwealth, were ſo abſurdly contrived, that they obliged the heads of parties to have recourſe to theſe extremities. All capital puniſhments were aboliſhed: However criminal, or, what is more, however dangerous, any citizen might be, he could not regularly be puniſhed otherwiſe than by baniſhment: And it became neceſſary, in the revolutions of party, to draw the ſword of private vengeance; nor was it eaſy, when laws were once violated, to ſet bounds to theſe ſanguinary proceedings. Had Brutus himſelf prevailed over the *triumvirate*, could he, in common prudence, have allowed Octavius and Anthony to live, and have contented himſelf with baniſhing them to Rhodes or Marſeilles, where they might ſtill have plotted new commotions

[92] See NOTE [O].

and

and rebellions? His executing C. Antonius, brother to the *triumvir*; ſhows evidently his ſenſe of the matter. Did not Cicero, with the approbation of all the wiſe and virtuous of Rome, arbitrarily put to death Cataline's accomplices, contrary to law, and without any trial or form of proceſs? and if he moderated his executions, did it not proceed, either from the clemency of his temper, or the conjunctures of the times? A wretched ſecurity in a government which pretends to laws and liberty!

Thus one extreme produces another. In the ſame manner as exceſſive ſeverity in the laws is apt to beget great relaxation in their execution; ſo their exceſſive lenity naturally produces cruelty and barbarity: It is dangerous to force us, in any caſe, to paſs their ſacred boundaries.

One general cauſe of the diſorders, ſo frequent in all ancient governments, ſeems to have conſiſted in the great difficulty of eſtabliſhing any Ariſtocracy in thoſe ages, and the perpetual diſcontents and ſeditions of the people, whenever even the meaneſt and moſt beggarly were excluded from the legiſlature, and from public offices. The very quality of *freemen* gave ſuch a rank, being oppoſed to that of ſlave, that it ſeemed to entitle the poſſeſſor to every power and privilege of the commonwealth. Solon's [93] laws excluded no freeman from votes or elections, but confined ſome magiſtracies to a particular *cenſus*; yet were the people never ſatisfied till thoſe laws were repealed. By the treaty with Antipater [94], no

[93] Plutarchus *in vita* Solon.
[94] Diod. Sic. lib. xviii.

Athenian was allowed a vote whose *census* was less than 2000 *drachmas* (about 60 *l. Sterling*). And though such a government would to us appear sufficiently democratical, it was so disagreeable to that people, that above two-thirds of them immediately left their country[95]. Cassander reduced that *census* to the half[96]; yet still the government was considered as an oligarchical tyranny, and the effect of foreign violence.

Servius Tullius's[97] laws seem equal and reasonable, by fixing the power in proportion to the property: Yet the Roman people could never be brought quietly to submit to them.

In those days there was no medium between a severe, jealous Aristocracy, ruling over discontented subjects; and a turbulent, factious, tyrannical Democracy. At present, there is not one republic in Europe, from one extremity of it to the other, that is not remarkable for justice, lenity, and stability, equal to, or even beyond Marseilles, Rhodes, or the most celebrated in antiquity. Almost all of them are well-tempered Aristocracies.

But, *thirdly*, There are many other circumstances, in which ancient nations seem inferior to the modern both for the happiness and increase of mankind. Trade, manufactures, industry, were no where, in former ages, so flourishing as they are at present in Europe. The only garb of the ancients, both for

[95] Id. ibid. [96] Id. ibid.

[97] Tit. Liv. lib. i. cap. 43.

males and females, ſeems to have been a kind of flannel which they wore commonly white or grey and which they ſcoured as often as it became dirty. Tyre, which carried on, after Carthage, the greateſt commerce of any city in the Mediterranean, before it was deſtroyed by Alexander, was no mighty city, if we credit Arrian's account of its inhabitants [98]. Athens is commonly ſuppoſed to have been a trading city; but it was as populous before the Median war as at any time after it, according to Herodotus [99]; yet its commerce, at that time, was ſo inconſiderable, that, as the ſame hiſtorian obſerves [100], even the neighbouring coaſts of Aſia were as little frequented by the Greeks as the pillars of Hercules: For beyond theſe he conceived nothing.

Great intereſt of money, and great profits of trade, are an infallible indication, that induſtry and commerce are but in their infancy. We read in Lyſias [101] of 100 *per cent.* profit made on a cargo of two talents, ſent to no greater diſtance than from Athens to the Adriatic: Nor is this mentioned as an inſtance of extraordinary profit. Antidorus, ſays

[98] Lib. ii. There were 8000 killed during the ſiege; and the captives amounted to 30,000. Diodorus Siculus, lib. xvii. ſays only 13,000: But he accounts for this ſmall number, by ſaying that the Tyrians had ſent away before hand part of their wives and children to Carthage.

[99] Lib. v. he makes the number of the citizens amount to 30,000.

[100] Id. ibid.

[101] *Orat.* 33. *adverſ.* Diagit.

Demoſthenes [102], paid three talents and a half for a houſe which he let at a talent a-year: And the orator blames his own tutors for not employing his money to like advantage. My fortune, ſays he, in eleven years minority, ought to have been tripled. The value of 20 of the ſlaves left by his father, he computes at 40 minas, and the yearly profit of their labor at 12 [103]. The moſt moderate intereſt at Athens (for there was higher [104] often paid), was *twelve per cent.* [105] and that paid monthly. Not to inſiſt upon the high intereſt to which the vaſt ſums diſtributed in elections had raiſed money [106] at Rome, we find, that Verres, before that factious period, ſtated 24 *per cent.* for money which he left in the hands of the publicans; and though Cicero exclaims againſt this article, it is not on account of the extravagant uſury; but becauſe it had never been cuſtomary to ſtate any intereſt on ſuch occaſions [107]. Intereſt, indeed, ſunk at Rome after the ſettlement of the empire: But it never remained any conſiderable time ſo low as in the commercial ſtates of modern times [108].

Among the other inconveniences, which the Athenians felt from the fortifying of Dacelia by the Lacedemonians, it is repreſented by Thucydides [109], as one of the moſt conſiderable, that they could not

[102] *Contra* Aphob. p. 25. *ex edit.* Aldi.
[103] Id. p. 19. [104] Id. ibid.
[105] Id. ibid. and Æſchines *contra* Cteſiph.
[106] *Epiſt. ad* Attic. lib. iv. epiſt. 15.
[107] *Contra* Verr. *orat.* 3.
[108] See Eſſay IV. [109] Lib. vii.

bring over their corn from Eubea by land, paſſing by Oropus; but were obliged to embark it, and to ſail round the promontory of Sunium. A ſurpriſing inſtance of the imperfection of ancient navigation! For the water-carriage is not here above double the land.

I do not remember a paſſage in any ancient author, where the growth of a city is aſcribed to the eſtabliſhment of a manufacture. The commerce, which is ſaid to flouriſh, is chiefly the exchange of thoſe commodities for which different ſoils and climates were ſuited. The ſale of wine and oil into Africa, according to Diodorus Siculus [110], was the foundation of the riches of Agrigentum. The ſituation of the city of Sybaris, according to the ſame author [111], was the cauſe of its immenſe populouſneſs; being built near the two rivers Crathys and Sybaris. But theſe two rivers, we may obſerve, are not navigable; and could only produce ſome fertile vallies, for agriculture and tillage; an advantage ſo inconſiderable, that a modern writer would ſcarcely have taken notice of it.

The barbarity of the ancient tyrants, together with the extreme love of liberty, which animated thoſe ages, muſt have baniſhed every merchant and manufacturer, and have quite depolulated the ſtate; had it ſubſiſted upon induſtry and commerce. While the cruel and ſuſpicious Dionyſius was carrying on his butcheries, who, that was not detained by his

[110] Lib. xiii.
[111] Lib. xii.

landed property, and could have carried with him any art or ſkill to procure a ſubſiſtence in other countries, would have remained expoſed to ſuch implacable barbarity? The perſecutions of Philip II. and Lewis XIV. filled all Europe with the manufacturers of Flanders and of France.

I grant, that agriculture is the ſpecies of induſtry chiefly requiſite to the ſubſiſtence of multitudes: and it is poſſible, that this induſtry may flouriſh, even where manufactures and other arts are unknown and neglected. Swiſſerland is at preſent a remarkable inſtance; where we find at once the moſt ſkilful huſbandmen, and the moſt bungling tradeſmen, that are to be met with in Europe. That agriculture flouriſhed in Greece and Italy, at leaſt in ſome parts of them, and at ſome periods, we have reaſon to preſume: And whether the mechanical arts had reached the ſame degree of perfection, may not be eſteemed ſo material; eſpecially, if we conſider the great equality of riches in the ancient republics, where each family was obliged to cultivate, with the greateſt care and induſtry, its own little field, in order to its ſubſiſtence.

But is it juſt reaſoning, becauſe agriculture may, in ſome inſtances, flouriſh without trade or manufactures, to conclude, that, in any great extent of country, and for any great tract of time, it would ſubſiſt alone? The moſt natural way, ſurely, of encouraging huſbandry, is, firſt to excite other kinds of induſtry, and thereby afford the laborer a ready market for his commodities, and a return of ſuch goods as may contribute to his pleaſure and

enjoyment. This method is infallible and univerſal; and, as it prevails more in modern government than in the ancient, it affords a preſumption of the ſuperior populouſneſs of the former.

Every man, ſays Xenophon [112], may be a farmer: No art or ſkill is requiſite: All conſiſts in induſtry, and in attention to the execution. A ſtrong proof, as Columella hints, that agriculture was but little known in the age of Xenophon.

All our later improvements and refinements, have they done nothing towards the eaſy ſubſiſtence of men, and conſequently towards their propagation and increaſe? Our ſuperior ſkill in mechanics; the diſcovery of new worlds, by which commerce has been ſo much enlarged; the eſtabliſhment of poſts; and the uſe of bills of exchange: Theſe ſeem all extremely uſeful to the encouragement of art, induſtry, and populouſneſs. Were we to ſtrike off theſe, what a check ſhould we give to every kind of buſineſs and labor, and what multitudes of families would immediately periſh from want and hunger? And it ſeems not probable, that we could ſupply the place of theſe new inventions by any other regulation or inſtitution.

Have we reaſon to think, that the police of ancient ſtates was any wiſe comparable to that of modern, or that men had then equal ſecurity, either at home or in their journeys by land or water? I queſtion not, but every impartial examiner would give us the preference in this particular [113].

[112] Oecon. [113] See Part I. Eſſay XI.

Thus, upon comparing the whole, it ſeems impoſſible to aſſign any juſt reaſon, why the world ſhould have been more populous in ancient than in modern times. The equality of property among the ancients, liberty, and the ſmall diviſion of their ſtates, were indeed circumſtances favorable to the propagation of mankind: But their wars were more bloody and deſtructive, their government more factious and unſettled, commerce and manufactures more feeble and languiſhing, and the general police more looſe and irregular. Theſe latter diſadvantages ſeem to form a ſufficient counterbalance to the former advantages; and rather favor the oppoſite opinion to that which commonly prevails with regard to this ſubject.

But there is no reaſoning, it may be ſaid, againſt matter of fact. If it appear, that the world was then more populous than at preſent, we may be aſſured, that our conjectures are falſe, and that we have overlooked ſome material circumſtance in the compariſon. This I readily own: All our preceding reaſonings, I acknowledge to be mere trifling, or, at leaſt, ſmall ſkirmiſhes and frivolous rencounters, which decide nothing. But unluckily the main combat, where we compare facts, cannot be rendered much more deciſive. The facts delivered by ancient authors, are either ſo uncertain or ſo imperfect, as to afford us nothing poſitive in this matter. How indeed could it be otherwiſe? The very facts which we muſt oppoſe to them, in computing the populouſneſs of modern ſtates, are far from being either certain or complete. Many grounds of calculation proceeded on by celebrated writers, are little better than

thoſe of the Emperor Heliogabalus, who formed an eſtimate of the immenſe greatneſs of Rome, from ten thouſand pound weight of cobwebs which had been found in that city [114].

It is to be remarked, that all kinds of numbers are uncertain in ancient manuſcripts, and have been ſubject to much greater corruptions than any other part of the text; and that for an obvious reaſon. Any alteration, in other places, commonly affects the ſenſe or grammar, and is more readily perceived by the reader and tranſcriber.

Few enumerations of inhabitants have been made of any tract of country by any ancient author of good authority, ſo as to afford us a large enough view for compariſon.

It is probable, that there was formerly a good foundation for the number of citizens aſſigned to any free city; becauſe they entered for a ſhare in the government, and there were exact regiſters kept of them. But as the number of ſlaves is ſeldom mentioned, this leaves us in as great uncertainty as ever, with regard to the populouſneſs even of ſingle cities.

The firſt page of Thucydides is, in my opinion, the commencement of real hiſtory. All preceding narrations are ſo intermixed with fable, that philoſophers ought to abandon them, in a great meaſure, to the embelliſhment of poets and orators [115].

With regard to remote times, the numbers of people aſſigned are often ridiculous, and loſe all credit and authority. The free citizens of Sybaris,

[114] Ælii Lamprid. *in vita* Heliogab. cap. 26.
[115] Se NOTE [P].

able to bear arms, and actually drawn out in battle, were 300,000. They encountered at Siagra with 100,000 citizens of Crotona, another Greek city contiguous to them; and were defeated. This is Diodorus Siculus's [116] account, and is very seriously insisted on by that historian. Strabo [117] also mentions the same number of Sybarites.

Diodorus Siculus [118], enumerating the inhabitants of Agrigentum, when it was destroyed by the Carthaginians, says, that they amounted to 20,000 citizens 200,000 strangers, besides slaves, who in so opulent a city as he represents it, would probably be, at least as numerous. We must remark, that the women and the children are not included; and that therefore, upon the whole, this city must have connained near two millions of inhabitants [119]. And what was the reason of so immense an increase, They were industrious in cultivating the neighbouring fields, not exceeding a small English county; and they traded with their wine and oil to Africa, which, at that time, produced none of these commodities.

Ptolemy, says Theocritus [120], commands 33,339 cities. I suppose the singularity of the number was the reason of assigning it. Diodorus Siculus [121] assigns three millions of inhabitants to Egypt, a small number: But then he makes the number of cities amount to 18,000: An evident contradiction.

[116] Lib. xii. [117] Lib. vi. [118] Lib. xiii.

[119] Diogenes Laertius (*in vita* Empedoclis) says, that Agrigentum contained only 800,000 inhabitants.

[120] Idyl. 17. [121] Lib. i.

He ſays [122], the people were formerly ſeven millions. Thus remote times are always moſt envied and admired.

That Xerxes's army was extremely numerous, I can readily believe; both from the great extent of his empire, and from the practice among the eaſtern nations, of encumbering their camp with a ſuperfluous multitude: But will any rational man cite Herodotus's wonderful narrations as an authority? There is ſomething very rational, I own, in Lyſias's[123] argument upon this ſubject. Had not Xerxes's army been incredibly numerous, ſays he, he had never made a bridge over the Helleſpont: It had been much eaſier to have tranſported his men over ſo ſhort a paſſage, with the numerous ſhipping of which he was maſter.

Polybius [124] ſays, that the Romans, between the firſt and ſecond Punic wars, being threatened with an invaſion from the Gauls, muſtered all their own forces, and thoſe of their allies, and found them amount to ſeven hundred thouſand men able to bear arms: A great number ſurely, and which when joined to the ſlaves, is probably not leſs, if not rather more, than that extent of country affords at preſent[125]. The enumeration too, ſeems to have been made with ſome exactneſs; and Polybius gives us the detail of the particulars. But might not the number be magnified, in order to encourage the people?

[122] Idyl. 17. [123] *Orat. funebris.* [124] Lib. ii.

[125] The country that ſupplied this number, was not above a third of Italy, viz. the Pope's dominions, Tuſcany, and a part of the kingdom of Naples: But perhaps in thoſe early times there were very few ſlaves, except in Rome or the great cities.

Diodorus Siculus [126] makes the ſame enumeration amount to near a million. Theſe variations are ſuſpicious. He plainly too ſuppoſes, that Italy in his time was not ſo populous: Another ſuſpicious circumſtance. For who can believe, that the inhabitants of that country diminiſhed from the time of the firſt Punic war to that of the *triumvirate?*

Julius Cæſar, according to Appian [127], encountered four millions of Gauls, killed one million, and made another million priſoners [128]. Suppoſing the number of the enemy's army and that of the ſlain could be exactly aſſigned, which never is poſſible; how could it be known how often the ſame man returned into the armies, or how diſtinguiſh the new from old levied ſoldiers? No attention ought ever to be given to ſuch looſe, exaggerated calculations; eſpecially where the author does not tell us the mediums upon which the circulations were founded.

Paterculus [129] makes the number of Gauls killed by Cæſar amount only to 400,000. A more probable account, and more eaſily reconciled to the hiſtory of theſe wars given by that conqueror himſelf in his Commentaries [130]. The moſt bloody of his battles were fought againſt the Helvetii and the Germans.

[126] Lib. ii. [127] Celtica.

[128] Plutarch (*in vita* Cæſ.) makes the number that Cæſar fought with amount to three millions; Julian (*in* Cæſaribus) to two. [129] Lib. ii. cap. 47.

[130] See NOTE [Q].

One would imagine, that every circumſtance of the life and actions of Dionyſius the elder might be regarded as authentic, and free from all fabulous exaggeration; both becauſe he lived at a time when letters flouriſhed moſt in Greece, and becauſe his chief hiſtorian was Philiſtus, a man allowed to be of great genius, and who was a courtier and miniſter of that prince. But can we admit, that he had a ſtanding army of 100,000 foot, 10,000 horſe, and a fleet of 400 gallies [131]? Theſe, we may obſerve, were mercenary forces, and ſubſiſted upon pay, like our armies in Europe. For the citizens were all diſarmed; and when Dion afterwards invaded Sicily, and called on his countrymen to vindicate their liberty, he was obliged to bring arms along with him, which he diſtributed among thoſe who joined him [132]. In a ſtate where agriculture alone flouriſhes, there may be many inhabitants; and if theſe be all armed and diſciplined, a great force may be called out upon occaſion: But great bodies of mercenary troops can never be maintained, without either great trade and numerous manufactures, or extenſive dominions. The United Provinces never were maſters of ſuch a force by ſea and land as that which is ſaid to belong to Dionyſius; yet they poſſeſs as large a territory, perfectly well cultivated, and have much more reſources from their commerce and induſtry. Diodorus Siculus allows, that, even in his time, the army of Dionyſius appeared incredible; that is, as I interpret it, was entirely a fiction; and the opinion aroſe from the exaggerated flattery of the

[131] Diod. Sic. lib. ii. [132] Plutarch, *in vita* Dionyſ.

courtiers and perhaps from the vanity and policy of the tyrant himſelf.

It is a uſual fallacy, to conſider all the ages of antiquity as one period, and to compute the numbers contained in the great cities mentioned by ancient authors, as if theſe cities had been all cotemporary. The Greek colonies flouriſhed extremely in Sicily during the age of Alexander: But in Auguſtus's time they were ſo decayed, that almoſt all the produce of that fertile iſland was conſumed in Italy [133].

Let us now examine the number of inhabitants aſſigned to particular cities in antiquity; and omitting the numbers of Nineveh, Babylon, and the Egyptian Thebes, let us confine ourſelves to the ſphere of real hiſtory, to the Grecian and Roman ſtates. I muſt own, the more I conſider this ſubject, the more I am inclined to ſcepticiſm, with regard to the great populouſneſs aſcribed to ancient times.

Athens is ſaid by Plato [134] to be a very great city; and it was ſurely the greateſt of all the Greek [135] cities except Syracuſe, which was nearly about the ſame ſize in Thucydides's [136] time, and afterwards increaſed beyond it. For Cicero [137] mentions it as

[133] Strabo, lib. vi. [134] *Apolog.* Socr.

[135] Argos ſeems alſo to have been a great city; for Lyſias contents himſelf with ſaying that it did not exceed Athens. Orat. 34.

[136] Lib. vi. See alſo Plutarch *in vita* Niciæ.

[137] *Orat. contra* Verrem, lib. iv. cap. 52. Strabo, lib. vi. ſays, it was twenty-two miles in compaſs. But then we are to conſider, that it contained two harbours within it; one of which was a very large one, and might be regarded as a kind of bay.

the greateſt of all the Greek cities in his time; not comprehending, I ſuppoſe, either Antioch or Alexandria under that domination. Athenæus [138] ſays, that, by the enumeration of Demetrius Phalereus, there were in Athens 21,000 citizens, 10,000 ſtrangers, and 400,000 ſlaves. This number is much inſiſted on by thoſe whoſe opinion I call in queſtion, and is eſteemed a fundamental fact to their purpoſe: But, in my opinion, there is no point of criticiſm more certain, than that Athenæus and Cteſicles, whom he quotes, are here miſtaken, and that the number of ſlaves is, at leaſt, augmented by a whole cipher, and ought not to be regarded as more than 40,000.

Firſt, When the number of citizens is ſaid to be 21,000 by Athenæus [139], men of full age are only underſtood. For, (1) Herodotus ſays [140] that Ariſtagoras, ambaſſador from the Ionians, found it harder to deceive one Spartan than 30,000 Athenians; meaning, in a looſe way, the whole ſtate, ſuppoſed to be met in one popular aſſembly, excluding the women and children. (2.) Thucydides [141] ſays, that, making allowance for all the abſentees in the fleet, army, garriſons, and for people employed in the private affairs, the Athenian aſſembly never roſe to five thouſand. (3.) The forces enumerated by the ſame hiſtorian [142], being all

138 Lib. vi. cap. 20.
139 Demoſthenes aſſigns 20,000; *contra* Ariſtag.
140 Lib. v. 141 Lib. viii.
142 Lib. ii. Dionyſius Siculus's account perfectly agrees, lib. xii.

citizens, and amounting to 13,000 heavy-armed infantry, prove the ſame method of calculation; as alſo the whole tenor of the Greek hiſtorians, who always underſtand men of full age, when they aſſign the number of citizens in any republic. Now, theſe being but the fourth of the inhabitants, the free Athenians were by this account 84,000; the ſtrangers 40,000; and the ſlaves, calculating by the ſmaller number, and allowing that they married and propagated at the ſame rate with freemen, were 160,000; and the whole of the inhabitants 284,000: A number ſurely large enough. The other number, 1,720,000, makes Athens larger than London and Paris united.

Secondly, There were but 10,000 houſes in Athens [143].

Thirdly, Though the extent of the walls, as given by Thucydides [144], be great, (to wit, eighteen miles, beſides the ſea-coaſt); yet Xenophon [145] ſays, there was much waſte-ground within the walls. They ſeem indeed to have joined four diſtinct and ſeparate cities [146].

Fourthly, No inſurrection of the ſlaves, or ſuſpicion of inſurrection, is ever mentioned by hiſtorians; except one commotion of the miners [147].

Fifthly, The treatment of ſlaves by the Athenians is ſaid by Xenophon [148], and Demoſthenes [149],

[143] Xenophon, *Mem.* lib. ii. [144] Lib. ii.
[145] *De ratione red.* [146] See NOTE [R].
[147] Athen. lib. vi. [148] *De rep.* Athen.
[149] Philip. 3.

and

and Plautus [149], to have been extremely gentle and indulgent: Which could never have been the caſe, had the diſproportion been twenty to one. The diſproportion is not ſo great in any of our colonies; yet are we obliged to exerciſe a rigorous military government over the negroes.

Sixthly, No man is ever eſteemed rich for poſſeſſing what may be reckoned an equal diſtribution of property in any country, or even triple or quadruple that wealth. Thus every perſon in England is computed by ſome to ſpend ſixpence a-day: Yet is he eſteemed but poor who has five times that ſum. Now Timarchus is ſaid by Æſchines [150] to have been left in eaſy circumſtances; but he was maſter only of ten ſlaves employed in manufactures. Lyſias and his brother, two ſtrangers, were proſcribed by the thirty for their great riches; though they had but ſixty a-piece [151]. Demoſthenes was left very rich by his father, yet he had no more than fifty-two ſlaves [152]. His workhouſe of twenty cabinet-makers, is ſaid to be a very conſiderable manufactory [153].

Seventhly, During the Decelian war, as the Greek hiſtorians call it, 20,000 ſlaves deſerted, and brought the Athenians to great diſtreſs, as we learn from

[149] Sticho.
[150] *Contra* Timarch.
[151] *Orat.* 11.
[152] *Contra* Aphob.
[153] Ibid.

Thucydides [154]. This could not have happened, had they been only the twentieth part. The beſt ſlaves would not deſert.

Eighthly, Xenophon [155] propoſes a ſcheme for maintaining by the public 10,000 ſlaves: And that ſo great a number may poſſibly be ſupported, any one will be convinced, ſays he, who conſiders the numbers we poſſeſſed before the Decelian war. A way of ſpeaking altogether incompatible with the larger number of Athenæus.

Ninthly, The whole *cenſus* of the ſtate of Athens was leſs than 6000 talents. And though numbers in ancient manuſcripts be often ſuſpected by critics, yet this is unexceptionable; both becauſe Demoſthenes [156], who gives it, gives alſo the detail, which checks him; and becauſe Polybius [157] aſſigns the ſame number, and reaſons upon it. Now, the moſt vulgar ſlave could yield by his labor an *obolus* a-day, over and above his maintenance, as we learn from Xenophon [158], who ſays, that Nicias's overſeer paid his maſter ſo much for ſlaves whom he employed in mines. If you will take the pains to eſtimate an *obolus* a-day, and the ſlaves at 400,000, computing only at four years purchaſe, you will find the ſum above 12,000 talents; even though allowance be made for the great number of holydays in Athens. Beſides, many of the ſlaves would have a much greater value from their art. The loweſt that Demoſthenes eſtimates any of his [159]

[154] Lib. vii.
[155] *De rat. red.*
[156] *De claſſibus.*
[157] Lib. ii. cap. 62.
[158] *De rat. red.*
[159] *Contra.* Aphobum.

father's ſlaves is two minas a-head. And upon this ſuppoſition, it is a little difficult, I confeſs, to reconcile even the number of 40,000 ſlaves with the *cenſus* of 6000 talents.

Tenthly, Chios is ſaid by Thucydides [160] to contain more ſlaves than any Greek city, except Sparta. Sparta then had more than Athens, in proportion to the number of citizens. The Spartans were 9000 in the town, 30,000 in the country [161]. The male-ſlaves, therefore, of full age, muſt have been more than 78,000; the whole more than 3,120,000. A number impoſſible to be maintained in a narrow barren country, ſuch as Laconia, which had no trade. Had the Helotes been ſo very numerous, the murder of 2000 mentioned by Thucydides [162], would have irritated them, without weakening them.

Beſides, we are to conſider, that the number aſſigned by Athenæus [163], whatever it is, comprehends all the inhabitants of Attica, as well as thoſe of Athens. The Athenians affected much a country-life, as we learn from Thucydides [164]; and when they were all chaſed into town, by the invaſion

[160] Lib. viii. [161] Plutarch *in vita* Lycurg. [162] Lib. iv.

[163] The ſame author affirms, that Corinth had once 460,000 ſlaves! Ægina 470,000. But the foregoing arguments hold ſtronger againſt theſe facts, which are indeed entirely abſurd and impoſſible. It is however remarkable, that Athenæus cites ſo great an authority as Ariſtotle for this laſt fact: And the ſcholiaſt on Pindar mentions the ſame number of ſlaves in Ægina.

[164] Lib. ii.

of their territory during the Peloponnesian war, the city was not able to contain them; and they were obliged to lie in the porticoes, temples, and even streets, for want of lodging [165].

The same remark is to be extended to all the other Greek cities; and when the number of citizens is assigned, we must always understand it to comprehend the inhabitants of the neighbouring country, as well as of the city. Yet, even with this allowance, it must be confessed, that Greece was a populous country, and exceeded what we could imagine concerning so narrow a territory, naturally not very fertile, and which drew no supplies of corn from other places. For, excepting Athens, which traded to Pontus for that commodity, the other cities seem to have subsisted chiefly from their neighbouring territory [166].

Rhodes is well known to have been a city of extensive commerce, and of great fame and splendor; yet it contained only 6000 citizens able to bear arms, when it was besieged by Demetrius [167].

Thebes was always one of the capital cities of Greece [168]. But the number of its citizens exceeded not those of Rhodes [169]. Phliasia is said to be a small city by Xenophon [170]; yet we find that it contained 6000 citizens [171]. I pretend not to reconcile these two facts. Perhaps, Xenophon calls

[165] Thucyd. lib. ii.
[166] See NOTE [S].
[167] Diod. Sic. lib. xx.
[168] Isocr. *paneg.*
[169] See NOTE [T].
[170] Hist. Græc. lib. vii.
[171] Id. lib. vii.

Phliaſia a ſmall town, becauſe it made but a ſmall figure in Greece, and maintained only a ſubordinate alliance with Sparta; or perhaps the country, belonging to it, was extenſive, and moſt of the citizens were employed in the cultivation of it, and dwelt in the neighbouring villages.

Mantinea was equal to any city in Arcadia [172]: Conſequently it was equal to Megalopolis, which was fifty ſtadia, or ſix miles and a quarter in circumference [173]. But Mantinea had only 3000 citizens [174]. The Greek cities, therefore, contained often fields and gardens, together with the houſes; and we cannot judge of them by the extent of their walls. Athens contained no more than 10,000 houſes; yet its walls, with the ſea-coaſt, were above twenty miles in extent. Syracuſe was twenty-two miles in circumference; yet was ſcarcely ever ſpoken of by the ancients as more populous than Athens. Babylon was a ſquare of fifteen miles, or ſixty miles in circuit; but it contained large cultivated fields and incloſures, as we learn from Pliny. Though Aurelian's wall was fifty miles in circumference [175], the circuit of all the thirteen diviſions of Rome, taken apart, according to Publius Victor, was only about forty-three miles. When an enemy invaded the country, all the inhabitants retired within the walls of the ancient cities, with their cattle and furniture, and inſtruments of huſbandry: and the great height to which the walls were raiſed, enabled a ſmall number to defend them with facility.

[172] Polyb. lib. ii.
[173] Polyb. lib. ix. cap. 20.
[174] Lyſias, orat. 34.
[175] Vopiſcus *in vita* Aurel.

Sparta, ſays Xenophon [176], is one of the cities of Greece that has the feweſt inhabitants. Yet Polybius [177] ſays, that it was forty-eight ſtadia in circumference, and was round.

All the Ætolians able to bear arms in Antipater's time, deducting ſome few garriſons, were but ten thouſand men [178].

Polybius [179] tells us, that the Achæan league might, without any inconvenience, march 30 or 40,000 men: And this account ſeems probable: For that league comprehended the greater part of Peloponneſus. Yet Pauſanias [180], ſpeaking of the ſame period, ſays, that all the Achæans able to bear arms, even when ſeveral manumitted ſlaves were joined to them, did not amount to fifteen thouſand.

The Theſſalians, till their final conqueſt by the Romans, were in all ages, turbulent, factious, ſeditious, diſorderly [181]. It is not therefore natural to ſuppoſe, that this part of Greece abounded much in people.

We are told by Thucydides [182], that the part of Peloponneſus, adjoining to Pylus, was deſert and uncultivated. Herodotus ſays [183], that Macedonia was full of lions and wild bulls; animals which can only inhabit vaſt unpeopled foreſts. Theſe were the two extremities of Greece.

[176] *De rep.* Laced. This paſſage is not eaſily reconciled with that of Plutarch above, who ſays, that Sparta had 9000 citizens.

[177] Polyb. lib. ix. cap. 20.

[178] Diod. Sic. lib. xviii.

[179] Legat.

[180] *In* Achaicis.

[181] Tit. Liv. lib. xxiv. cap. 51. Plato *in* Critone.

[182] Lib. vii.

[183] Lib. vii.

All the inhabitants of Epirus, of all ages, ſexes, and conditions, who were ſold by Paulus Æmilius, amounted only to 150,000 [184]. Yet Epirus might be double the extent of Yorkſhire.

Juſtin [185] tells us, that when Philip of Macedon was declared head of the Greek confederacy, he called a congreſs of all the ſtates, except the Lacedemonians, who refuſed to concur; and he found the force of the whole, upon computation, to amount to 200,000 infantry, and 15,000 cavalry. This muſt be underſtood to be all the citizens capable of bearing arms. For as the Greek republics maintained no mercenary forces, and had no militia diſtinct from the whole body of the citizens, it is not conceivable what other medium there could be of computation. That ſuch an army could ever, by Greece, be brought into the field, and be maintained there, is contrary to all hiſtory. Upon this ſuppoſition, therefore, we may thus reaſon. The free Greeks of all ages and ſexes were 860,000. The ſlaves, eſtimating them by the number of Athenian ſlaves as above, who ſeldom married or had families, were double the male-citizens of full age, to wit, 430,000: And all the inhabitants of ancient Greece, excepting Laconia, were about one million two hundred and ninety thouſand: No mighty number, nor exceeding what may be found at preſent in Scotland, a country of much greater extent, and very indifferently peopled.

[184] Tit. Liv. lib. xlv. cap. 54.

[185] Lib. ix. cap. 5.

We may now conſider the numbers of people in Rome and Italy, and collect all the lights afforded us by ſcattered paſſages in ancient authors. We ſhall find upon the whole, a great difficulty in fixing any opinion on that head; and no reaſon to ſupport thoſe exaggerated calculations ſo much inſiſted on by modern writers.

Dionyſius, Halicarnaſſæus [186] ſays, that the ancient walls of Rome were nearly of the ſame compaſs with thoſe of Athens, but that the ſuburbs ran out to a great extent; and it was difficult to tell where the town ended, or the country began. In ſome places of Rome, it appears from the ſame author [187], from Juvenal [188], and from other ancient writers [189], that the houſes were high, and families lived in ſeparate ſtories, one above another: But it is probable, that theſe were only the poorer citizens, and only in ſome few ſtreets. If we may judge from the younger Pliny's [190] account of his own houſe, and from Bartoli's plans of ancient buildings, the men of quality had very ſpacious palaces; and their buildings were like the Chineſe houſes at this day, where each apartment is ſeparated from the reſt, and riſes no higher than a ſingle ſtory. To which if we add, that the Roman nobility much affected extenſive porticoes, and even woods [191] in town; we may perhaps allow Voſſius (though there is no manner of reaſon for it) to read the famous paſſage of the

[186] Lib. iv. [187] Lib. x. [188] Satyr. iii. l. 269, 270.
[189] See NOTE [V]. [190] See NOTE [X].
[191] Vitruv. lib. v. cap. 11. Tacit. annal. lib. xi. cap. 3. Sueton. *in vita* Octav. cap. 72, &c.

elder Pliny [192] his own way, without admitting the extravagant consequences which he draws from it.

The number of citizens who received corn by the public distribution in the time of Augustus, were two hundred thousand [193]. This one would esteem a pretty certain ground of calculation; Yet it is attended with such circumstances as throw us back into doubt and uncertainty.

Did the poorer citizens only receive the distribution? It was calculated, to be sure, chiefly for their benefit. But it appears from a passage in Cicero [194], that the rich might also take their portion, and that it was esteemed no reproach in them to apply for it.

To whom was the corn given; whether only to heads of families, or to every man, woman, and child? The portion every month was five *modii* to each [195] (about $\frac{5}{8}$ of a bushel). This was too little for a family, and too much for an individual. A very accurate antiquary [196], therefore, infers, that it was given to every man of full age; but he allows the matter to be uncertain.

Was it strictly inquired, whether the claimant lived within the precincts of Rome; or was it sufficient,

[192] See NOTE [Y].

[193] *Ex monument. Ancyr.*

[194] *Tusc. Quest.* lib. iii. cap. 48.

[195] *Licinius apud Sallust. hist. frag.* lib. iii.

[196] *Nicolaus Hortensius de re frumentaria Roman.*

that he presented himself at the monthly distribution? This last seems more probable [197].

Were there no false claimants? We are told [198], that Cæsar struck off at once 170,000, who had creeped in without a just title; and it is very little probable that he remedied all abuses.

But, lastly, what proportion of slaves must we assign to these citizens? This is the most material question, and the most uncertain. It is very doubtful, whether Athens can be established as a rule for Rome. Perhaps the Athenians had more slaves, because they employed them in manufactures, for which a capital city like Rome seems not so proper. Perhaps, on the other hand, the Romans had more slaves, on account of their superior luxury and riches.

There were exact bills of mortality kept at Rome; but no ancient author has given us the number of burials, except Suetonius [199], who tells us, that in one season, there were 30,000 names carried to the temple of Libitina; but this was during a plague which can afford no certain foundation for any inference.

The public corn, though distributed only to 200,000 citizens, affected very considerably the whole

[197] Not to take the people too much from their business, Augustus ordained the distribution of corn to be made only thrice a-year: But the people, finding the monthly distributions more convenient (as preserving, I suppose, a more regular economy in their family), desired to have them restored. Sueton. August. cap. 40. Had not some of the people come from some distance for their corn, Augustus's precaution seems superfluous.

[198] *Sueton. in Jul.* cap. 41.

[199] *In vita Neronis.*

agriculture of Italy [200]: A fact no wife reconcileable to ſome modern exaggerations with regard to the inhabitants of that country.

The beſt ground of conjecture I can find concerning the greatneſs of ancient Rome, is this: We are told by Herodian [201], that Antioch and Alexandria were very little inferior to Rome. It appears from Diodorus Siculus [202], that one ſtraight ſtreet of Alexandria, reaching from gate to gate, was five miles long; and as Alexandria was much more extended in length than breadth, it ſeems to have been a city nearly of the bulk of Paris [203]; and Rome might be about the ſize of London.

There lived in Alexandria, in Diodorus Siculus's time [204], 300,000 free people, comprehending, I ſuppoſe, women and childern [205]. But what number of ſlaves? Had we any juſt ground to fix theſe at an equal number with the free inhabitants, it would favor the foregoing computation.

There is a paſſage in Herodian, which is a little ſurpriſing. He ſays poſitively, that the palace of the Emperor was as large as all the reſt of the city [206]. This was Nero's golden houſe, which is indeed repreſented by Suetonius [207] and Pliny as of an enormous extent [208], but no power of imagination can

[200] *Sueton. Aug.* cap. 42. [201] Lib. iv. cap. 5.

[202] Lib. xvii. [203] See NOTE [Z]. [204] Lib. xvii.

[205] He ſays ελευθεροι, not πολιται, which laſt expreſſion muſt have been underſtood of citizens alone, and grown men.

[206] Lib. iv. cap. 1. παση πολεος. Politian interprets it "æ-"dibus majoribus etiam reliqua urbe."

[207] See NOTE [AA].

[208] Plinius, lib. xxxvi. cap. 15. "Bis vidimus urbem to-"tam cingi domibus principum, Caji ac Neronis."

make us conceive it to bear any proportion to such a city as London.

We may obſerve, had the hiſtorian been relating Nero's extravagance, and had he made uſe of ſuch an expreſſion, it would have had much leſs weight;

Theſe rhetorical exaggerations being ſo apt to creep into an author's ſtyle, even when the moſt chaſte and correct. But it is mentioned by Herodian only by the bye, in relating the quarrels between Geta and Caracalla.

It appears from the ſame hiſtorian [209], that there was then much land uncultivated, and put to no manner of uſe; and he aſcribes it as a great praiſe to Pertinax, that he allowed every one to take ſuch land either in Italy or elſewhere, and cultivate it as he pleaſed, without paying any taxes. *Lands uncultivated, and put to no manner of uſe!* This is not heard of in any part of Chriſtendom, except in ſome remote parts of Hungary, as I have been informed. And it ſurely correſponds very ill with that idea of the extreme populouſneſs of antiquity ſo much inſiſted on.

We learn from Vopiſcus [210], that there was even in Etruria much fertile land uncultivated, which the Emperor Aurelian intended to convert into vineyards, in order to furniſh the Roman people with a gratuitous diſtribution of wine; a very proper expedient for depopulating ſtill farther that capital, and all the neighbouring territories.

It may not be amiſs to take notice of the account which Polybius [211] gives of the great herds of ſwine

[209] Lib. ii. cap. 15.
[210] In Aurelian. cap. 48.
[211] Lib. xii. cap. 2.

to be met with in Tuſcany and Lombardy, as well as in Greece, and of the method of feeding them which was then practiſed. "There are great herds "of ſwine" ſays he, "throughout all Italy, par- "ticularly in former times, through Etruria and "Ciſalpine Gaul. And a herd frequently conſiſts "of a thouſand or more ſwine. When one of theſe "herds in feeding meets with another, they mix to- "gether; and the ſwine-herds have no other expe- "dient for ſeparating them than to go to different "quarters, where they found their horn; and theſe "animals being accuſtomed to that ſignal, run im- "mediately each to the horn of his own keeper. "Whereas in Greece, if the herds of ſwine happen "to mix in the foreſts, he who has the greater flock, "takes cunningly the opportunity of driving all "away. And thieves are very apt to purloin the "ſtraggling hogs, which have wandered to a great "diſtance from their keeper in ſearch of food.

May we not infer from this account, that the north of Italy, as well as Greece, was then much leſs peopled, and worſe cultivated, than at preſent? How could theſe vaſt herds be fed in a country ſo full of incloſures, ſo improved by agriculture, ſo divided by farms, ſo planted with vines and corn intermingled together? I muſt confeſs, that Polybius's relation has more the air of that economy which is to be met with in our American colonies, than the manage- ment of an Euſopean country.

We meet with a reflection in Ariſtotle's [212] Ethics,

[212] Lib. ix. cap. 10. His expreſſion is ανθρωπος, not πολιτης; inhabitant, not citizen.

which ſeems unaccountable on any ſuppoſition, and by proving too much in favor of our preſent reaſoning, may be thought really to prove nothing. That philoſopher, treating of friendſhip, and obſerving, that this relation ought neither to be contracted to a very few, nor extended over a great multitude, illuſtrates his opinion by the following argument: "In like manner," ſays he, "as a city cannot ſub-"ſiſt, if it either have ſo few inhabitants as ten, or "ſo many as a hundred thouſand; ſo is there a me-"diocrity required in the number of friends: and "you deſtroy the eſſence of friendſhip by running "into either extreme." What! impoſſible that a city can contain a hundred thouſand inhabitants! Had Ariſtotle never ſeen nor heard of a city ſo populous? This, I muſt own, paſſes my comprehenſion.

Pliny [213] tells us, that Seleucia, the ſeat of the Greek empire in the Eaſt, was reported to contain 600,000 people. Carthage is ſaid by Strabo [214] to have contained 700,000. The inhabitants of Pekin are not much more numerous. London, Paris, and Conſtantinople, may admit of nearly the ſame computation; at leaſt, the two latter cities do not exceed it. Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, we have already ſpoken of. From the experience of paſt and preſent ages, one might conjecture that there is a kind of impoſſibility, that any city could ever riſe much beyond the proportion. Whether the grandeur of a city be founded on commerce or

[213] Lib. vi. cap. 28.

[214] Lib. xvii.

on empire, there ſeem to be invincible obſtacles, which prevent its farther progreſs. The ſeats of vaſt monarchies, by introducing extravagant luxury, irregular expenſe, idleneſs, dependence, and falſe ideas of rank and ſuperiority, are improper for commerce. Extenſive commerce checks itſelf, by raiſing the price of all labor and commodities. When a great court engages the attendance of a numerous nobility, poſſeſſed of overgrown fortunes, the middling gentry remain in their provincial towns, where they can make a figure on a moderate income. And if the dominions of a ſtate arrive at an enormous ſize, there neceſſarily ariſe many capitals, in the remoter provinces, whither all the inhabitants, except a few courtiers, repair for education, fortune, and amuſement[215]. London, by uniting extenſive commerce and middling empire, has, perhaps, arrived at a greatneſs, which no city will ever be able to exceed.

Chuſe Dover or Calais for a centre: Draw a circle of two hundred miles radius: You comprehend London, Paris, the Netherlands, the United Provinces and ſome of the beſt cultivated parts of France and England. It may ſafely, I think, be affirmed, that no ſpot of ground can be

[215] Such were Alexandria, Antioch, Carthage, Epheſus, Lyons, &c. in the Roman empire. Such are even Bourdeaux, Toulouſe, Dijon, Rennes, Rouen, Aix, &c. in France: Dublin, Edinburgh, York, in the Britiſh dominions.

found in antiquity, of equal extent, which contained near ſo many great and populous cities, and was ſo ſtocked with riches and inhabitants. To balance in both periods, the ſtates which poſſeſſed moſt art, knowledge, civility, and the beſt police, ſeems the trueſt method of compariſon.

It is an obſervation of L'Abbé du Bos, that Italy is warmer at preſent than it was in ancient times. "The annals of Rome tell us," ſays he, "that in "the year 480 *ab U. C.* the winter was ſo ſevere "that it deſtroyed the trees. The Tyber froze in "Rome, and the ground was covered with ſnow "for forty days. When Juvenal [216] deſcribes a ſu- "perſtitious woman, he repreſents her as breaking "the ice of the Tyber, that ſhe might perform her "ablutions:

"*Hybernum fracta glacie deſcendet in amnem,*
"*Ter matutino Tyberi mergetur.*

"He ſpeaks of that river's freezing as a common "event. Many paſſages of Horace ſuppoſe the "ſtreets of Rome full of ſnow and ice. We "ſhould have more certainty with regard to this "point, had the ancients known the uſe of "thermometers: But their writers, without in- "tending it, give us information, ſufficient to con- "vince us, that the winters are now much more "temperate at Rome than formerly. At preſent "the Tyber no more freezes at Rome than the "Nile at Cairo. The Romans eſteem the winters "very rigorous, if the ſnow lie two days, and if

[216] Sat. 6.

"one

" one fee for eight-and-forty hours a few icicles
" hang from a fountain that has a north-expoſure."

The obſervation of this ingenious critic may be extended to other European climates. Who could diſcover the mild climate of France in Diodorus Siculus's [217] deſcription of that of Gaul? "As it is "a northern climate," ſays he, "it is infected "with cold to an extreme degree. In cloudy "weather, inſtead of rain there fall great ſnows; "and in clear weather, it there freezes ſo exceſſive "hard, that the rivers acquire bridges of their "own ſubſtance, over which, not only ſingle "travellers may paſs, but large armies, accom-"panied with all their baggage and loaded waggons. "And there being many rivers in Gaul, the Rhone, "the Rhine, &c. almoſt all of them are frozen over; "and it is uſual in order to prevent falling, to "cover the ice with chaff and ſtraw at the place "where the road paſſes." *Colder than a* Gallic *Winter*, is uſed by Petronius as a proverbial expreſſion. Ariſtotle ſays, that Gaul is ſo cold a climate that an aſs could not live in it [218].

North of the Cevennes, ſays Strabo [219], Gaul produces not figs and olives: And the vines which have been planted, bear not grapes that will ripen.

Ovid poſitively maintains, with all the ſerious affirmation of proſe, that the Euxine ſea was frozen over every winter in his time; and he appeals to

[217] Liv. iv.
[218] De generat. anim. lib. ii.
[219] Lib. iv.

Roman governors, whom he names, for the truth of his aſſertion [220]. This ſeldom or never happens at preſent in the latitude of Tomi, whither Ovid was baniſhed. All the complaints of the ſame poet ſeem to mark a rigor of the ſeaſons, which is ſcarcely experienced at preſent in Peterſburgh or Stockholm.

Tournefort, a *Provençal*, who had travelled into the ſame country, obſerves, that there is not a finer climate in the world: And he aſſerts, that nothing but Ovid's melancholy could have given him ſuch diſmal ideas of it. But the facts mentioned by that poet are too circumſtantial to bear any ſuch interpretation.

Polybius [221] ſays, that the climate in Arcadia was very cold, and the air moiſt.

"Italy," ſays Varro [222], "is the moſt temperate "climate in Europe. The inland parts" (Gaul, Germany, and Pannonia, no doubt) "have almoſt "perpetual winter."

The northern parts of Spain, according to Strabo [223], are but ill inhabited, becauſe of the great cold.

Allowing, therefore, this remark to be juſt, that Europe is become warmer than formerly; how can we account for it? Plainly by no other method, than by ſuppoſing, that the land is at preſent much better cultivated, and that the woods are cleared, which formerly threw a ſhade upon the earth, and kept the

[220] *Triſt.* lib. iii. eleg. 9. *Ex Pont.* lib. iv. eleg. 7. 9, 10.
[221] Lib. iv. cap. 21. [222] Lib. i. cap. 2.
[223] Lib. iii.

rays of the ſun from penetrating to it. Our northern colonies in America become more temperate, in proportion as the woods are felled [224]; but in general, every one may remark, that cold is ſtill much more ſeverely felt, both in North and South America, than in places under the ſame latitude in Europe.

Saſerna, quoted by Columella [225], affirmed, that the diſpoſition of the heavens was altered before his time, and that the air had become much milder and warmer; as appears hence, ſays he, that many places now abound with vineyards and olive-plantations, which formerly, by reaſon of the rigor of the climate, could raiſe none of theſe productions. Such a change, if real, will be allowed an evident ſign of the better cultivation and peopling of countries before the age of Saſerna [226]; and if it be continued to the preſent times, is a proof, that theſe advantages have been continually increaſing throughout this part of the world.

Let us now caſt our eye over all the countries which are the ſcene of ancient and modern hiſtory, and compare their paſt and preſent ſituation: We ſhall not, perhaps find ſuch foundation for the complaint of the preſent emptineſs and deſolation of the

[224] The warm ſouthern colonies alſo become more healthful: And it is remarkable, that in the Spaniſh hiſtories of the firſt diſcovery and conqueſt of theſe countries, they appear to have been very healthful; being then well peopled and cultivated. No account of the ſickneſs or decay of Cortes's or Pizarro's ſmall armies.

[225] Lib. i. cap. 1.

[226] He ſeems to have lived about the time of the younger Africanus; lib. i. cap. i.

world. Ægypt is represented by Maillet, to whom we owe the best account of it, as extremely populous; though he esteems the number of its inhabitants to be diminished. Syria, and the Lesser Asia, as well as the coast of Barbary, I can readily own to be desert in comparison of their ancient condition. The depopulation of Greece is also obvious. But whether the country now called Turky in Europe may not, in general, contain more inhabitants than during the flourishing period of Greece, may be a little doubtful. The Thracians seem then to have lived like the Tartars at present, by pasturage and plunder[227]: The Getes were still more uncivilized[228]: And the Illyrians were no better[229]. These occupy nine-tenths of that country: And though the government of the Turks be not very favorable to industry and propagation; yet it preserves at least peace and order among the inhabitants; and is preferable to that barbarous, unsettled condition, in which they anciently lived.

Poland and Muscovy in Europe are not populous; but are certainly much more so than the ancient Sarmatia and Scythia; where no husbandry or tillage was ever heard of, and pasturage was the sole art by which the people were maintained. The like observation may be extended to Denmark and Sweden. No one ought to esteem the immense swarms of people, which formerly came from the North, and over-ran all Europe, to be

227 *Xenoph. Exp.* lib. vii. *Polyb.* lib. iv. cap. 45.

228 *Ovid. passim, &c. Strabo*, lib. vii.

229 *Polyb.* lib. ii. cap. 12.

any objection to this opinion. Where a whole nation, or even half of it, remove their ſeat; it is eaſy to imagine, what a prodigious multitude they muſt form; with what deſperate valor they muſt make their attacks; and how the terror they ſtrike into the invaded nations will make theſe magnify, in their imagination, both the courage and multitude of the invaders. Scotland is neither extenſive nor populous; but were the half of its inhabitants to ſeek new ſeats, they would form a colony as numerous as the Teutons and Cimbri; and would ſhake all Europe, ſuppoſing it in no better condition for defence than formerly.

Germany has ſurely at preſent twenty times more inhabitants than in ancient times, when they cultivated no ground, and each tribe valued itſelf on the extenſive deſolation which it ſpread around; as we learn from Cæſar [230], and Tacitus [231], and Strabo [232]. A proof, that the diviſion into ſmall republics will not alone render a nation populous, unleſs attended with the ſpirit of peace, order, and induſtry.

The barbarous condition of Britain in former times is well known, and the thinneſs of its inhabitants may eaſily be conjectured, both from their barbarity, and from a circumſtance mentioned by Herodian [233], that all Britain was marſhy, even

230 *De bello Gallico*, lib. vi.

231 *De Moribus Germ.*

232 Lib. vii.

233 Lib. iii. cap. 47.

in Severus's time, after the Romans had been fully ſettled in it above a century.

It is not eaſily imagined, that the Gauls were anciently much more advanced in the arts of life than their northern neighbours; ſince they travelled to this iſland for their education in the myſteries of the religion and philoſophy of the Druids [234]. I cannot therefore think, that Gaul was then near ſo populous as France is at preſent.

Were we to believe, indeed, and join together the teſtimony of Appian, and that of Diodorus Siculus, we muſt admit of an incredible populouſneſs in Gaul. The former hiſtorian [235] ſays, that there were 400 nations in that country; the latter [236] affirms, that the largeſt of the Gallic nations conſiſted of 200,000 men, beſides women and children, and the leaſt of 50,000. Calculating, therefore, at a medium, we muſt admit of near 200,000,000 of people, in a country which we eſteem populous at preſent, though ſuppoſed to contain little more than twenty [237]. Such calculations, therefore, by their extravagance, loſe all manner of authority. We may obſerve, that the equality of property, to which the populouſneſs of antiquity may be aſcribed, had no place among the Gauls [238]. Their inteſtine wars alſo, before Cæſar's time, were almoſt

234 Cæſar *de Bello Gallico*, lib. xvi. Strabo, lib. vii. ſays, the Gauls were not much more improved than the Germans.

235 Celt. pars 1.

236 Lib. v.

237 Ancient Gaul was more extenſive than modern France.

238 Cæſar *de Bello Gallico*, lib. vi.

perpetual[239]. And Strabo[240] obſerves, that though all Gaul was cultivated, yet it was not cultivated with any ſkill or care; the genius of the inhabitants leading them leſs to arts than arms; till their ſlavery under Rome produced peace among themſelves.

Cæſar[241] enumerates very particularly the great forces which were levied in Belgium to oppoſe his conqueſts; and makes them amount to 208,000. Theſe were not the whole peole able to bear arms: For the ſame hiſtorian tells us, that the Bellovaci could have brought a hundred thouſand men into the field, though they engaged only for ſixty. Taking the whole; therefore, in this proportion of ten to ſix, the ſum of fighting men in all the ſtates of Belgium was about 350,000; all the inhabitants a million and a half. And Belgium being about a fourth of Gaul, that country might contain ſix millions, which is not near the third of its preſent inhabitants[242]. We are informed by Cæſar, that the Gauls had no fixed property in land; but that the chieftains, when any death happened in a family, made a new diviſion of all the lands among the ſeveral members of the family. This is the cuſtom of *Taniſtry*, which ſo long prevailed in Ireland, and which retained that country in a ſtate of miſery, barbariſm, and deſolation.

239 Cæſar *de Bello Gallico*, lib. vi.
240 Lib. iv.
241 *De Bello Gallico*, lib. ii.
242 See NOTE [BB].

The ancient Helvetia was 250 miles in length, and 180 in breadth, according to the ſame author[243]; yet contained only 360,000 inhabitants. The canton of Bern alone has, at preſent, as many people.

After this computation of Appian and Diodorus Siculus, I know not whether I dare affirm, that the modern Dutch are more numerous than the ancient Batavi.

Spain is, perhaps, decayed from what it was three centuries ago; but if we ſtep backward two thouſand years, and conſider the reſtleſs, turbulent, unſettled condition of its inhabitants, we may probably be inclined to think, that it is now much more populous. Many Spaniards killed themſelves, when deprived of their arms by the Romans[244]. It appears from Plutarch[245], that robbery and plunder were eſteemed honorable among the Spaniards. Hirtius[246] repreſents in the ſame light the ſituation of that country in Cæſar's time; and he ſays, that every man was obliged to live in caſtles and walled towns for his ſecurity. It was not till its final conqueſt under Auguſtus, that theſe diſorders were repreſſed[247]. The account which Strabo[248] and Juſtin[249] give of Spain, correſponds exactly with thoſe above mentioned. How

243 *De Bello Gallico*, lib. i.
244 *Titi Livii*, lib. xxxiv. cap. 17.
245 *In vita Marii.*
246 *De Bello Hiſp.*
247 *Vell. Paterc.* lib. ii. § 90.
248 Lib. iii. 249 Lib. xliv.

much, therefore, muſt it diminiſh from our idea of the populouſnefs of antiquity, when we find, that Tully, comparing Italy, Afric, Gaul, Greece, and Spain, mentions the great number of inhabitants, as the peculiar circumſtance which rendered this latter country formidable [250]?

Italy, however, it is probable, has decayed: But how many great cities does it ſtill contain? Venice, Genoa, Pavia, Turin, Milan, Naples, Florence, Leghorn, which either ſubſiſted not in ancient times, or were then very inconſiderable? If we reflect on this, we ſhall not be apt to carry matters to ſo great an extreme as is uſual with regard to this ſubject.

When the Roman authors complain, that Italy, which formerly exported corn, became dependent on all the provinces for its daily bread, they never aſcribe this alteration to the increaſe if its inhabitants, but to the neglect of tillage and agriculture [251]. A natural effect of that pernicious practice of importing corn, in order to diſtribute it *gratis* among the Roman citizens, and a very bad means of

250 "Nec numero Hiſpanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calli-
" ditate Pœnos, nec artibus Græcos, nec denique hoc ipſo hu-
" jus gentis ac terræ domeſtico nativoque ſenſu, Italos ipſos
" ac Latinos — ſuperavimus." *De haruſp. reſp.* cap. 9. The diſorders of Spain ſeem to have been almoſt proverbial: "Nec
" impacatos a tergo horrebis Iberos." *Virg. Georg.* lib. iii. The Iberi are here plainly taken, by a poetical figure, for robbers in general.

251 Varro *de re ruſtica*, lib. ii. præf. Columella, præf. Sueton. Auguſt. cap. 42.

multiplying the inhabitants of any country [252]. The *ſportula*, ſo much talked of by Martial and Juvenal, being preſents regularly made by the great lords to their ſmaller clients, muſt have had a like tendency to produce idleneſs, debauchery, and a continual decay among the people. The Pariſh-rates have at preſent the ſame bad conſequences in England.

Were I to aſſign a period, when I imagine this part of the world might poſſibly contain more inhabitants than at preſent, I ſhould pitch upon the age of Trajan and the Antonines; the great extent of the Roman empire being then civilized and cultivated, ſettled almoſt in a profound peace both foreign and domeſtic, and living under the ſame regular police and government [253]. But we are told, that all extenſive governments, eſpecially abſolute monarchies, are pernicious to population, and contain a ſecret vice and poiſon which deſtroy the effect of all theſe promiſing appearances [254]. To confirm this, there is a paſſage cited from Plutarch [255], which being ſomewhat ſingular, we ſhall here examine it.

The author, endeavouring to account for the ſilence of many of the oracles, ſays, that it may be

[252] Though the obſervations of L'Abbé du Bos ſhould be admitted, that Italy is now warmer than in former times, the conſequence may not be neceſſary, that it is more populous or better cultivated. If the other countries of Europe were more ſavage and woody, the cold winds that blew from them might affect the climate of Italy.

[253] See NOTE [CC].

[254] *L'Eſprit des Loix*, liv. xxiii. chap. 19.

[255] *De Orac. Defect.*

aſcribed to the preſent deſolation of the world, proceeding from former wars and factions; which common calamity, he adds, has fallen heavier upon Greece than on any other country; inſomuch, that the whole could ſcarcely at preſent furniſh three thouſand warriors; a number which, in the time of the Median war, were ſupplied by the ſingle city of Megara. The gods, therefore, who affect works of dignity and importance, have ſuppreſſed many of their oracles, and deign not to uſe ſo many interpreters of their will to ſo diminutive a people.

I muſt confeſs, that this paſſage contains ſo many difficulties, that I know not what to make of it. You may obſerve, that Plutarch aſſigns, for a cauſe of the decay of mankind, not the extenſive dominion of the Romans, but the former wars and factions of the ſeveral ſtates; all which were quieted by the Roman arms. Plutarch's reaſoning, therefore, is directly contrary to the inference which is drawn from the fact he advances.

Polybius ſuppoſes, that Greece had become more proſperous and flouriſhing after the eſtabliſhment of the Roman yoke [256]; and though that hiſtorian wrote before theſe conquerors had degenerated, from being the patrons, to be the plunderers of mankind; yet as we find from Tacitus [257], that the ſeverity of the emperors afterwards corrected the licence of the governors, we have no reaſon to think that extenſive monarchy ſo deſtructive as it is often repreſented.

We learn from Strabo [258], that the Romans,

256 See NOTE [DD].

257 *Annal.* lib. i. cap. 2.

258 Lib. viii. and ix.

from their regard to the Greeks, maintained, to his time, moſt of the privileges and liberties of that celebrated nation; and Nero afterwards rather increaſed them [259]. How therefore can we imagine, that the Roman yoke was ſo burdenſome over that part of the world? The oppreſſion of the proconſuls was checked; and the magiſtracies in Greece being all beſtowed, in the ſeveral cities, by the free votes of the people, there was no neceſſity for the competitors to attend the emperor's court. If great numbers went to ſeek their fortunes in Rome, and advance themſelves by learning or eloquence, the commodities of their native country, many of them would return with the fortunes which they had acquired, and thereby enrich the Grecian commonwealths.

But Plutarch ſays, that the general depopulation had been more ſenſibly felt in Greece than in any other country. How is this reconcileable to its ſuperior privileges and advantages?

Beſides, this paſſage, by proving too much, really proves nothing. *Only three thouſand men able to bear arms in all* Greece! who can admit ſo ſtrange a propoſition, eſpecially if we conſider the great number of Greek cities, whoſe names ſtill remain in hiſtory, and which are mentioned by writers long after the age of Plutarch? There are there ſurely ten times more people at preſent, when there ſcarcely remains a city in all the bounds of ancient Greece. That country is ſtill tolerably cultivated, and furniſhes a ſure ſupply of corn, in caſe

259 Plutarch. *De his qui ſero a Numine puniuntur.*

of any ſcarcity in Spain, Italy, or the South of France.

We may obſerve, that the ancient frugality of the Greeks, and their equality of property, ſtill ſubſiſted during the age of Plutarch, as appears from Lucian [260]. Nor is there any ground to imagine, that that country was poſſeſſed by a few maſters, and a great number of ſlaves.

It is probable, indeed, that military diſcipline, being entirely uſeleſs, was extremely neglected in Greece after the eſtabliſhment of the Roman empire; and if theſe commonwealths, formerly ſo warlike and ambitious, maintained each of them a ſmall city-guard to prevent mobbiſh diſorders, it is all they had occaſion for; and theſe perhaps did not amount to 3000 men throughout all Greece. I own, that if Plutarch had this fact in his eye, he is here guilty of a groſs paralogiſm, and aſſigns cauſes no wiſe proportioned to the effects. But is it ſo great a prodigy, that an author ſhould fall into a miſtake of this nature [261]?

But whatever force may remain in this paſſage of Plutarch, we ſhall endeavour to counterbalance it by as remarkable a paſſage in Diodorus Siculus, where the hiſtorian, after mentioning Ninus's army of 1,700,000 foot, and 200,000 horſe, endeavours to ſupport the credibility of this account by ſome poſterior facts; and adds, that we muſt not form a notion of the ancient populouſneſs of mankind from the preſent emptineſs and depopulation

260 *De mercede conductis.* 261 See NOTE [EE].

which is ſpread over the world [262]. Thus an author, who lived at that very period of antiquity which is repreſented as moſt populous [263], complains of the deſolation which then prevailed, gives the preference to former times, and has recourſe to ancient fables as a foundation for his opinion. The humor of blaming the preſent, and admiring the paſt, is ſtrongly rooted in human nature, and has an influence even on perſons endued with the profoundeſt judgment and moſt extenſive learning.

ESSAY XII.

OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT.

As no party, in the preſent age, can well ſupport itſelf, without a philoſophical or ſpeculative ſyſtem of principles, annexed to its political or practical one, we accordingly find, that each of the factions, into which this nation is divided, has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that ſcheme of actions which it purſues. The people being commonly very rude builders, eſpecially in this ſpeculative way, and more eſpecially ſtill when actuated by party-zeal; it is natural to imagine, that their workmanſhip muſt be a little unſhapely, and diſcover evident marks of that violence and hurry in which it was raiſed. The one party, by tracing up government to the Deity, endeavour to render it ſo ſacred and inviolate, that it muſt be little leſs than ſacrilege, however

[262] Lib. ii.

[263] He was cotemporary with Cæſar and Auguſtus.

tyrannical it may become, to touch or invade it in the ſmalleſt article. The other party, by founding government altogether on the conſent of the People, ſuppoſe that there is a kind of *original contract*, by which the ſubjects have tacitly reſerved the power of reſiſting their ſovereign, whenever they find themſelves aggrieved by that authority, with which they have, for certain purpoſes, voluntarily intruſted him. Theſe are the ſpeculative principles of the two parties; and theſe too are the practical conſequences deduced from them.

I ſhall venture to affirm, *That both theſe* ſyſtems *of ſpeculative principles are juſt; though not in the ſenſe intended by the parties*: And, *That both the* ſchemes *of practical conſequences are prudent; though not in the extremes to which each party, in oppoſition to the other, has commonly endeavoured to carry them.*

That the Deity is the ultimate author of all government, will never be denied by any who admit a general providence, and allow, that all events in the univerſe are conducted by an uniform plan, and directed to wiſe purpoſes. As it is impoſſible for the human race to ſubſiſt, at leaſt in any comfortable or ſecure ſtate, without the protection of government; this inſtitution muſt certainly have been intended by that beneficent Being, who means the good of all his creatures: And as it has univerſally, in fact, taken place, in all countries, and all ages; we may conclude, with ſtill greater certainty, that it was intended by that omniſcient Being, who can never be deceived by any event or operation. But ſince he gave riſe to it, not by any

particular or miraculous interpoſition, but by his concealed and univerſal efficacy; a ſovereign cannot, properly ſpeaking, be called his vicegerent, in any other ſenſe than every power or force, being derived from him, may be ſaid to act by his commiſſion. Whatever actually happens is comprehended in the general plan or intention of providence; nor has the greateſt and moſt lawful prince any more reaſon, upon that account, to plead a peculiar ſacredneſs or inviolable authority, than an inferior magiſtrate or even an uſurper, or even a robber and a pirate. The ſame divine ſuperintendent, who for wiſe purpoſes, inveſted a Titus or a Trajan with authority, did alſo, for purpoſes, no doubt, equally wiſe, though unknown, beſtow power on a Borgia or an Angria. The ſame cauſes, which gave riſe to the ſovereign power in every ſtate, eſtabliſhed likewiſe every petty juriſdiction in it, and every limited authority. A conſtable, therefore, no leſs than a king, acts by a divine commiſſion, and poſſeſſes an indefeaſible right.

When we conſider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education; we muſt neceſſarily allow, that nothing but their own conſent could, at firſt, aſſociate them together, and ſubject them to any authority. The people, if we trace government to its firſt origin in the woods and deſerts, are the ſource of all power and juriſdiction, and voluntarily, for the ſake of peace and order, abandoned their native liberty, and received laws from their equal and companion. The conditions, upon which they

they were willing to ſubmit, were either expreſſed, or were ſo clear and obvious, that it might well be eſteemed ſuperfluous to expreſs them. If this, then, be meant by the *original contract*, it cannot be denied, that all government is, at firſt, founded on a contract, and that the moſt ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed chiefly by that principle. In vain, are we aſked in what record this charter of our liberties is regiſtered. It was not written on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It preceded the uſe of writing and all the other civilized arts of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and in the equality, or ſomething approaching equality, which we find in all the individuals of that ſpecies. The force, which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly political, and derived from authority, the effect of eſtabliſhed government. A man's natural force conſiſts only in the vigor of his limbs, and the firmneſs of his courage; which could never ſubject multitudes to the command of one. Nothing but their own conſent, and their ſenſe of the advantages reſulting from peace and order, could have had that influence.

Yet even this conſent was long very imperfect, and could not be the baſis of a regular adminiſtration. The chieftain, who had probably acquired his influence during the continuance of war, ruled more by perſuaſion than command; and till he could employ force to reduce the refractory and diſobedient, the ſociety could ſcarcely be ſaid to have attained a ſtate of civil government. No compact or agreement, it is evident, was expreſsly formed for general

ſubmiſſion; an idea far beyond the comprehenſion of ſavages: Each exertion of authority in the chieftain muſt have been particular, and called forth by the preſent exigencies of the caſe: The ſenſible utility, reſulting from his interpoſition, made theſe exertions become daily more frequent; and their frequency gradually produced a habitual, and, if you pleaſe to call it ſo, a voluntary, and therefore precarious, acquieſcence in the people.

But philoſophers, who have embraced a party (if that be not a contradiction in terms) are not contented with theſe conceſſions. They aſſert, not only that government in its earlieſt infancy aroſe from conſent, or rather the voluntary acquieſcence of the people; but alſo, that, even at preſent, when it has attained its full maturity, it reſts on no other foundation. They affirm, that all men are ſtill born equal, and owe allegiance to no prince or government, unleſs bound by the obligation and ſanction of a *promiſe*. And as no man, without ſome equivalent, would forego the advantages of his native liberty, and ſubject himſelf to the will of another; this promiſe is always underſtood to be conditional, and impoſes on him no obligation, unleſs he meet with juſtice and protection from his ſovereign. Theſe advantages the ſovereign promiſes him in return; and if he fail in the execution, he has broken, on his part, the articles of engagement, and has thereby freed his ſubject from all obligations to allegiance. Such, according to theſe philoſophers, is the foundation of authority in every government; and ſuch the right of reſiſtance poſſeſſed by every ſubject.

But would theſe reaſoners look abroad into the world, they would meet with nothing that, in the leaſt, correſponds to their ideas, or can warrant ſo refined and philoſophical a ſyſtem. On the contrary, we find, every where, princes, who claim their ſubjects as their property, and aſſert their independent right of ſovereignty, from conqueſt or ſucceſſion. We find alſo, every where, ſubjects, who acknowledge this right in their prince, and ſuppoſe themſelves born under obligations of obedience to a certain ſovereign, as much as under the ties of reverence and duty to certain parents. The connexions are always conceived to be equally independent of our conſent, in Perſia and China; in France and Spain; and even in Holland and England, wherever the doctrines above-mentioned have not been carefully inculcated. Obedience or ſubjection becomes ſo familiar, that moſt men never make any inquiry about its origin or cauſe, more than about the principle of gravity, reſiſtance, or the moſt univerſal laws of nature. Or if curioſity ever move them, as ſoon as they learn, that they themſelves and their anceſtors have, for ſeveral ages, or from time immemorial, been ſubject to ſuch a form of government or ſuch a family; they immediately acquieſce, and acknowledge their obligation to allegiance. Were you to preach, in moſt parts of the world, that political connexions are founded altogether on voluntary conſent or a mutual promiſe, the magiſtrate would ſoon impriſon you, as ſeditious, for looſening the ties of obedience; if your friends did not before ſhut you up as delirious for advancing

ſuch abſurdities. It is ſtrange, that an act of the mind, which every individual is ſuppoſed to have formed, and after he came to the uſe of reaſon too, otherwiſe it could have no authority; that this act, I ſay, ſhould be ſo much unknown to all of them, that, over the face of the whole earth, there ſcarcely remain any traces or memory of it.

But the contract, on which government is founded, is ſaid to be the *original contract*; and conſequently may be ſuppoſed too old to fall under the knowledge of the preſent generation. If the agreement, by which ſavage men firſt aſſociated and conjoined their force, be here meant, this is acknowledged to be real; but being ſo ancient, and being obliterated by a thouſand changes of government and princes, it cannot now be ſuppoſed to retain any authority. If we would ſay any thing to the purpoſe, we muſt aſſert, that every particular government, which is lawful, and which impoſes any duty of allegiance on the ſubject, was, at firſt founded on conſent and a voluntary compact. But beſides that this ſuppoſes the conſent of the fathers to bind the children, even to the moſt remote generations (which republican writers will never allow), beſides this, I ſay, it is not juſtified by hiſtory or experience, in any age or country of the world.

Almoſt all the governments, which exiſt at preſent, or of which there remains any record in ſtory, have been founded originally, either on uſurpation or conqueſt, or both, without any pretence of a fair conſent, or voluntary ſubjection of the people. When an artful and bold man is placed at the head of an

army or faction, it is often eaſy for him, by employing, ſometimes violence, ſometimes falſe pretences, to eſtabliſh his dominion over a people a hundred times more numerous than his partiſans. He allows no ſuch open communication, that his enemies can know, with certainty, their number or force. He gives them no leiſure to aſſemble together in a body to oppoſe him. Even all thoſe, who are the inſtruments of his uſurpation, may wiſh his fall; but their ignorance of each other's intention keeps them in awe, and is the ſole cauſe of his ſecurity. By ſuch arts as theſe, many governments have been eſtabliſhed; and this is all the *original contract* which they have to boaſt of.

The face of the earth is continually changing, by the increaſe of ſmall kingdoms into great empires, by the diſſolution of great empires into ſmaller kingdoms, by the planting of colonies, by the migration of tribes. Is there any thing diſcoverable in all theſe events, but force and violence? Where is the mutual agreement or voluntary aſſociation ſo much talked of?

Even the ſmootheſt way, by which a nation may receive a foreign maſter, by marriage or a will, is not extremely honorable for the people; but ſuppoſes them to be diſpoſed of, like a dowry or a legacy, according to the pleaſure or intereſt of their rulers.

But where no force interpoſes, and elections takes place; what is this election ſo highly vaunted? It is either the combination of a few great men, who decide for the whole, and will allow of no oppoſition:

Or it is the fury of a multitude, that follow a seditious ringleader, who is not known, perhaps, to a dozen among them, and who owes his advancement merely to his own impudence, or to the momentary caprice of his fellows.

Are these disorderly elections, which are rare too, of such mighty authority, as to be the only lawful foundation of all government and allegiance?

In reality, there is not a more terrible event, than a total dissolution of government, which gives liberty to the multitude, and makes the determination or choice of a new establishment depend upon a number, which nearly approaches to that of the body of the people: For it never comes entirely to the whole body of them. Every wise man, then, wishes to see at the head of a powerful and obedient army, a general, who may speedily seize the prize, and give to the people a master, which they are so unfit to chuse for themselves. So little correspondent is fact and reality to those philosophical notions.

Let not the establishment at the *Revolution* deceive us, or make us so much in love with a philosophical origin of government, as to imagine all others monstrous and irregular. Even that event was far from corresponding to these refined ideas. It was only the succession, and that only in the regal part of the government, which was then changed: And it was only the majority of seven hundred, who determined that change for near ten millions. I doubt not indeed, but the bulk of those ten millions acquiesced willingly in the determination: But was the matter left, in the least, to their choice? Was it not justly

ſuppoſed to be, from that moment, decided, and every man puniſhed, who refuſed to ſubmit to the new ſovereign? How otherwiſe could the matter have ever been brought to any iſſue or concluſion?

The republic of Athens was, I believe, the moſt extenſive democracy that we read of in hiſtory: Yet if we make the requiſite allowances for the women, the ſlaves, and the ſtrangers, we ſhall find, that that eſtabliſhment was not at firſt made, nor any law ever voted, by a tenth part of thoſe who were bound to pay obedience to it: Not to mention the iſland and foreign dominions, which the Athenians claimed as theirs by right of conqueſt. And as it is well known, that popular aſſemblies in that city were always full of licence and diſorder, notwithſtanding the inſtitutions and laws by which they were checked; how much more diſorderly muſt they prove, where they form not the eſtabliſhed conſtitution, but meet tumultuouſly on the diſſolution of the ancient government, in order to give riſe to a new one? How chimerical muſt it be to talk of a choice in ſuch circumſtances?

The Achæans enjoyed the freeſt and moſt perfect democracy of all antiquity; yet they employed force to oblige ſome cities to enter into their league, as we learn from Polybius [1].

Harry the IVth and Harry the VIIth of England, had really no title to the throne but a parliamentary election; yet they never would acknowledge it, leſt they ſhould thereby weaken their authority,

[1] Lib. ii. cap. 38.

Strange, if the only real foundation of all authority be conſent and promiſe!

It is in vain to ſay, that all governments are or ſhould be, at firſt, founded on popular conſent, as much as the neceſſity of human affairs will admit. This favors entirely my pretenſion. I maintain, that human affairs will never admit of this conſent; ſeldom of the appearance of it. But that conqueſt or uſurpation, that is, in plain terms, force, by diſſolving the ancient governments, is the origin of almoſt all the new ones which were ever eſtabliſhed in the world. And that in the few caſes where conſent may ſeem to have taken place, it was commonly ſo irregular ſo confined, or ſo much intermixed either with fraud or violence, that it cannot have any great authority.

My intention here is not to exclude the conſent of the people from being one juſt foundation of government where it has place. It is ſurely the beſt and moſt ſacred of any. I only pretend, that it has very ſeldom had place in any degree, and never almoſt in its full extent: And that therefore ſome other foundation of government muſt alſo be admitted.

Were all men poſſeſſed of ſo inflexible a regard to juſtice, that, of themſelves, they would totally abſtain from the properties of others; they had for ever remained in a ſtate of abſolute liberty, without ſubjection to any magiſtrate or political ſociety: But this is a ſtate of perfection of which human nature is juſtly deemed incapable. Again; were all men poſſeſſed of ſo perfect an underſtanding, as always to

know their own intereſts, no form of government had ever been ſubmitted to, but what was eſtabliſhed on conſent, and was fully canvaſſed by every member of the ſociety: But this ſtate of perfection is likewiſe much ſuperior to human nature. Reaſon, hiſtory, and experience ſhow us, that all political ſocieties have had an origin much leſs accurate and regular; and were one to chuſe a period of time, when the people's conſent was the leaſt regarded in public tranſactions, it would be preciſely on the eſtabliſhment of a new government. In a ſettled conſtitution, their inclinations are often conſulted: but during the fury of revolutions, conqueſts, and public convulſions, military force or political craft uſually decides the controverſy.

When a new government is eſtabliſhed, by whatever means, the people are commonly diſſatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear and neceſſity, than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation. The prince is watchful and jealous, and muſt carefully guard againſt every beginning or appearance of inſurrection. Time, by degrees, removes all theſe difficulties and accuſtoms the nation to regard, as their lawful or native princes, that family which, at firſt, they conſidered as uſurpers or foreign conquerors. In order to found this opinion, they have no recourſe to any notion of voluntary conſent or promiſe, which, they know, never was, in this caſe, neither expected or demanded. The original eſtabliſhment was formed by violence, and ſubmitted to from neceſſity. The ſubſequent adminiſtration is alſo ſupported by power, and acquieſced in by the

people, not as a matter of choice, but of obligation. They imagine not, that their conſent gives their prince a title: But they willingly conſent, becauſe they think, that, from long poſſeſſion, he has acquired a title, independent of their choice or inclination.

Should it be ſaid, that, by living under the dominion of a prince, which one might leave, every individual has given a *tacit* conſent to his authority, and promiſed him obedience; it may be anſwered, that ſuch an implied conſent can only have place, where a man imagines that the matter depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind do who are born under eſtabliſhed governments) that by his birth he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain form of government; it would be abſurd to infer a conſent or choice, which he expreſsly, in this caſe, renounces and diſclaims.

Can we ſeriouſly ſay, that a poor peaſant or artiſan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners; and lives, from day to day, by the ſmall wages which he acquires? We may as well aſſert, that a man, by remaining in a veſſel, freely conſents to the dominion of the maſter; though he was carried on board while aſleep, and muſt leap into the ocean, and periſh the moment he leaves her.

What if the prince forbid his ſubjects to quit his dominions; as in Tiberius's time, it was regarded as a crime in a Roman knight that he had attempted to fly to the Parthians, in order to eſcape the tyranny of that emperor [2]? Or as the ancient

[2] Tacit. ann. lib. vi. cap. 14.

Muſcovites prohibited all travelling under pain of death? And did a prince obſerve, that many of his ſubjects were ſeized with the frenzy of migrating to foreign countries, he would doubtleſs, with great reaſon and juſtice, reſtrain them, in order to prevent the depopulation of his own kingdom. Would he forfeit the allegiance of all his ſubjects, by ſo wiſe and reaſonable a law? Yet the freedom of their choice is ſurely in that caſe raviſhed from them.

A company of men, who ſhould leave their native country, in order to people ſome inhabited region, might dream of recovering their native freedom, but they would ſoon find, that their prince ſtill laid claim to them, and called them his ſubjects, even in their new ſettlement. And in this he would but act conformably to the common ideas of mankind.

The trueſt *tacit* conſent of this kind, that is ever obſerved, is when a foreigner ſettles in any country, and is before-hand acquainted with the prince, and government, and laws, to which he muſt ſubmit: Yet is his allegiance, though more voluntary, much leſs expected or depended on, than that of a natural born ſubject. On the contrary, his native prince ſtill aſſerts a claim to him. And if he puniſh not the renegade, when he ſeizes him in war with his new prince's commiſſion; this clemency is not founded on the municipal law, which in all countries condemns the priſoner; but on the conſent of princes, who have agreed to this indulgence, in order to prevent repriſals.

Did one generation of men go off the ſtage at once, and another ſucceed, as is the caſe with ſilk-worms,

and butterflies, the new race, if they had ſenſe enough to chuſe their government, which ſurely is never the caſe with men, might voluntarily, and by general conſent, eſtabliſh their own form of civil polity, without any regard to the laws or precedents which prevailed among their anceſtors. But as human ſociety is in perpetual flux, one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it, it is neceſſary, in order to preſerve ſtability in government, that the new brood ſhould conform themſelves to the eſtabliſhed conſtitution, and nearly follow the path which their fathers, treading in the footſteps of theirs, had marked out to them. Some innovations muſt neceſſarily have place in every human inſtitution; and it is happy where the enlightened genius of the age give theſe a direction to the ſide of reaſon, liberty, and juſtice: But violent innovations no individual is entitled to make: They are even dangerous to be attempted by the legiſlature: More ill than good is ever to be expected from them: And if hiſtory affords examples to the contrary, they are not to be drawn into precedent, and are only to be regarded as proofs, that the ſcience of politics affords few rules, which will not admit of ſome exception, and which may not ſometimes be controlled by fortune and accident. The violent innovations in the reign of Henry VIII. proceeded from an imperious monarch, ſeconded by the appearance of legiſlative authority: Thoſe in the reign of Charles I. were derived from faction and fanaticiſm; and both of them have proved happy in the iſſue: But even the former were long the ſource of many diſorders, and

ſtill more dangers; and if the meaſures of allegiance were to be taken from the latter, a total anarchy muſt have place in human ſociety, and a final period at once be put to every government.

Suppoſe than an uſurper, after having baniſhed his lawful prince and royal family, ſhould eſtabliſh his dominion for ten or a dozen years in any country, and ſhould preſerve ſo exact a diſcipline in his troops, and ſo regular a diſpoſition in his garriſons, that no inſurrection had ever been raiſed, or even murmur heard, againſt his adminiſtration; can it be aſſerted, that the people, who in their hearts abhor his treaſon, have tacitly conſented to his authority, and promiſed him allegiance, merely becauſe, from neceſſity, they live under his dominion? Suppoſe again their native prince reſtored, by means of an army, which he levies in foreign countries: They receive him with joy and exultation, and ſhow plainly with what reluctance they had ſubmitted to any other yoke. I may now aſk, upon what foundation the prince's title ſtands? Not on popular conſent ſurely: For though the people willingly acquieſce in his authority, they never imagine, that their conſent made him ſovereign. They conſent; becauſe they apprehend him to be already, by birth, their lawful ſovereign. And as to that tacit conſent, which may now be inferred, from their living under his dominion, this is no more than what they formerly gave to the tyrant and uſurper.

When we aſſert, that all lawful government ariſes from the conſent of the people, we certainly do them a great deal more honor than they deſerve, or even

expect and desire from us. After the Roman dominions became too unwieldy for the republic to govern them, the people, over the whole known world, were extremely grateful to Augustus for that authority, which, by violence, he had established over them, and they showed an equal disposition to submit to the successor, whom he left them by his last will and testament. It was afterwards their misfortune, that there never was, in one family, any long regular succession; but that their line of princes was continually broken, either by private assassinations or public rebellions. The *prætorian* bands, on the failure of every family, set up one emperor; the legions in the East a second; those in Germany, perhaps, a third: And the sword alone could decide the controversy. The condition of the people in that mighty monarchy, was to be lamented, not because the choice of the emperor was never left to them; for that was impracticable: But because they never fell under any succession of masters, who might regularly follow each other. As to the violence and wars and bloodshed, occasioned by every new settlement; these were not blameable, because they were inevitable.

The house of Lancaster ruled in this island about sixty years; yet the partisans of the white rose seemed daily to multiply in England. The present establishment has taken place during a still longer period. Have all views of right in another family been utterly extinguished; even though scarce any man now alive had arrived at years of discretion, when it was expelled, or could have consented

to its dominion, or have promiſed it allegiance? A ſufficient indication ſurely of the general ſentiment of mankind on this head. For we blame not the partiſans of the abdicated family, merely on account of the long time during which they have preſerved their imaginary loyalty: We blame them for adhering to a family, which we affirm, has been juſtly expelled, and which, from the moment the new ſettlement took place, had forfeited all title to authority.

But would we have a more regular, at leaſt a more philoſophical refutation of this principle of an original contract or popular conſent; perhaps the following obſervations may ſuffice.

All *moral* duties may be divided into two kinds. The *firſt* are thoſe to which men are impelled by a natural inſtinct, or immediate propenſity, which operates on them, independent of all ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to public or private utility. Of this nature are, love of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate. When we reflect on the advantage which reſults to ſociety from ſuch humane inſtincts, we pay them the juſt tribute of moral approbation and eſteem: But the perſon, actuated by them: feels their power and influence antecedent to any ſuch reflection.

The *ſecond* kind of moral duties are ſuch as are not ſupported by any original inſtinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a ſenſe of obligation, when we conſider the neceſſities of human ſociety, and the impoſſibility of ſupporting it, if theſe duties were neglected. It is thus *juſtice* or a regard to the

property of others, *fidelity* or the obſervance of promiſes, become obligatory, and acquire an authority over mankind. For as it is evident, that every man loves himſelf better than any other perſon, he is naturally impelled to extend his acquiſitions as much as poſſible; and nothing can reſtrain him in this propenſity, but reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects of that licence, and the total diſſolution of ſociety which muſt enſue from it. His original inclination, therefore, or inſtinct, is here checked and reſtrained by a ſubſequent judgment or obſervation.

The caſe is preciſely the ſame with the political or civil duty of *allegiance*, as with the natural duties of juſtice and fidelity. Our primary inſtincts lead us, either to indulge ourſelves in unlimited freedom, or to ſeek dominion over others: And it is reflection only, which engages us to ſacrifice ſuch ſtrong paſſions to the intereſts of peace and public order. A ſmall degree of experience and obſervation ſuffices to teach us, that ſociety cannot poſſibly be maintained without the authority of magiſtrates, and that this authority moſt ſoon fall into contempt, where exact obedience is not paid to it. The obſervation of theſe general and obvious intereſts is the ſource of all allegiance, and of that moral obligation which we attribute to it.

What neceſſity, therefore, is there to found the duty of *allegiance* or obedience to magiſtrates on that of *fidelity* or a regard to promiſes, and to ſuppoſe, that it is the conſent of each individual, which ſubjects

him

him to government; when it appears that both allegiance and fidelity ſtand preciſely on the ſame foundation, and are both ſubmitted to by mankind, on account of the apparent intereſts and neceſſities of human ſociety? We are bound to obey our ſovereign, it is ſaid; becauſe we have given a tacit promiſe to that purpoſe. But why are we bound to obſerve our promiſe? It muſt here be aſſerted, that the commerce and intercourſe of mankind, which are of ſuch mighty advantage, can have no ſecurity where men pay no regard to their engagements. In like manner, may it be ſaid, that men could not live at all in ſociety, at leaſt in a civilized ſociety, without laws and magiſtrates and judges, to prevent the encroachments of the ſtrong upon the weak, of the violent upon the juſt and equitable. The obligation to allegiance being of like force and authority with the obligation to fidelity, we gain nothing by reſolving the one into the other. The general intereſts or neceſſities of ſociety are ſufficient to eſtabliſh both.

If the reaſon be aſked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily anſwer, *becauſe ſociety could not otherwiſe ſubſiſt*: And this anſwer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your anſwer is, *becauſe we ſhould keep our word.* But beſides, that no body, till trained in a philoſophical ſyſtem, can either comprehend or reliſh this anſwer: Beſides this, I ſay, you find yourſelf embarraſſed, when it is aſked, *why we are bound to keep our word?* Nor can you give any anſwer, but what would

immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance.

But *to whom is allegiance due? And who is our lawful sovereign?* This queſtion is often the moſt difficult of any, and liable to infinite diſcuſſions. When people are ſo happy, that they can anſwer, *Our preſent ſovereign, who inherits, in a direct line, from anceſtors that have governed us for many ages;* this anſwer admits of no reply; even though hiſtorians, in tracing up to the remoteſt antiquity, the origin of that royal family, may find, as commonly happens, that its firſt authority was derived from uſurpation and violence. It is confeſſed, that private juſtice, or the abſtinence from the properties of others, is a moſt cardinal virtue: Yet reaſon tells us, that there is no property in durable objects, ſuch as lands or houſes, when carefully examined in paſſing from hand to hand, but muſt, in ſome period, have been founded on fraud and injuſtice. The neceſſities of human ſociety, neither in private nor public life, will allow of ſuch an accurate inquiry: And there is no virtue or moral duty, but what may with facility be refined away, if we indulge a falſe philoſophy, in ſifting and ſcrutinizing it, by every captious rule of logic, in every light or poſition, in which it may be placed.

The queſtions with regard to private property have filled infinite volumes of law and philoſophy, if in both we add the commentators to the original text; and in the end, we may ſafely pronounce that many of the rules, there eſtabliſhed, are uncertain, ambiguous, and arbitrary. The like opinion

may be formed with regard to the ſucceſſion and rights of princes and forms of government. Several caſes, no doubt, occur, eſpecially in the infancy of any conſtitution, which admit of no determination from the laws of juſtice and equity: And our hiſtorian Rapin pretends, that the controverſy between Edward the Third and Philip de Valois was of this nature, and could be decided only by an appeal to heaven, that is, by war and violence.

Who ſhall tell me, whether Germanicus or Druſus ought to have ſucceeded to Tiberius, had he died, while they were both alive, without naming any of them for his ſucceſſor? Ought the right of adoption to be received as equivalent to that of blood, in a nation, where it had the ſame effect in private families, and had already, in two inſtances, taken place in the public? Ought Germanicus to be eſteemed the elder ſon becauſe he was born before Druſus: or the younger, becauſe he was adopted after the birth of his brother? Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where he had no advantage in the ſucceſſion of private families? Ought the Roman empire at that time to be deemed hereditary, becauſe of two examples? or ought it, even ſo early, to be regarded as belonging to the ſtronger or to the preſent poſſeſſor, as being founded on ſo recent an uſurpation?

Commodus mounted the throne after a pretty long ſucceſſion of excellent emperors, who had acquired their title, not by birth, or public election, but by the fictitious rite of adoption. That bloody debauchee being murdered by a conſpiracy, ſuddenly

formed between his wench and her gallant, who happened at that time to be *Prætorian Præfect*; theſe immediately deliberated about chuſing a maſter to human kind, to ſpeak in the ſtyle of thoſe ages; and they caſt their eyes on Pertinax. Before the tyrant's death was known, the *Præfect* went ſecretly to that ſenator, who, on the appearance of the ſoldiers, imagined that his execution had been ordered by Commodus. He was immediately ſaluted emperor by the officer and his attendants; cheerfully proclaimed by the populace; unwillingly ſubmitted to by the guards; formally recognized by the ſenate; and paſſively received by the provinces and armies of the empire.

The diſcontent of the *Prætorian* bands broke out in a ſudden ſedition, which occaſioned the murder of that excellent prince: And the world being now without a maſter and without government, the guards thought proper to ſet the empire formally to ſale. Julian, the purchaſer, was proclaimed by the ſoldiers, recognized by the ſenate, and ſubmitted to by the people; and muſt alſo have been ſubmitted to by the provinces, had not the envy of the legions begotten oppoſition and reſiſtance. Peſcennius Niger in Syria elected himſelf emperor, gained the tumultuary conſent of his army, and was attended with the ſecret good will of the ſenate and people of Rome. Albinus in Britain found an equal right to ſet up his claim; but Severus, who governed Pannonia, prevailed in the end above both of them. That able politician and warrior, finding his own birth and dignity too much inferior to the

imperial crown, profeſſed at firſt an intention only of revenging the death of Pertinax. He marched as general into Italy; defeated Julian; and without our being able to fix any preciſe commencement even of the ſoldiers conſent, he was from neceſſity acknowledged emperor by the ſenate and people; and fully eſtabliſhed in his violent authority by ſubduing Niger and Albinus[3].

Inter hæc Gordianus Cæſar (ſays Capitolinus, ſpeaking of another period) *ſublatus a militibus.* Imperator *eſt appellatus, quia non erat alius in præſenti.* It is to be remarked, that Gordian was a boy of fourteen years of age.

Frequent inſtances of a like nature occur in the hiſtory of the emperors; in that of Alexander's ſucceſſors; and of many other countries: Nor can any thing be more unhappy than a deſpotic government of this kind; where the ſucceſſion is disjointed and irregular, and muſt be determined, on every vacancy, by force or election. In a free government the matter is often unavoidable, and is alſo much leſs dangerous. The intereſts of liberty may there frequently lead the people, in their own defence, to alter the ſucceſſion of the crown. And the conſtitution, being compounded of parts, may ſtill maintain a ſufficient ſtability, by reſting on the ariſtocratical or democratical members, though the monarchical be altered, from time to time, in order to accommodate it to the former.

In an abſolute government, when there is no legal prince who has a title to the throne, it may ſafely

[3] Herodian, lib. ii.

be determined to belong to the firſt occupant. Inſtances of this kind are but too frequent, eſpecially in the eaſtern monarchies. When any race of princes expires, the will or deſtination of the laſt sovereign will be regarded as a title. Thus the edict of Lewis the XIV th. who called the baſtard princes to the ſucceſſion in caſe of the failure of all the legitimate princes, would, in ſuch an event, have ſome authority *. Thus the will of Charles the Second diſpoſed of the whole Spaniſh monarchy. The ceſſion of the ancient proprietor, eſpecially when joined to conqueſt, is likewiſe deemed a good title.

The general obligation, which binds us to government is, the intereſt and neceſſities of ſociety; and this obligation is very ſtrong. The determination of it to this or that particular prince or form of government, is frequently more uncertain and dubious. Preſent poſſeſſion has conſiderable authority in theſe caſes, and greater than in private property; becauſe of the diſorders which attend all revolutions and changes of government.

We ſhall only obſerve, before we conclude, that, though an appeal to general opinion may juſtly, in the ſpeculative ſciences of metaphyſics, natural philoſophy, or aſtronomy, be deemed unfair and inconcluſive, yet in all queſtions with regard to morals, as well as criticiſm, there is really no other ſtandard, by which any controverſy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous, than to find, that it leads to paradoxes,

* See NOTE [FF].

repugnant to the common ſentiments of mankind, and to the practice and opinion of all nations and all ages. The doctrine, which founds all lawful government on an *original contract*, or conſent of the people, is plainly of this kind; nor has the moſt noted of its partiſans, in proſecution of it, ſcrupled to affirm, *that abſolute monarchy is inconſiſtent with civil ſociety, and ſo can be no form of civil government at all*[5]; and *that the ſupreme power in a ſtate cannot take from any man, by taxes and impoſitions, any part of his property, without his own conſent or that of his repreſentatives*[6]. What authority any moral reaſoning can have, which leads into opinions, ſo wide of the general practice of mankind, in every place but this ſingle kingdom, it is eaſy to determine.

The only paſſage I meet with in antiquity, where the obligation of obedience to government is aſcribed to a promiſe, is in Plato's *Crito*; where Socrates refuſes to eſcape from priſon, becauſe he had tacitly promiſed to obey the laws. Thus he builds a *tory* conſequence of paſſive obedience on a *whig* foundation of the original contract.

New diſcoveries are not to be expected in theſe matters. If ſcarce any man, till very lately, ever imagined that government was founded on compact, it is certain, that it cannot, in general, have any ſuch foundation.

The crime of rebellion among the ancients was commonly expreſſed by the terms νεωτερίζειν, *novas res moliri*.

[5] See Locke on Government, chap. vii. § 90.
[6] Id. chap. xi. § 138, 139, 140.

ESSAY XIII.

OF PASSIVE OBEDIENCE.

IN the former eſſay, we endeavour to refute the *ſpeculative* ſyſtems of politics advanced in this nation; as well the religious ſyſtem of the one party, as the philoſophical of the other. We come now to examine the *practical* conſequences, deduced by each party, with regard to the meaſures of ſubmiſſion due to ſovereigns.

As the obligation to juſtice is founded entirely on the intereſts of ſociety, which require mutual abſtinence from property, in order to preſerve peace among mankind; it is evident, that when the execution of juſtice would be attended with very pernicious conſequences, that virtue muſt be ſuſpended, and give place to public utility, in ſuch extraordinary and ſuch preſſing emergencies The maxim. *fiat Juſtitia et ruat Cœlum*, "let juſtice be "performed, though the univerſe be deſtroyed," is apparently falſe; and by ſacrificing the end to the means, ſhows a prepoſterous idea of the ſubordination of duties. What governor of a town makes any ſcruple of burning the ſuburbs, when they facilitate the approaches of the enemy? Or what general abſtains from plundering a neutral country, when the neceſſities of war require it, and he cannot otherwiſe ſubſiſt his army? The caſe is the ſame with the duty of allegiance; and common ſenſe teaches us, that as government binds us to obedience

only on account of its tendency to public utility, that duty muſt always, in extraordinary caſes, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original obligation. *Salus populi ſuprema lex.* "The ſafety of the people is the ſupreme law." This maxim is agreeable to the ſentiments of mankind in all ages: Nor is any one, when he reads of the inſurrections againſt Nero or Philip the Second, ſo infatuated with party-ſyſtems, as not to wiſh ſucceſs to the enterpriſe, and praiſe the undertakers. Even our high monarchical party, in ſpite of their ſublime theory, are forced, in ſuch caſes, to judge, and feel, and approve, in conformity to the reſt of mankind.

Reſiſtance, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary emergencies, the queſtion can only be among good reaſoners, with regard to the degree of neceſſity which can juſtify reſiſtance, and render it lawful or commendable. And here I muſt confeſs, that I ſhall always incline to their ſide who draw the bond of allegiance very cloſe, and conſider an infringement of it, as the laſt refuge in deſperate caſes, when the public is in the higheſt danger from violence and tyranny. For beſides the miſchiefs of a civil war which commonly attends inſurrection; it is certain, that where a diſpoſition to rebellion appears among any people, it is one chief cauſe of tyranny in the rulers, and forces them into many violent meaſures which they never would have embraced, had every one been inclined to ſubmiſſion and obedience. Thus the *tyrannicide* or aſſaſſination, approved of by ancient maxims, inſtead of keeping tyrants and uſurpers in awe,

made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting; and is now juſtly, upon that account, aboliſhed by the laws of nations, and univerſally condemned as a baſe and treacherous method of bringing to juſtice theſe diſturbers of ſociety.

Beſides, we muſt conſider, that as obedience is our duty in the common courſe of things, it ought chiefly to be inculcated; nor can any thing be more preposterous than an anxious care and ſolicitude in ſtating all the caſes in which reſiſtance may be allowed. In like manner, though a philoſopher reaſonably acknowledges in the courſe of an argument, that the rules of juſtice may be diſpenſed with in caſes of urgent neceſſity: What ſhould we think of a preacher or caſuiſt, who ſhould make it his chief ſtudy to find out ſuch caſes, and enforce them with all the vehemence of argument and eloquence? Would he not be better employed in inculcating the general doctrine, than in diſplaying the particular exceptions, which, we are perhaps but too much inclined of ourſelves, to embrace and to extend?

There are, however, two reaſons which may be pleaded in defence of that party among us, who have, with ſo much induſtry, propagated the maxims of reſiſtance; maxims which, it muſt be confeſſed, are, in general, ſo pernicious, and ſo deſtructive of civil ſociety. The *firſt* is, that their antagoniſts carrying the doctrine of obedience to ſuch an extravagant height, as not only never to mention the exceptions in extraordinary caſes (which might, perhaps, be excuſable), but even poſitively to exclude them; it became neceſſary to inſiſt on theſe exceptions, and

defend the rights of injured truth and liberty. The *ſecond*, and, perhaps, better reaſon, is founded on the nature of the Britiſh conſtitution and form of government.

It is almoſt peculiar to our conſtitution to eſtabliſh a firſt magiſtrate with ſuch high pre-eminence and dignity, that, though limited by the laws, he is, in a manner, ſo far as regards his own perſon, above the laws, and can neither be queſtioned nor puniſhed for any injury or wrong which may be committed by him. His miniſters alone, or thoſe who act by his commiſſion, are obnoxious to juſtice; and while the prince is thus allured, by the proſpect of perſonal ſafety, to give the laws their free courſe, an equal ſecurity is, in effect, obtained by the puniſhment of leſſer offenders, and at the ſame time a civil war is avoided, which would be the infallible conſequence, were an attack, at every turn, made directly upon the ſovereign. But though the conſtitution pays this ſalutary complement to the prince, it can never reaſonably be underſtood, by that maxim, to have determined its own deſtruction, or to have eſtabliſhed a tame ſubmiſſion, where he protects his miniſters, perſeveres in injuſtice, and uſurps the whole power of the commonwealth. This caſe, indeed, is never expreſsly put by the laws; becauſe it is impoſſible for them, in their ordinary courſe, to provide a remedy for it, or eſtabliſh any magiſtrate, with ſuperior authority, to chaſtiſe the exorbitancies of the prince. But as a right without a remedy would be an abſurdity, the remedy, in this caſe, is the extraordinary one of reſiſtance, when affairs come to

that extremity, that the conſtitution can be defended by it alone. Reſiſtance therefore muſt, of courſe, become more frequent in the Britiſh government than in others which are ſimpler, and conſiſt of fewer parts and movements. Where the king is an abſolute ſovereign, he has little temptation to commit ſuch enormous tyranny as may juſtly provoke rebellion: But where he is limited, his imprudent ambition, without any great vices, may run him into that perilous ſituation. This is frequently ſuppoſed to have been the caſe with Charles the Firſt; and if we may now ſpeak truth, after animoſities are ceaſed, this was alſo the caſe with James the Second. Theſe were harmleſs, if not, in their private character, good men; but miſtaking the nature of our conſtitution, and engroſſing the whole legiſlative power, it became neceſſary to oppoſe them with ſome vehemence; and even to deprive the latter formally of that authority, which he had uſed with ſuch imprudence and indiſcretion.

ESSAY XIV.

OF THE COALITION OF PARTIES.

TO abolish all distinction of party may not be practicable, perhaps not desirable, in a free government. The only dangerous parties are such as entertain opposite views with regard to the essentials of government, the succession of the crown, or the more considerable privileges belonging to the several members of the constitution; where there is no room for any compromise or accommodation, and where the controversy may appear so momentous as to justify even an opposition by arms to the pretensions of antagonists. Of this nature was the animosity, continued for above a century past, between the parties in England; an animosity which broke out sometimes into civil war, which occasioned violent revolutions, and which continually endangered the peace and tranquillity of the nation. But as there have appeared of late the strongest symptoms of an universal desire to abolish these party-distinctions; this tendency to a coalition affords the most agreeable prospect of future happiness, and ought to be carefully cherished and promoted by every lover of his country.

There is not a more effectual method of promoting so good an end, than to prevent all unreasonable insult and triumph of the one party over the other, to encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper medium in all disputes, to persuade each

that its antagoniſt may poſſibly be ſometimes in the right, and to keep a balance in the praiſe and blame which we beſtow on either ſide. The two former Eſſays, concerning the *original contract* and *paſſive obedience*, are calculated for this purpoſe with regard to the *philoſophical* and *practical* controverſies between the parties, and tend to ſhow that neither ſide are in theſe reſpects ſo fully ſupported by reaſon, as they endeavour to flatter themſelves. We ſhall proceed to exerciſe the ſame moderation with regard to the *hiſtorical* diſputes between the parties, by proving that each of them was juſtified by plauſible topics; that there were on both ſides wiſe men who meant well to their country; and that the paſt animoſity between the factions had no better foundation than narrow prejudice or intereſted paſſion.

The popular party, who afterwards acquired the name of whigs, might juſtify, by very ſpecious arguments, that oppoſition to the crown, from which our preſent free conſtitution is derived. Though obliged to acknowledge, that precedents in favor of prerogative had uniformly taken place during many reigns before Charles the Firſt, they thought, that there was no reaſon for ſubmitting any longer to ſo dangerous an authority. Such might have been their reaſoning: As the rights of mankind are for ever to be deemed ſacred, no preſcription of tyranny or arbitrary power can have authority ſufficient to aboliſh them. Liberty is a bleſſing ſo ineſtimable, that wherever there appears any probability of recovering it, a nation may willingly run many hazards, and ought not even to repine at the greateſt effuſion of blood

or diſſipation of treaſure. All human inſtitutions, and none more than government, are in continual fluctuation. Kings are ſure to embrace every opportunity of extending their prerogatives; and if favorable incidents be not alſo laid hold of for extending and ſecuring the privileges of the people, an univerſal deſpotiſm muſt for ever prevail amongſt mankind. The example of all the neighbouring nations proves, that it is no longer ſafe to intruſt with the crown the ſame high prerogatives which had formerly been exerciſed during rude and ſimple ages. And though the example of many late reigns may be pleaded in favor of a power in the prince ſomewhat arbitrary, more remote reigns afford inſtances of ſtricter limitations impoſed on the crown; and thoſe pretenſions of the parliament, now branded with the title of innovations, are only a recovery of the juſt rights of the people.

Theſe views, far from being odious, are ſurely large, and generous, and noble: To their prevalence and ſucceſs the kingdom owes its liberty; perhaps its learning, its induſtry, commerce, and naval power: By them chiefly the Engliſh name is diſtinguiſhed among the ſociety of nations, and aſpires to a rivalſhip with that of the freeſt and moſt illuſtrious commonwealths of antiquity. But as all theſe mighty conſequences could not reaſonably be foreſeen at the time when the conteſt began, the royaliſts of that age wanted not ſpecious arguments on their ſide, by which they could juſtify their defence of the then eſtabliſhed prerogatives of the prince. We ſhall ſtate the queſtion as it might have appeared to them at the

assembling of that parliament, which, by its violent encroachments on the crown, began the civil wars.

The only rule of government, they might have said, known and acknowledged among men, is use and practice: Reason is so uncertain a guide, that it will always be exposed to doubt and controversy: Could it ever render itself prevalent over the people, men had always retained it as their sole rule of conduct: They had still continued in the primitive, unconnected state of nature, without submitting to political government, whose sole basis is, not pure reason, but authority and precedent. Dissolve these ties, you break all the bonds of civil society, and leave every man at liberty to consult his private interest, by those expedients, which his appetite, disguised under the appearance of reason, shall dictate to him. The spirit of innovation is in itself pernicious, however favorable its particular object may sometimes appear: A truth so obvious, that the popular party themselves are sensible of it; and therefore cover their encroachments on the crown by the plausible pretence of their recovering the ancient liberties of the people.

But the present prerogatives of the crown, allowing all the suppositions of that party, have been incontestibly established ever since the accession of the House of Tudor; a period which, as it now comprehends a hundred and sixty years, may be allowed sufficient to give stability to any constitution. Would it not have appeared ridiculous, in the reign of the Emperor Adrian, to have talked of the republican constitution as the rule of government; or to

have

have ſuppoſed that the former rights of the ſenate, and conſuls, and tribunes, were ſtill ſubſiſting?

But the preſent claims of the Engliſh monarch are much more favorable than thoſe of the Roman emperors during that age. The authority of Auguſtus was a plain uſurpation, grounded only on military violence, and forms ſuch an epoch in the Roman hiſtory as is obvious to every reader. But if Henry VII. really, as ſome pretend, enlarged the power of the crown, it was only by inſenſible acquiſitions which eſcaped the apprehenſion of the people, and have ſcarcely been remarked even by hiſtorians and politicians. The new government, if it deſerve the epithet, is an imperceptible tranſition from the former; is entirely engrafted on it; derives its title fully from that root; and is to be conſidered only as one of thoſe gradual revolutions, to which humam affairs, in every nation, will be for ever ſubject.

The Houſe of Tudor, and after them that of Stuart, exerciſed no prerogatives, but what had been claimed and exerciſed by the Plantagenets. Not a ſingle branch of their authority can be ſaid to be an innovation. The only difference is, that, perhaps, former kings exerted theſe powers only by intervals, and were not able, by reaſon of the oppoſition of their barons, to render them ſo ſteady a rule of adminiſtration. But the ſole inference from this fact is, that thoſe ancient times were more turbulent and ſeditious; and that royal authority, the conſtitution, and the laws, have happily of late gained the aſcendant.

Under what pretence can the popular party now ſpeak of recovering the ancient conſtitution? The formercontrol over the kings was not placed in the commons, but in the barons: The people had no authority, and even little or no liberty; till the crown, by ſuppreſſing theſe factious tyrants, enforced the execution of the laws, and obliged all the ſubjects equally to reſpect each other's rights, privileges, and properties. If we muſt return to the ancient barbarous and feudal conſtitution; let thoſe gentlemen, who now behave themſelves with ſo much inſolence to their ſovereign, ſet the firſt example. Let them make court to be admitted as retainers to a neighbouring baron; and by ſubmitting to ſlavery under him, acquire ſome protection to themſelves; together with the power of exerciſing rapine and oppreſſion over their inferior ſlaves and villains. This was the condition of the commons among their remote anceſtors.

But how far back muſt we go, in having recourſe to ancient conſtitutions and governments? There was a conſtitution ſtill more ancient than that to which theſe innovators affect ſo much to appeal. During that period there was no *magna charta*: The barons themſelves poſſeſſed few regular, ſtated privileges: And the houſe of commons probably had not an exiſtence.

It is ridiculous to hear the commons, while they are aſſuming, by uſurpation, the whole power of government, talk of reviving ancient inſtitutions. Is it not known, that, though repreſentatives received wages from their conſtituents; to be a member of

the lower houſe was always conſidered as a burden, and an exemption from it as a privilege? Will they perſuade us, that power, which of all human acquiſitions, is the moſt coveted, and in compariſon of which even reputation and pleaſure and riches are ſlighted, could ever be regarded as a burden by any man.

The property, acquired of late by the commons, it is ſaid, entitles them to more power than their anceſtors enjoyed. But to what is this increaſe of their property owing, but to an increaſe of their liberty and their ſecurity? Let them therefore acknowledge, that their anceſtors, while the crown was reſtrained by the ſeditious barons, really enjoyed leſs liberty than they themſelves have attained, after the ſovereign acquired the aſcendant: And let them enjoy that liberty with moderation; and not forfeit it by new exorbitant claims, and by rendering it a pretence for endleſs innovations.

The true rule of government is the preſent eſtabliſhed practice of the age. That has moſt authority, becauſe it is recent: It is alſo beſt known, for the ſame reaſon. Who has aſſured thoſe tribunes, that the Plantagenets did not exerciſe as high acts of authority as the Tudors? Hiſtorians, they ſay, do not mention them. But hiſtorians are alſo ſilent with regard to the chief exertions of prerogative by the Tudors. Where any power or prerogative is fully and undoubtedly eſtabliſhed, the exerciſe of it paſſes for a thing of courſe, and readily eſcapes the notice of hiſtory and annals. Had we no other monuments of Elizabeth's reign, than what are preſerved even

by Camden, the moſt copious, judicious, and exact of our hiſtorians, we ſhould be entirely ignorant of the moſt important maxims of her government.

Was not the preſent monarchical government, in its full extent, authorized by lawyers, recommended by divines, acknowledged by politicians, acquiſced in, nay paſſionately cheriſhed, by the people in general; and all this during a period of at leaſt a hundred and ſixty years, and till of late, without the ſmalleſt murmur or controverſy? This general conſent ſurely, during ſo long a time, muſt be ſufficient to render a conſtitution legal and valid. If the origin of all power be derived, as is pretended, from the people; here is their conſent in the fulleſt and moſt ample terms that can be deſired or imagined.

But the people muſt not pretend, becauſe they can, by their conſent, lay the foundations of government, that therefore they are to be permitted, at their pleaſure, to overthrow and ſubvert them. There is no end of theſe ſeditious and arrogant claims. The power of the crown is now openly ſtruck at: The nobility are alſo in viſible peril: The gentry will ſoon follow: The popular leaders, who will then aſſume the name of gentry, will next be expoſed to danger: And the people themſelves, having become incapable of civil government, and lying under the reſtraint of no authority, muſt, for the ſake of peace, admit, inſtead of their legal and mild monarchs, a ſucceſſion of military and deſpotic tyrants.

Theſe conſequences are the more to be dreaded, as the preſent fury of the people, though gloſſed over

by pretenſions to civil liberty, is in reality incited by the fanaticiſm of religion; a principle the moſt blind, headſtrong, and ungovernable, by which human nature can poſſibly be actuated. Popular rage is dreadful, from whatever motive derived: But muſt be attended with the moſt pernicious conſequences, when it ariſes from a principle, which diſclaims all control by human law, reaſon, or authority.

Theſe are the arguments which each party may make uſe of to juſtify the conduct of their predeceſſors during that great criſis. The event, if that can be admitted as a reaſon, has ſhown, that the arguments of the popular party were better founded; but perhaps, according to the eſtabliſhed maxims of lawyers and politicians, the views of the royaliſts ought, before-hand, to have appeared more ſolid, more ſafe, and more legal. But this is certain, that the greater moderation we now employ in repreſenting paſt events, the nearer ſhall we be to produce a full coalition of the parties, and an entire acquieſcence in our preſent eſtabliſhment. Moderation is of advantage to every eſtabliſhment: Nothing but zeal can overturn a ſettled power: And an over-active zeal in friends is apt to beget a like ſpirit in antagoniſts. The tranſition from a moderate oppoſition againſt an eſtabliſhment, to anentire acquieſcence in it, is eaſy and inſenſible.

There are many invincible arguments, which ſhould induce the malecontent party to acquieſce entirely in the preſent ſettlement of the conſtitution. They now find, that the ſpirit of civil liberty, though at firſt connected with religious fanaticiſm, could purge

itſelf from that pollution, and appear under a more genuine and engaging aſpect; a friend to toleration, and an encourager of the enlarged and generous ſentiments that do honor to human nature. They may obſerve, that the popular claims could ſtop at a proper period; and after retrenching the high claims of prerogative, could ſtill maintain a due reſpect to monarchy, to nobility, and to all ancient inſtitutions. Above all, they muſt be ſenſible, that the very principle, which made the ſtrength of their party, and from which it derived its chief authority, has now deſerted them, and gone over to their antagoniſts. The plan of liberty is ſettled; its happy effects are proved by experience; a long tract of time has given it ſtability; and whoever would attempt to overturn it, and to recal the paſt government or abdicated family, would, beſides other more criminal imputations, be expoſed, in their turn, to the reproach of faction and innovation. While they peruſe the hiſtory of paſt events, they ought to reflect, both that thoſe rights of the crown are long ſince annihilated, and that the tyranny, and violence, and oppreſſion, to which they often gave riſe, are ills, from which the eſtabliſhed liberty of the conſtitution has now at laſt happily protected the people. Theſe reflections will prove a better ſecurity to our freedom and privileges, than to deny, contrary to the cleareſt evidence of facts, that ſuch regal powers ever had an exiſtence. There is not a more effectual method of betraying a cauſe, than to lay the ſtreſs of the argument on a wrong place, and by diſputing an untenable poſt, enure the adverſaries to ſucceſs and victory.

ESSAY XV.

OF THE PROTESTANT SUCCESSION.

I Suppoſe, that a member of parliament in the reign of King William or Queen Anne, while the eſtabliſhment of the *Proteſtant Succeſſion* was yet uncertain, were deliberating concerning the party he would chuſe in that important queſtion, and weighing, with impartiality, the advantages and diſadvantages on each ſide: I believe the following particulars would have entered into his conſideration.

He would eaſily perceive the great advantage reſulting from the reſtoration of the Stuart family; by which we ſhould preſerve the ſucceſſion clear and undiſputed, free from a pretender, with ſuch a ſpecious title as that of blood, which, with the multitude, is always the claim, the ſtrongeſt and moſt eaſily comprehended. It is in vain to ſay, as many have done, that the queſtion with regard to *governors*, independent of *government*, is frivolous, and little worth diſputing, much leſs fighting about. The generality of mankind never will enter into theſe ſentiments; and it is much happier, I believe, for ſociety, that they do not, but rather continue in their natural prepoſſeſſions. How could ſtability be preſerved in any monarchical government (which, though, perhaps, not the beſt, is, and always has been, the moſt common of any), unleſs men had ſo paſſionate a regard for the true heir of their royal

family; and even though he be weak in underſtanding, or infirm in years, gave him ſo ſenſible a preference above perſons the moſt acompliſhed in ſhining talents, or celebrated for great achievements? Would not every popular leader put in his claim at every vacancy, or even without any vacancy; and the kingdom become the theatre of perpetual wars and convulſions? The condition of the Roman empire, ſurely, was not, in this reſpect, much to be envied; nor is that of the *Eaſtern* nations, who pay little regard to the titles of their ſovereign, but ſacrifice them, every day, to the caprice or momentary humor of the populace or ſoldiery. It is but a fooliſh wiſdom, which is ſo carefully diſplayed, in undervaluing princes, and placing them on a level with the meaneſt of mankind. To be ſure, an anatomiſt finds no more in the greateſt monarch than in the loweſt peaſant, or day-laborer; and a moraliſt may, perhaps, frequently find leſs. But what do all theſe reflections tend to? We, all of us, ſtill retain theſe prejudices in favor of birth and family? and neither in our ſerious occupations, nor moſt careleſs amuſements, can we ever get entirely rid of them. A tragedy, that ſhould repreſent the adventures of ſailors, or porters, or even of private gentlemen, would preſently diſguſt us; but one that introduces kings and princes, acquires in our eyes an air of importance and dignity. Or ſhould a man be able, by his ſuperior wiſdom, to get entirely above ſuch poſſeſſions, he would ſoon, by means of the ſame wiſdom, again bring himſelf down to them, for the ſake of ſociety, whoſe welfare he would perceive to

be intimately connected with them. Far from endeavouring to undeceive the people in this particular, he would cheriſh ſuch ſentiments of reverence to their princes, as requiſite to preſerve a due ſubordination in ſociety. And though the lives of twenty thouſand men be often ſacrificed to maintain a king in poſſeſſion of his throne, or preſerve the right of ſucceſſion undiſturbed, he entertains no indignation at the loſs, on pretence that every individual of theſe was, perhaps, in himſelf, as valuable as the prince he ſerved. He conſiders the conſequences of violating the hereditary right of kings: Conſequences which may be felt for many centuries; while the loſs of ſeveral thouſand men brings ſo little prejudice to a large kingdom, that it may not be perceived a few years after.

The advantages of the Hanover ſucceſſion are of an oppoſite nature, and ariſe from this very circumſtance, that it violates hereditary right; and places on the throne a prince, to whom birth gave no title to that dignity. It is evident, from the hiſtory of this iſland, that the privileges of the people have, during near two centuries, been continually upon the increaſe, by the diviſion of the church-lands, by the alienations of the barons-eſtates, by the progreſs of trade, and above all, by the happineſs of our ſituation, which, for a long time, gave us ſufficient ſecurity, without any ſtanding army or military eſtabliſhment. On the contrary, public liberty has, almoſt in every other nation of Europe, been, during the ſame period, extremely upon the decline; while the people were diſguſted at the hardſhips of the old

feudal militia, and rather chose to intrust their prince with mercenary armies, which he easily turned against themselves. It was nothing extraordinary, therefore, that some of our British sovereigns mistook the nature of the constitution, at least the genius of the people; and as they embraced all the favorable precedents left them by their ancestors, they overlooked all those which were contrary, and which supposed a limitation in our government. They were encouraged in this mistake, by the example of all the neighbouring princes, who, bearing the same title or appellation, and being adorned with the same ensigns of authority, naturally led them to claim the same powers and prerogatives. It appears from the speeches and proclamations of James I. and the whole train of that prince's actions, as well as his son's, that he regarded the English government as a simple monarchy, and never imagined that any considerable part of his subjects entertained a contrary idea. This opinion made those monarchs discover their pretensions without preparing any force to support them; and even without reserve or disguise, which are always employed by those who enter upon any new project, or endeavour to innovate in any government. The flattery of courtiers farther confirmed their prejudices; and above all, that of the clergy, who from several passages of *scripture*, and these wrested too, had erected a regular and avowed system of arbitrary power. The only method of destroying, at once, all these high claims and pretensions, was to depart from the true hereditary line, and chuse a prince, who, being plainly a creature of the public, and receiving the

crown on conditions, expreſſed and avowed, found his authority eſtabliſhed on the ſame bottom with the privileges of the people. By electing him in the royal line, we cut off all hopes of ambitious ſubjects, who might, in future emergencies, diſturb the government by their cabals and pretenſions: By rendering the crown hereditary in his family, we avoided all the inconveniences of elective monarchy; and by excluding the lineal heir, we ſecured all our conſtitutional limitations, and rendered our government uniform and of a piece. The people cheriſh monarchy, becauſe protected by it: The monarch favors liberty; becauſe created by it. And thus every advantage is obtained by the new eſtabliſhment, as far as human ſkill and wiſdom can extend itſelf.

Theſe are the ſeparate advantages of fixing the ſucceſſion, either in the houſe of Stuart or in that of Hanover. There are alſo diſadvantages in each eſtabliſhment, which an impartial patriot would ponder and examine, in order to form a juſt judgement upon the whole.

The diſadvantages of the proteſtant ſucceſſion conſiſt in the foreign dominions, which are poſſeſſed by the princes of the Hanover line, and which, it might be ſuppoſed, would engage us in the intrigues and wars of the continent, and loſe us, in ſome meaſure, the ineſtimable advantage we poſſeſs, of being ſurrounded and guarded by the ſea, which we command. The diſadvantages of recalling the abdicated family, conſiſt chiefly in their religion, which is more prejudicial to ſociety than that eſtabliſhed amongſt us is contrary to it, and affords

or toleration, or peace or ſecurity to any other communion.

It appears to me, that theſe advantages and diſadvantages are allowed on both ſides; at leaſt by every one who is at all ſuſceptible of argument or reaſoning. No ſubject, however loyal, pretends to deny, that the diſputed title and foreign dominions of the preſent royal family are a loſs. Nor is there any partiſan of the Stuarts, but will confeſs, that the claim of hereditary, indefeaſible right, and the Roman Catholic religion, are alſo diſadvantages in that family. It belongs, therefore, to a philoſopher alone, who is of neither party, to put all the circumſtances in the ſcale, and aſſign to each of them its proper poiſe and influence. Such a one will readily, at firſt, acknowledge, that all political queſtions are infinitely complicated, and that there ſcarcely ever occurs, in any deliberation, a choice, which is either purely good or purely ill. Conſequences, mixed and varied, may be foreſeen to flow from every meaſure: And many conſequences, unforeſeen, do always, in fact, reſult from every one. Heſitation, and reſerve, and ſuſpenſe, are, therefore, the only ſentiments he brings to this eſſay or trial. Or if he indulges any paſſion, it is that of deriſion, againſt the ignorant multitude, who are always clamorous and dogmatical, even in the niceſt queſtions, of which, from want of temper, perhaps ſtill more than of underſtanding, they are altogether unfit judges.

But to ſay ſomething more determinate on this head, the following reflections will, I hope, ſhow the temper, if not the underſtanding, of a philoſopher.

Were we to judge merely by firſt appearances, and by paſt experience, we muſt allow that the advantages of a parliamentary title in the houſe of Hanover are greater than thoſe of an undiſputed hereditary title in the houſe of Stuart; and that our fathers acted wiſely in preferring the former to the latter. So long as the houſe of Stuart ruled in Great Britain, which, with ſome interruption, was above eighty years, the government was kept in a continual fever, by the contention between the privileges of the people and the prerogatives of the crown. If arms were dropped, the noiſe of diſputes continued: Or if theſe were ſilenced, jealouſy ſtill corroded the heart, and threw the nation into an unnatural ferment and diſorder. And while we were thus occupied in domeſtic diſputes, a foreign power, dangerous to public liberty, erected itſelf in Europe, without any oppoſition from us, and even ſometimes with our aſſiſtance.

But during theſe laſt ſixty years, when a parliamentary eſtabliſhment has taken place; whatever factions may have prevailed either among the people or in public aſſemblies, the whole force of our conſtitution has always fallen to one ſide, and an uninterrupted harmony has been preſerved between our princes and our parliaments. Public liberty, with internal peace and order, has flouriſhed almoſt without interruption: Trade and manufactures and agriculture have increaſed: The arts, and ſciences, and philoſophy, have been cultivated. Even religious parties have been neceſſitated to lay aſide their mutual rancor: And the glory of the nation has ſpread

itſelf all over Europe; derived equally from our progreſs in the arts of peace, and from valor and ſucceſs in war. So long and ſo glorious a period no nation almoſt can boaſt of: Nor is there another inſtance in the whole hiſtory of mankind, that ſo many millions of people have, during ſuch a ſpace of time, been held together, in a manner ſo free, ſo rational, and ſo ſuitable to the dignity of human nature.

But though this recent experience ſeems clearly to decide in favor of the preſent eſtabliſhment, there are ſome circumſtances to be thrown into the other ſcale; and it is dangerous to regulate our judgment by one event or example.

We have had two rebellions during the flouriſhing period above mentioned, beſides plots and conſpiracies without number. And if none of theſe have produced any very fatal event, we may aſcribe our eſcape chiefly to the narrow genius of thoſe princes who diſputed our eſtabliſhment; and we may eſteem ourſelves ſo far fortunate. But the claims of the baniſhed family, I fear, are not yet antiquated; and who can foretel, that their future attempts will produce no greater diſorder?

The diſputes between privileges and prerogative may eaſily be compoſed by laws, and votes, and conferences, and conceſſions; where there is tolerable temper or prudence on both ſides, or on either ſide. Among contending titles, the queſtion can only be determined by the ſword, and by devaſtation, and by civil war.

A prince, who fills the throne with a diſputed title, dares not arm his ſubjects; the only method

of ſecuring a people fully, both againſt domeſtic oppreſſion and foreign conqueſt.

Notwithſtanding our riches and renown, what a critical eſcape did we make, by the late peace, from dangers, which were owing not ſo much to bad conduct and ill ſucceſs in war, as to the pernicious practice of mortgaging our finances, and the ſtill more pernicious maxim of never paying off our incumbrances? Such fatal meaſures would not probably have been embraced, had it not been to ſecure a precarious eſtabliſhment.

But to convince us, that a hereditary title is to be embraced rather than a parliamentary one, which is not ſupported by any other views or motives; a man needs only tranſport himſelf back to the era of the reſtoration, and ſuppoſe, that he had a ſeat in that parliament which recalled the royal family, and put a period to the greateſt diſorders that ever aroſe from the oppoſite pretenſions of prince and people. What would have been thought of one, that had propoſed at that time, to ſet aſide Charles II. and ſettle the crown on the Duke of York or Glouceſter, merely in order to exclude all his claims, like thoſe of their father and grandfather? Would not ſuch a one have been regarded as an extravagant projector, who loved dangerous remedies, and could temper and play with a government and national conſtitution, like a quack with a ſickly patient?

In reality, the reaſon aſſigned by the nation for excluding the race of Stuart, and ſo many other branches of the royal family, is not on account of their hereditary title (a reaſon which would, to

vulgar apprehenſions, have appeared altogether abſurd), but on account of their religion. Which leads us to compare the diſadvantages above mentioned in each eſtabliſhment.

I confeſs, that, conſidering the matter in general, it were much to be wiſhed, that our prince had no foreign dominions, and could confine all his attention to the government of this iſland. For not to mention ſome real inconveniences that may reſult from territories on the continent, they afford ſuch a handle for calumny and defamation, as is greedily ſeized by the people, always diſpoſed to think ill of their ſuperiors. It muſt, however, be acknowledged, that Hanover, is, perhaps, the ſpot of ground in Europe the leaſt inconvenient for a King in England. It lies in the heart of Germany, at a diſtance from the great powers, which are our natural rivals: It is protected by the laws of the empire, as well as by the arms of its own ſovereign: And it ſerves only to connect us more cloſely with the houſe of Auſtria, our natural ally.

The religious perſuaſion of the houſe of Stuart is an inconvenience of a much deeper die, and would threaten us with much more diſmal conſequences. The Roman Catholic religion, with its train of prieſts and friars, is more expenſive than ours: Even though unaccompanied with its natural attendants of inquiſitors, and ſtakes, and gibbets, it is leſs tolerating: And not content with dividing the ſacerdotal from the regal office (which muſt be prejudicial to any ſtate), it beſtows the former on a foreigner, who has always a ſeparate intereſt from

that

that of the public, and may often have an oppoſite one.

But were this religion ever ſo advantageous to ſociety, it is contrary to that which is eſtabliſhed among us, and which is likely to keep poſſeſſion, for a long time, of the minds of the people. And though it is much to be hoped, that the progreſs of reaſon will, by degrees, abate the acrimony of oppoſite religions all over Europe; yet the ſpirit of moderation has, as yet, made too ſlow advances to be entirely truſted.

Thus, upon the whole, the advantages of the ſettlement in the family of Stuart, which frees us from a diſputed title, ſeem to bear ſome proportion with thoſe of the ſettlement in the family of Hanover, which frees us from the claims of prerogative: But at the ſame time, its diſadvantages, by placing on the throne a Roman Catholic; are greater than thoſe of the other eſtabliſhment, in ſettling the crown on a foreign prince. What party an impartial patriot in the reign of K. William or Q. Anne, would have choſen amidſt theſe oppoſite views, may, perhaps, to ſome appear hard to determine.

But the ſettlement in the houſe of Hanover has actually taken place. The princes of that family, without intrigue, without cabal, without ſolicitation on their part, have been called to mount our throne, by the united voice of the whole legiſlative body. They have, ſince their acceſſion, diſplayed in all their actions, the utmoſt mildneſs, equity, and regard to the laws and conſtitution. Our own

miniſters, our own parliaments, ourſelves have governed us; and if aught ill has befallen us, we can only blame fortune or ourſelves. What a reproach muſt we become among nations, if diſguſted with a ſettlement ſo deliberately made, and whoſe conditions have been ſo religiouſly obſerved, we ſhould throw every thing again into confuſion, and by our levity and rebellious diſpoſition, prove ourſelves totally unfit for any ſtate but that of abſolute ſlavery and ſubjection?

The greateſt inconvenience attending a diſputed title is, that it brings us in danger of civil wars and rebellions. What wiſe man, to avoid this inconvenience, would run directly into a civil war and rebellion? Not to mention, that ſo long poſſeſſion, ſecured by ſo many laws, muſt, ere this time, in the apprehenſion of a great part of the nation, have begotten a title in the houſe of Hanover, independent of their preſent poſſeſſion: So that now we ſhould not, even by a revolution, obtain the end of avoiding a diſputed title.

No revolution made by national forces, will ever be able, without ſome other great neceſſity, to aboliſh our debts and incumbrances, in which the intereſt of ſo many perſons is concerned. And a revolution made by foreign forces, is a conqueſt: A calamity, with which the precarious balance of power threatens us, and which our civil diſſenſions are likely, above all other circumſtances, to bring upon us.

ESSAY XVI.

IDEA OF A PERFECT COMMONWEALTH.

IT is not with forms of government as with other artificial contrivances, where an old engine may be rejected, if we can diſcover another more accurate and commodious; or where trials may ſafely be made, even though the ſucceſs be doubtful. An eſtabliſhed government has an infinite advantage, by that very circumſtance, of its being eſtabliſhed; the bulk of mankind being governed by authority, not reaſon, and never attributing authority to any thing that has not the recommendation of antiquity. To tamper, therefore, in this affair, or try experiments merely upon the credit of ſuppoſed argument and philoſophy, can never be the part of a wiſe magiſtrate, who will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age; and though he may attempt ſome improvements for the public good; yet will he adjuſt his innovations as much as poſſible to the ancient fabric, and preſerve entire the chief pillars and ſupports of the conſtitution.

The mathematicians in Europe have been much divided concerning that figure of a ſhip, which is the moſt commodious for ſailing; and Huygens, who at laſt determined the controverſy, is juſtly thought to have obliged the learned as well as commercial world; though Columbus had ſailed to America, and Sir Francis Drake made the tour of the world, without any ſuch diſcovery. As

one form of government muſt be allowed more perfect than another, independent of the manners and humors of particular men; why may we not inquire what is the moſt perfect of all, though the common botched and inaccurate governments ſeem to ſerve the purpoſes of ſociety; and though it be not ſo eaſy to eſtabliſh a new ſyſtem of government, as to build a veſſel upon a new conſtruction? The ſubject is ſurely the moſt worthy curioſity of any the wit of man can poſſibly deviſe. And who knows, if this controverſy were fixed by the univerſal conſent of the wiſe and learned; but, in ſome future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a diſſolution of ſome old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one in ſome diſtant part of the world? In all caſes, it muſt be advantageous to know what is moſt perfect in the kind, that we may be able to bring any real conſtitution or form of government as near it as poſſible, by ſuch gentle alterations and innovations as may not give too great diſturbance to ſociety.

All I pretend to in the preſent eſſay is, to revive this ſubject of ſpeculation; and therefore I ſhall deliver my ſentiments in as few words as poſſible. A long diſſertation on that head would not, I apprehend, be very acceptable to the public, who will be apt to regard ſuch diſquiſitions both as uſeleſs and chimerical.

All plans of government, which ſuppoſe great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plainly imaginary. Of this nature are the *Republic*

of Plato, and the *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More. The Oceana is the only valuable model of a commonwealth that has yet been offered to the public.

The chief defects of the Oceana seem to be these. *First*, Its rotation is inconvenient, by throwing men, of whatever abilities, by intervals, out of public employment. *Secondly*, Its *Agrarian* is impracticable. Men will soon learn the art which was practised in ancient Rome, of concealing their possessions under other people's name; till at last the abuse will become so common, that they will throw off even the appearance of restraint. *Thirdly*, The Oceana provides not a sufficient security for liberty, or the redress of grievances. The senate must propose, and the people consent; by which means, the senate have not only a negative upon the people, but, what is of much greater consequence, their negative goes before the votes of the people. Were the King's negative of the same nature in the English constitution, and could he prevent any bill from coming into parliament, he would be an absolute monarch. As his negative follows the votes of the houses, it is of little consequence: Such a difference is there in the manner of placing the same thing. When a popular bill has been debated in parliament, is brought to maturity, all its conveniences and inconveniences weighed and balanced; if afterwards it be presented for the royal assent, few princes will venture to reject the unanimous desire of the people. But could the King crush a disagreeable bill in embryo (as was the case, for some time, in the Scottish parliament, by means of the lords of the articles), the

Britiſh government would have no balance, nor would grievances ever be redreſſed; and it is certain, that exorbitant power proceeds not, in any government, from new laws, ſo much as from neglecting to remedy the abuſes which frequently riſe from the old ones. A government, ſays Machiavel, muſt often be brought back to its original principles. It appears then, that, in the Oceana, the whole legiſlature may be ſaid to reſt in the ſenate, which Harrington would own to be an inconvenient form of government, eſpecially after the *Agrarian* is aboliſhed.

Here is a form of government, to which I cannot, in theory, diſcover any conſiderable objection.

Let Great Britain and Ireland, or any territory of equal extent, be divided into 100 counties, and each county into 100 pariſhes, making in all 10,000. If the country, propoſed to be erected into a commonwealth, be of more narrow extent, we may diminiſh the number of counties; but never bring them below thirty. If it be of greater extent, it were better to enlarge the pariſhes, or throw more pariſhes into a county, than increaſe the number of counties.

Let all the freeholders of twenty pounds a-year in the county, and all the houſeholders worth 500 pounds in the town-pariſhes, meet annually in the pariſh-church, and chuſe by ballot, ſome freeholder of the county for their member, whom we ſhall call the county-*repreſentative*.

Let the 100 county repreſentatives two days after their election, meet in the county-town, and chuſe by

ballot, from their own body, ten county-*magiſtrates* and one *ſenator*. There are, therefore, in the whole commonwealth, 100 ſenators, 1100 county-magiſtrates, and 10,000 county-repreſentatives. For we ſhall beſtow on all ſenators the authority of county-magiſtrates, and on all county-magiſtrates the authority of county-repreſentatives.

Let the ſenators meet in the capital, and be endowed with the whole executive power of the commonwealth, the power of peace and war, of giving orders to generals, admirals, and ambaſſadors; and, in ſhort, all the prerogatives of a Britiſh King, except his negative.

Let the county-repreſentatives meet in their particular counties, and poſſeſs the whole legiſlative power of the commonwealth; the greater number of counties deciding the queſtion; and where theſe are equal, let the ſenate have the caſting vote.

Every new law muſt firſt be debated in the ſenate; and though rejected by it, if ten ſenators inſiſt and proteſt, it muſt be ſent down to the counties. The ſenate, if they pleaſe, may join to the copy of the law their reaſons for receiving or rejecting it.

Becauſe it would be troubleſome to aſſemble all the county-repreſentatives for every trivial law that may be requiſite, the ſenate have their choice of ſending down the law either to the county-magiſtrates or county-repreſentatives.

The magiſtrates, though the law be referred to them, may, if they pleaſe, call the repreſentatives, and ſubmit the affair to their determination.

Whether the law be referred by the ſenate to the

county-magiſtrates or repreſentatives, a copy of it, and of the ſenate's reaſons, muſt be ſent to every repreſentative eight days before the day appointed for the aſſembling, in order to deliberate concerning it; and though the determination be, by the ſenate, referred to the magiſtrates, if five repreſentatives of the county order the magiſtrates to aſſemble the whole court of repreſentatives, and ſubmit the affair to their determination, they muſt obey.

Either the county-magiſtrates or repreſentatives may give to the ſenator of the county the copy of a law to be propoſed to the ſenate; and if five counties concur in the ſame order, the law, though refuſed by the ſenate, muſt come either to the county-magiſtrates or repreſentatives as is contained in the order of the five counties.

Any twenty counties, by a vote either of their magiſtrates or repreſentatives, may throw any man out of all public offices for a year. Thirty counties for three years.

The ſenate has a power of throwing out any member or number of members of its own body, not to be re-elected for that year. The ſenate cannot throw out twice in a year the ſenator of the ſame county.

The power of the old ſenate continues for three weeks after the annual election of the county-repreſentatives. Then all the new ſenators are ſhut up in a conclave like the cardinals; and by an intricate ballot ſuch as that of Venice or Malta, they chuſe the following magiſtrates; a protector who repreſents the dignity of the commonwealth, and preſides in

the ſenate; two ſecretaries of ſtate; theſe ſix councils, a council of ſtate, a council of religion and learning, a council of trade, a council of laws, a council of war, a council of the admiralty, each council conſiſting of five perſons, together with ſix commiſſioners of the treaſury and a firſt commiſſioner. All theſe muſt be ſenators. The ſenate alſo names all the ambaſſadors to foreign courts, who may either be ſenators or not.

The ſenate may continue any or all of theſe, but muſt re-elect them every year.

The protector and two ſecretaries have ſeſſion and ſuffrage in the council of ſtate. The buſineſs of that council is all foreign politics. The council of ſtate has ſeſſion and ſuffrage in all the other councils.

The council of religion and learning inſpects the univerſities and clergy. That of trade inſpects every thing that may affect commerce. That of laws inſpects all the abuſes of law by the inferior magiſtrates, and examines what improvements may be made of the municipal law. That of war inſpects the militia and its diſcipline, magazines, ſtores, &c. and when the republic is in war, examines into the proper orders for generals. the council of admiralty has the ſame power with regard to the navy, together with the nomination of the captains and all inferior officers.

None of theſe councils can give orders themſelves, except where they receive ſuch powers from the ſenate. In other caſes, they muſt communicate every thing to the ſenate.

When the ſenate is under adjournment, any of

the councils may aſſemble it before the day appointed for its meeting.

Beſides theſe councils or courts, there is another called the court of *competitors;* which is thus conſtituted. If any candidates for the office of ſenator have more votes than a third of the repreſentatives, that candidate, who has moſt votes, next to the ſenator elected, becomes incapable for one year of all public offices, even of being a magiſtrate or repreſentative: But he takes his ſeat in the court of competitors. Here then is a court which may ſometimes conſiſt of a hundred members, ſometimes have no members at all; and by that means, be for a year aboliſhed.

The court of competitors has no power in the commonwealth. It has only the inſpection of public accounts, and the accuſing of any man before the ſenate. If the ſenate acquit him, the court of competitors may, if they pleaſe, appeal to the people, either magiſtrates or repreſentatives. Upon that appeal, the magiſtrates or repreſentatives meet on the day appointed by the court of competitors, and chuſe in each county three perſons; from which number every ſenator is excluded. Theſe, to the number of 300, meet in the capital, and bring the perſon accuſed to a new trial.

The court of competitors may propoſe any law to the ſenate; and if refuſed, may appeal to the people, that is, to the magiſtrates or repreſentatives, who examine it in their counties. Every ſenator, who is thrown out of the ſenate by a vote of the court, takes his ſeat in the court of competitors.

The ſenate poſſeſſes all the judicative authority of the houſe of Lords, that is all the appeals from the inferior courts. It likewiſe appoints the Lord Chancellor, and all the officers of the law.

Every county is a kind of republic within itſelf, and the repreſentatives may make by-laws; which have no authority till three months after they are voted. A copy of the law is ſent to the ſenate, and to every other county. The ſenate, or any ſingle county, may, at any time, annul any by-law of another county.

The repreſentatives have all the authority of the Britiſh juſtices of peace in trials, commitments, &c.

The magiſtrates have the appointment of all the officers of the revenue in each county. All cauſes with regard to the revenue are carried ultimately by appeal before the magiſtrates. They paſs the accompts of all the officers; but muſt have their own accompts examined and paſſed at the end of the year by the repreſentatives.

The magiſtrates name rectors or miniſters to all the pariſhes.

The Preſbyterian government is eſtabliſhed; and the higheſt eccleſiaſtical court is an aſſembly or ſynod of all the preſbyters of the county. The magiſtrates may take any cauſe from this court, and determine it themſelves.

The magiſtrates may try, and depoſe or ſuſpend any preſbyter.

The militia is eſtabliſhed in imitation of that of Swiſſerland; which being well known, we ſhall

not insist upon it. It will only be proper to make this addition, that an army of 20,000 men be annually drawn out by rotation, paid and encamped during six weeks in summer; that the duty of a camp may not be altogether unknown.

The magistrates appoint all the colonels and downwards; the senate all upwards. During war, the general appoints the colonel and downwards, and his commission is good for a twelvemonth. But after that, it must be confirmed by the magistrates of the county, to which the regiment belongs. The magistrates may break any officer in the county-regiment; and the senate may do the same to any officer in the service. If the magistrates do not think proper to confirm the general's choice, they may appoint another officer in the place of him they reject.

All crimes are tried within the county by the magistrates and a jury. But the senate can stop any trial, and bring it before themselves.

Any county may indict any man before the senate for any crime.

The protector, the two secretaries, the council of state, with any five or more that the senate appoints, are possessed, on extraordinary emergencies, of *dictatorial* power for six months.

The protector may pardon any person condemned by the inferior courts.

In time of war, no officer of the army that is in the field can have any civil office in the commonwealth.

The capital, which we ſhall call London, may be allowed four members in the ſenate. It may therefore be divided into four counties. The repreſentatives of each of theſe chuſe one ſenator and ten magiſtrates. There are therefore in the city four ſenators, forty-four magiſtrates, and four hundred repreſentatives. The magiſtrates have the ſame authority as in the counties. The repreſentatives alſo have the ſame authority; but they never meet in one general court: They give their votes in their particular county, or diviſion of hundreds.

When they enact any by-law, the greater number of counties or diviſions determines the matter. And where theſe are equal, the magiſtrates have the caſting vote.

The magiſtrates chuſe the mayor, ſheriff, recorder, and other officers of the city.

In the commonwealth, no repreſentative, magiſtrate, or ſenator, as ſuch, has any ſalary. The protector, ſecretaries, councils, and ambaſſadors, have ſalaries.

The firſt year in every century is ſet apart for correcting all inequalities, which time may have produced in the repreſentative. This muſt be done by the legiſlature.

The following political aphoriſms may explain the reaſon of theſe orders.

The lower ſort of people and ſmall proprietors are good judges enough of one not very diſtant from them in rank or habitation; and therefore, in their parochial meeting, will probably chuſe the beſt, or nearly the beſt, repreſentative: But they are wholly

unfit for country-meetings, and for electing into the higher offices of the republic. Their ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them.

Ten thousand, even though they were not annually elected, are a basis large enough for any free government. It is true, the nobles in Poland are more than 10,000, and yet these oppress the people. But as power always continues there in the same persons and families, this makes them, in a manner, a different nation from the people. Besides the nobles are there united under a few heads of families.

All free governments must consist of two councils, a lesser and greater; or, in other words, of a senate and people. The people, as Harrington observes, would want wisdom, without the senate: The senate, without the people, would want honesty.

A large assembly of 1000, for instance, to represent the people, if allowed to debate, would fall into disorder. If not allowed to debate, the senate has a negative upon them, and the worst kind of negative, that before resolution.

Here therefore is an inconvenience, which no government has yet fully remedied, but which is the easiest to be remedied in the world. If the people debate, all is confusion: If they do not debate, they can only resolve; and then the senate carves for them. Divide the people into many separate bodies; and then they may debate with safety, and every inconvenience seems to be prevented.

Cardinal de Retz says, that all numerous assemblies, however composed, are mere mob, and swayed in their debates by the least motive. This we find

confirmed by daily experience. When an abſurdity ſtrikes a member, he conveys it to his neighbour, and ſo on, till the whole be infected. Separate this great body; and though every member be only of middling ſenſe, it is not probable, that any thing but reaſon can prevail over the whole. Influence and example being removed, good ſenſe will always get the better of bad among a number of people.

There are two things to be guarded againſt in every *ſenate:* Its combination, and its diviſion. Its combination is moſt dangerous. And againſt this inconvenience we have provided the following remedies. 1. The great dependence of the ſenators on the people by annual elections; and that not by an undiſtinguiſhing rabble, like the Engliſh electors, but by men of fortune and education. 2. The ſmall power they are allowed. They have few offices to diſpoſe of. Almoſt all are given by the magiſtrates in the counties. 3. The court of competitors, which being compoſed of men that are their rivals, next to them in intereſt, and uneaſy in their preſent ſituation, will be ſure to take all advantages againſt them.

The diviſion of the ſenate is prevented. 1. By the ſmallneſs of their number. 2. As faction ſuppoſes a combination in a ſeparate intereſt, it is prevented by their dependence on the people. 3. They have a power of expelling any factious member. It is true, when another member of the ſame ſpirit comes from the county, they have no power of expelling him: Nor is it fit they ſhould; for that ſhows the humor to be in the people, and may poſſibly ariſe from ſome ill conduct in public affairs. 4. Almoſt any man in

a ſenate ſo regularly choſen by the people, may be ſuppoſed fit for any civil office. It would be proper, therefore, for the ſenate to form ſome *general* reſolutions with regard to the diſpoſing of offices among the members: Which reſolutions would not confine them in critical times, when extraordinary parts on the one hand, or extraordinary ſtupidity on the other, appears in any ſenator; but they will be ſufficient to prevent intrigue and faction by making the diſpoſal of the offices a thing of courſe. For inſtance, let it be a reſolution. That no man ſhall enjoy any office, till he has ſat four years in the ſenate: That except ambaſſadors, no man ſhall be in office two years following: That no man ſhall attain the higher offices but through the lower: That no man ſhall be protector twice, &c. The ſenate of Venice govern themſelves by ſuch reſolutions.

In foreign politics the intereſt of the ſenate can ſcarcely ever be divided from that of the people; and therefore it is fit to make the ſenate abſolute with regard to them; otherwiſe there could be no ſecrecy or refined policy. Beſides, without money no alliance can be executed; and the ſenate is ſtill ſufficiently dependent. Not to mention, that the legiſlative power being always ſuperior to the executive, the magiſtrates or repreſentatives may interpoſe whenever they think proper.

The chief ſupport of the Britiſh government is the oppoſition of intereſts: but that, though in the main ſerviceable, breeds endleſs factions. In the foregoing plan, it does all the good without any of the harm. The *competitors* have no power of controlling

the

the ſenate: They have only the power of accuſing and appealing to the people.

It is neceſſary, likewiſe, to prevent both combination and diviſion in the thouſand magiſtrates. This is done ſufficiently by the ſeparation of places and intereſts.

But leſt that ſhould not be ſufficient, their dependence on the 10,000 for their elections, ſerves to the ſame purpoſe.

Nor is that all: For the 10,000 may reſume the power whenever they pleaſe; and not only when they all pleaſe, but when any five of a hundred pleaſe; which will happen upon the very firſt ſuſpicion of a ſeparate intereſt.

The 10,000 are too large a body either to unite or divide, except when they meet in one place, and fall under the guidance of ambitious leaders. Not to mention their annual election, by the whole body of the people, that are of any conſideration.

A ſmall commonwealth is the happieſt government in the world within itſelf, becauſe every thing lies under the eye of the rulers: But it may be ſubdued by great force from without. This ſcheme ſeems to have all the advantages both of a great and a little commonwealth.

Every county-law may be annulled either by the ſenate or another county; becauſe that ſhows an oppoſition of intereſt: In which caſe no part ought to decide for itſelf. The matter muſt be referred to the whole, which will beſt determine what agrees with general intereſt.

As to the clergy and militia, the reaſons of theſe orders are obvious. Without the dependence of the clergy on the civil magiſtrates, and without a militia, it is in vain to think that any free government will ever have ſecurity or ſtability.

In many governments, the inferior magiſtrates have no rewards but what ariſe from their ambition, vanity, or public ſpirit. The ſalaries of the French judges amount not to the intereſt of the ſums they pay for their offices. The Dutch burgomaſters have little more immediate profit than the Engliſh juſtices of peace, or the members of the houſe of commons formerly. But leſt any ſhould ſuſpect, that this would beget negligence in the adminiſtration (which is little to be feared, conſidering the natural ambition of mankind), let the magiſtrates have competent ſalaries. The ſenators have acceſs to ſo many honorable, and lucrative offices, that their attendance needs not be bought. There is little attendance required of the repreſentatives.

That the foregoing plan of government is practicable, no one can doubt who conſiders the reſemblance that it bears to the commonwealth of the United Provinces; a wiſe and renowned government.

The alterations in the preſent ſcheme ſeem all evidently for the better. 1. The repreſentation is more equal. 2. The unlimited power of the burgomaſters in the towns, which forms a perfect ariſtocracy in the Dutch commonwealth, is corrected by a well-tempered democracy, in giving to the people the annual election of the county-repreſentatives. 3. The negative, which every province and town has upon

the whole body of the Dutch republic, with regard to alliances, peace and war, and the impoſitions of taxes, is here removed. 4. The counties, in the preſent plan, are not ſo independent of each other, nor do they form ſeparate bodies ſo much as the ſeven provinces; where the jealouſy and envy of the ſmaller provinces and towns againſt the greater, particularly Holland and Amſterdam, have frequently diſturbed the government. 5. Larger powers, though of the ſafeſt kind, are intruſted to the ſenate than the States-General poſſeſs; by which means, the former may become more expeditious and ſecret in their reſolutions, than it is poſſible for the latter.

The chief alterations that could be made on the Britiſh government, in order to bring it to the moſt perfect model of limited monarchy, ſeem to be the following. *Firſt*, the plan of Cromwell's parliament ought to be reſtored, by making the repreſentation equal, and by allowing none to vote in the county-elections who poſſeſs not a property of 200 pounds value. *Secondly*, As ſuch a houſe of Commons would be too weighty for a frail houſe of Lords, like the preſent, the Biſhops and Scotch Peers ought to be removed: The number of the upper houſe ought to be raiſed to three or four hundred: Their ſeats not hereditary, but during life: They ought to have the election of their own members; and no commoner ſhould be allowed to refuſe a ſeat that was offered him. By this means the houſe of Lords would conſiſt entirely of the men of chief credit, abilities, and intereſt in the nation; and every turbulent leader in the houſe of Commons might be taken off, and connected by

intereſt with the houſe of Peers. Such an ariſtocracy would be an excellent barrier both to the monarchy and againſt it. At preſent, the balance of our government depends in ſome meaſure on the abilities and behaviour of the ſovereign, which are variable and uncertain circumſtances.

This plan of limited monarchy, however corrected. ſeems ſtill liable to three great inconveniences. *Firſt*, It removes not entirely, though it may ſoften, the parties of *court* and *country*. *Secondly*, The king's perſonal character muſt ſtill have great influence on the government. *Thirdly*, The ſword is in the hands of a ſingle perſon, who will always neglect to diſcipline the militia, in order to have a pretence for keeping up a ſtanding army.

We ſhall conclude this ſubject, with obſerving the falſhood of the common opinion, that no large ſtate, ſuch as France or Great Britain, could ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that ſuch a form of government can only take place in a city or ſmall territory. The contrary ſeems probable. Though it is more difficult to form a republican government in an extenſive country than in a city; there is more facility, when once it is formed, of preſerving it ſteady and uniform, without tumult and faction. It is not eaſy for the diſtant parts of a large ſtate to combine in any plan of free government; but they eaſily conſpire in the eſteem and reverence for a ſingle perſon, who, by means of this popular favor, may ſeize the power, and forcing the more obſtinate to ſubmit, may eſtabliſh a monarchical government. On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the ſame

notions of government, the natural equality of property favors liberty, and the nearneſs of habitation enables the citizens mutually to aſſiſt each other. Even under abſolute princes, the ſubordinate government of cities is commonly republican; while that of counties and provinces is monarchical: But theſe ſame circumſtances which facilitate the erection of commonwealths in cities, render their conſtitution more frail and uncertain. Democracies are turbulent. For however the people may be ſeparated or divided into ſmall parties, either in their votes or elections; their near habitation in a city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very ſenſible. Ariſtocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and accordingly were moſt admired by ancient writers; but they are jealous and oppreſſive. In a large government, which is modelled with maſterly ſkill, there is compaſs and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people who may be admitted into the firſt elections or firſt concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magiſtrates, who direct all the movements. At the ſame time, the parts are ſo diſtant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or paſſion, to hurry them into any meaſures againſt the public intereſt.

It is needleſs to inquire, whether ſuch a government would be immortal. I allow the juſtneſs of the poet's exclamation on the endleſs projects of human race, *Man and for ever!* The world itſelf probably is not immortal. Such conſuming plagues may ariſe as would leave even a perfect government

a weak prey to its neighbours. We know not to what length enthuſiaſm, or other extraordinary movements of the human mind, may tranſport men, to the neglect of all order and public good. Where difference of intereſt is removed, whimſical and unaccountable factions often ariſe from perſonal favor or enmity. Perhaps, ruſt may grow to the ſprings of the moſt accurate political machine, and diſorder its motions. Laſtly, extenſive conqueſts, when purſued, muſt be the ruin of every free government; and of the more perfect governments ſooner than of the imperfect; becauſe of the very advantages which the former poſſeſs above the latter. And though ſuch a ſtate ought to eſtabliſh a fundamental law againſt conqueſts; yet republics have ambition as well as individuals, and preſent intereſt makes men forgetful of their poſterity. It is a ſufficient incitement to human endeavours, that ſuch a government would flouriſh for many ages, without pretending to beſtow, on any work of man, that immortality which the Almighty ſeems to have refuſed to his own productions.

NOTES

TO THE

SECOND VOLUME.

NOTE [A], p. 8.

THE more ancient Romans lived in perpetual war with all their neighbours : And in old Latin, the term *boſtis*, expreſſed both a ſtranger and an enemy. This is remarked by Cicero; but by him aſcribed to the humanity of his anceſtors, who ſoftened as much as poſſible the denomination of an enemy, by calling him by the ſame appellation which ſignified a ſtranger. *De Off.* lib. ii. It is however much more probable, from the manners of the times, that the ferocity of thoſe people was ſo great as to make them regard all ſtrangers as enemies, and call them by the ſame name. It is not, beſides, conſiſtent with the moſt common maxims of policy or of nature, that any ſtate ſhould regard its public enemies with a friendly eye, or preſerve any ſuch ſentiments for them as the Roman orator would aſcribe to his anceſtors. Not to mention, that the early Romans really exerciſed piracy, as we learn from their firſt treaties with Carthage, preſerved by Polybius, lib. iii. and conſequently like the Sallee and Algerine rovers, were actually at war with moſt nations, and a ſtranger and an enemy were with them almoſt ſynonymous.

NOTE [B], p. 36.

A Private ſoldier in the Roman infantry had a denarius a day, ſomewhat leſs than eight pence. The Roman emperors had commonly 25 legions in pay, which allowing 5000 men to a legion, makes 125,000. Tacit. *Ann.* lib. iv. It is true, there were alſo auxiliaries to the legions; but their numbers are uncertain, as well as their pay. To conſider only the legionaries, the pay of the private men could not exceed 1,600,000 pounds. Now the parliament in the laſt war commonly allowed for the fleet 2,500,000. We have therefore 900,000 over for the officers and other expenſes of the Roman legions. There ſeem to have been but few officers in the Roman armies, in compariſon of what are employed in all of our modern troops, except ſome Swiſs corps. And theſe officers had very ſmall pay: A centurion, for inſtance, only double a common ſoldier. And as the ſoldiers from their pay (Tacit. *Ann.* lib. 1.) bought their own clothes, arms, tents, and baggage; this muſt alſo diminiſh conſiderably the other charges of the army. So little expenſive was that mighty government, and ſo eaſy was its yoke over the world. And, indeed, this is the more natural concluſion from the foregoing calculation. For money, after the conqueſt of Egypt, ſeems to have been nearly in as great plenty at Rome as it is at preſent in the richeſt of the European kingdoms.

NOTE [C], p. 41.

THESE facts I give upon the authority of Monſ. du Tot in his *Réflexions politiques*, an author of reputation. Though I muſt confeſs, that the facts which he advances on other occaſions, are often ſo ſuſpicious, as to make his authority leſs in this matter. However, the general obſervation, that the

augmenting of the money in France does not at firſt proportionably augment the prices, is certainly juſt.

By the bye, this ſeems to be one of the beſt reaſons which can be given, for a gradual and univerſal increaſe of the denomination of money, though it has been entirely overlooked in all thoſe volumes which have been written on that queſtion by Melon, Du Tot, and Paris de Verney. Were all our money, for inſtance, recoined, and a penny's worth of ſilver taken from every ſhilling, the new ſhilling would probably purchaſe every thing that could have been bought by the old; the prices of every thing would thereby be inſenſibly diminiſhed; a foreign trade enlivened; and domeſtic induſtry, by the circulation of a great number of pounds and ſhillings, would receive ſome increaſe and encouragement. In executing ſuch a project, it would be better to make the new ſhillings paſs for 24 halfpence, in order to preſerve the illuſion, and make it be taken for the ſame. And as a recoinage of our ſilver begins to be requiſite, by the continual wearing of our ſhillings and ſixpences, it may be doubtful, whether we ought to imitate the example in King William's reign, when the clipt money was raiſed to the old ſtandard.

NOTE [D], p. 73.

IT muſt carefully be remarked, that throughout this diſcourſe, wherever I ſpeak of the level of money, I mean always its proportional level to the commodities, labor, induſtry, and ſkill, which is in the ſeveral ſtates. And I aſſert, that where theſe advantages are double, triple, quadruple, to what they are in the neighbouring ſtates, the money infallibly will alſo be double, triple, quadruple. The only circumſtance that can obſtruct the exactneſs of theſe pro-

portions, is the expenſe of tranſporting the commodities from one place to another; and this expenſe is ſometimes unequal. Thus the corn, cattle, cheeſe, butter, of Derbyſhire, cannot draw the money of London, ſo much as the manufactures of London draw the money of Derbyſhire. But this objection is only a ſeeming one: For ſo far as the tranſport of commodities is expenſive, ſo far is the communication between the places obſtructed and imperfect.

NOTE [E], p. 126.

I Have heard it has been computed, that all the creditors of the public, natives and foreigners, amount only to 17,000. Theſe make a figure at preſent on their income; but in caſe of a public bankruptcy, would, in an inſtant, become the loweſt as well as the moſt wretched of the people. The dignity and authority of the landed gentry and nobility is much better rooted; and would render the contention very unequal, if ever we come to that extremity. One would incline to aſſign to this event a very near period, ſuch as half a century, had not our fathers prophecies of this kind been already found fallacious, by the duration of our public credit ſo much beyond all reaſonable expectation. When the aſtrologers in France were every year foretelling the death of Henry IV. *Theſe fellows*, ſays he, *muſt be right at laſt.* We ſhall, therefore, be more cautious than to aſſign any preciſe date; and ſhall content ourſelves with pointing out the event in general.

NOTE [F], p. 140.

COLUMELLA ſays, lib. iii. cap. 8. that in Egypt and Africa, the bearing of twins was frequent, and even cuſtomary, *gemini partus familiares, ac pene ſolennes ſunt.* If this was true, there is a phyſical difference both in countries and ages: For travellers make no ſuch remarks on theſe countries at preſent. On the contrary, we are apt to ſuppoſe the northern nations more prolific. As thoſe two countries were provinces of the Roman empire, it is difficult, though not altogether abſurd, to ſuppoſe that ſuch a man as Columella might be miſtaken with regard to them.

NOTE [G], p. 147.

EPIST. 122. The inhuman ſports exhibited at Rome, may juſtly be conſidered too as an effect of the people's contempt for ſlaves, and was alſo a great cauſe of the general inhumanity of their princes and rulers. Who can read the accounts of the amphitheatrical entertainments without horror? Or who is ſurpriſed, that the emperors ſhould treat that people in the ſame way the people treated their inferiors? One's humanity is apt to renew the barbarous wiſh of Caligula, that the people had but one neck: A man could almoſt be pleaſed by a ſingle blow, to put an end to ſuch a race of monſters. You may thank God, ſays the author above cited (*epiſt.* 7.), addreſſing himſelf to the Roman people, that you have a maſter (to wit the mild and merciful Nero), who is incapable of learning cruelty from your example. This was ſpoke in the beginning of his reign: But he fitted them very well afterwards;

and, no doubt, was conſiderably improved by the ſight of the barbarous objects, to which he had, from his infancy, been accuſtomed.

NOTE [H], p. 150.

AS *ſervus* was the name of the genus, and *verna* of the ſpecies, without any correlative, this forms a ſtrong preſumption, that the latter were by far the leaſt numerous. It is an univerſal obſervation which we may form upon language, that where two related parts of a whole bear any proportion to each other, in numbers, rank, or conſideration, there are always correlative terms invented, which anſwer to both the parts, and expreſs their mutual relation. If they bear no proportion to each other, the term is only invented for the leſs; and marks its diſtinction from the whole. Thus *man* and *woman*, *maſter* and *ſervant*, *father* and *ſon*, *prince* and *ſubject*, *ſtranger* and *citizen*, are correlative terms. But the words *ſeaman*, *carpenter*, *ſmith*, *taylor*, *&c.* have no correſpondent terms, which expreſs thoſe who are no ſeamen, no carpenters, &c. Languages differ very much with regard to the particular words where this diſtinction obtains; and may thence afford very ſtrong inferences concerning the manners and cuſtoms of different nations. The military government of the Roman emperors had exalted the ſoldiery ſo high, that they balanced all the other orders of the ſtate: Hence *miles* and *paganus* became relative terms; a thing, till then, unknown to ancient, and ſtill ſo to modern languages. Modern ſuperſtition exalted the clergy ſo high, that they overbalanced the whole ſtate: Hence *clergy* and *laity* are terms oppoſed in all modern languages; and in theſe alone. And from the

ſame principles I infer, that if the number of ſlaves bought by the Romans from foreign countries, had not extremely exceeded thoſe which were bred at home, *verna* would have had a correlative which would have expreſſed the former ſpecies of ſlaves. But theſe, it would ſeem, compoſed the main body of the ancient ſlaves, and the latter were but a few exceptions.

NOTE [I], p. 153.

"NON temere ancillæ ejus rei cauſa comparantur ut "pariant." *Digeſt.* lib. v. tit. 3. *de hæred. petit. lex.* 27. The following texts are to the ſame purpoſe, "Spadonem "morboſum non eſſe, neque vitioſum, verius mihi vide- "tur; ſed ſanum eſſe, ſicuti illum qui unum teſticulum "habet, qui etiam generare poteſt." *Digeſt.* lib. ii. tit. 1. *de ædilitio edicto*, *lex* 6. §. 2. "Sin autem quis ita ſpado "ſit, ut tam neceſſaria pars corporis penitus abſit, mor- "boſus eſt." *Id. lex* 7. His impotence, it ſeems, was only regarded ſo far as his health or life might be affected by it. In other reſpects, he was full as valuable. The ſame reaſoning is employed with regard to female-ſlaves. "Quæritur de ea muliere quæ ſemper mortuos parit, an "morboſa ſit? et ait Sabinus, ſi vulvæ vitio hoc contingit, "morboſam eſſe." *Id. lex* 14. It had even been doubted, whether a woman pregnant was morbid or vitiated; and it is determined, that ſhe is ſound, not on account of the value of her offspring, but becauſe it is the natural part or office of women to bear children. "Si mulier prægnans "venerit, inter omnes convenit ſanam eam eſſe. Maximum "enim ac præcipuum munus fœminarum accipere ac tueri "conceptum. Puerperam quoque ſanam eſſe; ſi modo nihil

" extrinſecus accedit, quod corpus ejus in aliquam valetu
" dinem immitteret. De ſterili Cœlius diſtinguere Treba-
" tium dicit, ut ſi natura ſterilis ſit, ſana ſit; ſi vitio
" corporis, contra." *Id.*

NOTE [K], p. 161.

THE practice of leaving great ſums of money to friends, though one had near relations, was common in Greece as well as Rome; as we may gather from Lucian. This practice prevails much leſs in modern times; and Ben Jonſon's Volpone is therefore almoſt entirely extracted from ancient authors, and ſuits better the manners of thoſe times.

It may juſtly be thought, that the liberty of divorces in Rome was another diſcouragement to marriage. Such a practice prevents not quarrels from *humor*, but rather increaſes them; and occaſions alſo thoſe from *intereſt*, which are much more dangerous and deſtructive. See farther on this head, Part. I. Eſſay XVIII. Perhaps too the unnatural luſts of the ancients ought to be taken into conſideration as of ſome moment.

NOTE [L], p. 165.

PLIN. lib. xviii. cap. 3. The ſame author, in cap. 6. ſays, *Verumque fatentibus latifundia perdidere* Italiam; *jam vero et provincias. Sex domi ſemiſſem* Africæ *poſſidebant, cum interfecit eos* Nero *princeps*. In this view the barbarous butchery committed by the firſt Roman emperors, was not, perhaps, ſo deſtructive to the public as we may imagine. Theſe never ceaſed till they had extinguiſhed all the illuſtrious families, which had enjoyed the plunder of the world during the latter ages of the republic. The new

nobles who aroſe in their place were leſs ſplendid, as we learn from Tacit. *Ann.* lib. iii. cap. 55.

NOTE [M], p. 172.

WE ſhall mention from Diodorus Siculus alone a few maſſacres, which paſſed in the courſe of ſixty years, during the moſt ſhining age of Greece. There were baniſhed from Sybaris 500 of the nobles and their partiſans; lib. xii. p. 77. *ex edit.* Rhodomanni. Of Chians, 600 citizens baniſhed; lib. xiii. p. 189. At Epheſus, 340 killed, 1000 baniſhed; lib. xiii. p. 223. Of Cyrenians, 500 nobles killed, all the reſt baniſhed; lib. xiv. p. 263. The Corinthians killed 120, baniſhed 500; lib. xiv. p. 304. Phæbidas the Spartan baniſhed 300 Bæotians; lib. xv. p. 324. Upon the fall of the Lacædemonians, democracies were reſtored in many cities, and ſevere vengeance taken of the nobles, after the Greek manner. But matters did not end there; for the baniſhed nobles returning in many places, butchered their adverſaries at Phialæ, in Corinth, in Megara, in Phliaſia. In this laſt place they killed 300 of the people; but theſe again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles, and baniſhed the reſt; lib. xv. p. 357. In Arcadia 1400 baniſhed, beſides many killed. The baniſhed retired to Sparta and to Pallantium: The latter were delivered up to their countrymen, and all killed; lib. xv. p. 373. Of the baniſhed from Argos and Thebes, there were 509 in the Spartan army; *id.* p. 374. Here is a detail of the moſt remarkable of Agathocles's cruelties from the ſame author. The people before his uſurpation had baniſhed 600 nobles; lib. xix. p. 655. Afterwards that tyrant, in concurrence with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and baniſhed 6000; *id.* p. 647. He

killed 4000 people at Gela; *id.* p. 741. By Agathocles's brother 8000 baniſhed from Syracuſe; lib. xx. p. 757. The inhabitants of Ægeſta, to the number of 40,000 were killed, man, woman, and child; and with tortures, for the ſake of their money; *id.* p. 802. All the relations, to wit, father, brother, children, grandfather, of his Libyan army, killed; *id.* p. 803. He killed 7000 exiles after capitulation; *id.* p. 816. It is to be remarked, that Agathocles was a man of great ſenſe and courage, and is not to be ſuſpected of wanton cruelty, contrary to the maxims of his age.

NOTE [N], p. 174.

IN order to recommend his client to the favor of the people, he enumerates all the ſums he had expended. When χορηγος, 30 minas: Upon a chorus of men 20 minas; εις πυρριχισας, 8 minas; ανδρασι χορηγων, 50 minas; κυκλικω χορω, 3 minas; Seven times trierarch, where he ſpent 6 talents: Taxes, once 30 minas, another time 40; γυμνασιαρχων, 12 minas; χορηγω παιδικω χορω, 15 minas; κωμοδοις χορηγων, 18 minas; πυρριχισαις, αγενειοις, 7 minas; τριηρει αμιλλωμενω, 15 minas; αρχιθεωρος, 30 minas: In the whole, ten talents 38 minas. An immenſe ſum for an Athenian fortune, and what alone would be eſteemed great riches, *Orat.* 20. It is true, he ſays, the law did not oblige him abſolutely to be at ſo much expenſe, not above a fourth. But without the favor of the people, no body was ſo much as ſafe; and this was the only way to gain it. See farther, *orat.* 24. de *pop. ſtatu.* In another place, he introduces a ſpeaker, who ſays that he had ſpent his whole fortune, and an immenſe one, eighty talents, for the people. *Orat.* 25. *de prob.* Evandri. The μετοικοι,

or

or ſtrangers, find, ſays he, if they do not contribute largely enough to the people's fancy, that they have reaſon to repent it. *Orat.* 30. *contra* Phil. You may ſee with what care Demoſthenes diſplays his expenſes of this nature, when he pleads for himſelf *de corona*; and how he exaggerates Midas's ſtinginеſs in this particular, in his accuſation of that criminal. All this, by the bye, is a mark of a very iniquitous judicature; and yet the Athenians valued themſelves on having the moſt legal and regular adminiſtration of any people in Greece.

NOTE [O], p. 176.

THE authorities above cited are all hiſtorians, orators, and philoſophers, whoſe teſtimony is unqueſtioned. It is dangerous to rely upon writers who deal in ridicule and ſatire. What will poſterity, for inſtance, infer from this paſſage of Dr. Swift? "I told him, that in the kingdom of "Tribnia (Britain) by the natives called Langdon (London) "where I had ſojourned ſome time in my travels, the bulk "of the people conſiſt, in a manner, wholly of diſcoverers, "witneſſes, informers, accuſers, proſecutors, evidences, "ſwearers, together with their ſeveral ſubſervient and "ſubaltern inſtruments, all under the colors, the conduct, "and pay of miniſters of ſtate and their deputies. The "plots in that kingdom are uſually the workmanſhip of "thoſe perſons," &c. Gulliver's *Travels*. Such a repreſentation might ſuit the government of Athens; not that of England, which is remarkable, even in modern times, for humanity, juſtice, and liberty. Yet the Doctor's ſatire, though carried to extremes, as is uſual with him, even beyond other ſatirical writers, did not altogether want an

object. The Biſhop of Rocheſter, who was his friend, and of the ſame party, had been baniſhed a little before by bill of attainder, with great juſtice, but without ſuch proof as was legal, or according to the ſtrict forms of common law.

NOTE [P], p. 185.

In general, there is more candor and ſincerity in ancient hiſtorians, but leſs exactneſs and care, than in the moderns. Our ſpeculative factions, eſpecially thoſe of religion, throw ſuch an illuſion over our minds, that men ſeem to regard impartiality to their adverſaries and to heretics, as a vice or weakneſs: But the commonneſs of books, by means of printing, has obliged modern hiſtorians to be more careful in avoiding contradictions and incongruities. Diodorus Siculus is a good writer; but it is with pain I ſee his narration contradict, in ſo many particulars, the two moſt authentic pieces of all Greek hiſtory, to wit, Xenophon's expedition, and Demoſthenes's orations. Plutarch and Appian ſeem ſcarce ever to have read Cicero's epiſtles.

NOTE [Q], p. 188.

Pliny, lib. vii. cap. 25. ſays, that Cæſar uſed to boaſt, that there had fallen in battle againſt him one million one hundred and ninety-two thouſand men, beſides thoſe who periſhed in the civil wars. It is not probable, that the conqueror could ever pretend to be ſo exact in his computation. But allowing the fact, it is likely, that the Helvetii, Germans, and Britons, whom he ſlaughtered, would amount to near a half of the number.

NOTE [R], p. 92.

WE are to obſerve, that when Dionyſius Halycarnaſſæus ſays, that if we regard the ancient walls of Rome, the extent of that city will not appear greater than that of Athens; he muſt mean the Acropolis and high town only. No ancient author ever ſpeaks of the Pyræum, Phalerus, and Munychia, as the ſame with Athens. Much leſs can it be ſuppoſed, that Dionyſius would conſider the matter in that light, after the walls of Cimon and Pericles were deſtroyed, and Athens was entirely ſeparated from theſe other towns. This obſervation deſtroys all Voſſius's reaſonings, and introduces common ſenſe into theſe calculations.

NOTE [S], p. 196.

DEMOST. *contra* Lept. The Athenians brought yearly from Pontus 400,000 medimni or buſhels of corn, as appeared from the cuſtom-houſe books; and this was the greater part of their importation of corn. This, by the bye, is a ſtrong proof that there is ſome great miſtake in the foregoing paſſage of Athenæus. For Attica itſelf was ſo barren of corn, that it produced not enough even to maintain the peaſants. Tit. Liv. lib. xliii. cap. 6. And 400,000 medimni would ſcarcely feed 100,000 men during a twelvemonth. Lucian, in his *navigium ſive vota*, ſays, that a ſhip, which, by the dimenſions he gives, ſeems to have been about the ſize of our third rates, carried as much corn as would maintain all Attica for a twelvemonth: But perhaps Athens was decayed at that time; and beſides, it is not ſafe to truſt to ſuch looſe rhetorical calculations.

NOTE [T], p. 196.

DIOD. Sic. lib. xvii. When Alexander attacked Thebes, we may ſafely conclude, that almoſt all the inhabitants were preſent. Whoever is acquainted with the ſpirit of the Greeks, eſpecially of the Thebans, will never ſuſpect that any of them would deſert their country, when it was reduced to ſuch extreme peril and diſtreſs. As Alexander took the town by ſtorm, all thoſe who bore arms were put to the ſword without mercy; and they amounted only to 6000 men. Among theſe were ſome ſtrangers and manumitted ſlaves. The captives, conſiſting of old men, women, children, and ſlaves, were ſold, and they amounted to 30,000. We may therefore conclude, that the free citizens in Thebes, of both ſexes and all ages, were near 24,000; the ſtrangers and ſlaves about 12,000. Theſe laſt, we may obſerve, were ſomewhat fewer in proportion than at Athens, as is reaſonable to imagine from this circumſtance; that Athens was a town of more trade to ſupport ſlaves, and of more entertainment to allure ſtrangers. It is alſo to be remarked, that thirty-ſix thouſand was the whole number of people, both in the city of Thebes, and the neighbouring territory: A very moderate number, it muſt be confeſſed; and this computation, being founded on facts which appear indiſputable, muſt have great weight in the preſent controverſy. The above-mentioned number of Rhodians too, were all the inhabitants of the iſland who were free, and able to bear arms.

NOTE [V], p. 200.

STRABO, lib. v. ſays, that the emperor Auguſtus prohibited the raiſing houſes higher than ſeventy feet. In another paſſage, lib. xvi. he ſpeaks of the houſes of Rome as remarkably high. See alſo to the ſame purpoſe Vitruvius, lib. ii. cap. 8. Ariſtides the ſophiſt, in his oration εις Ρωμην, ſays, that Rome conſiſted of cities on the top of cities; and that if one were to ſpread it out and unfold it, it would cover the whole ſurface of Italy. Where an author indulges himſelf in ſuch extravagant declamations, and gives ſo much into the hyperbolical ſtyle, one knows not how far he muſt be reduced. But this reaſoning ſeems natural: If Rome was built in ſo ſcattered a manner as Dionyſius ſays, and ran ſo much into the country, there muſt have been very few ſtreets where the houſes were raiſed ſo high. It is only for want of room that any body builds in that inconvenient manner.

NOTE [X], p. 200.

LIB. ii. epiſt. 16. lib. v. epiſt. 6. It is true, Pliny there deſcribes a country-houſe: But ſince that was the idea which the ancients formed of a magnificent and convenient building, the great men would certainly build the ſame way in town. "In laxitatem ruris excurrunt," ſays Seneca of the rich and voluptuous, epiſt. 114. Valerius Maximus, lib. iv. cap. 4. ſpeaking of Cincinnatus's field of four acres, ſays, "Anguſte ſe habitare nunc putat, cujus domus tan-
" tum patet quantum Cincinnati rura patuerant." To the ſame purpoſe ſee lib. xxxvi. cap. 15. alſo lib. xviii. cap. 2.

NOTE [Y], p. 201.

" MOENIA ejus (Romæ) collegere ambitu imperatoribus
" cenſoribuſque Veſpaſianis, A. U. C. 828. paſſ. xiii. MCC.
" complexa montes ſeptem, ipſa dividitur in regiones qua-
" tuordecim, compita Larium 265. Ejuſdem ſpatii men-
" ſura currente a milliario, in capite Rom. Fori ſtatuto,
" ad ſingulas portas, quæ ſunt hodie numero 37, ita ut
" duodecim portæ ſemel numerentur, prætereanturque ex
" veteribus ſeptem, quæ eſſe deſierunt, efficit paſſuum per
" directum 30,775, ad extrema vero tectorum cum caſtris
" prætoriis ab eodem Milliario, per vicos omnium viarum
" menſura collegit paulo amplius ſeptuaginta millia paſſuum.
" Quo ſi quis altitudinem tectorum addat, dignam pro-
" fecto æſtimationem concipiat, fateaturque nullius urbis
" magnitudinem in toto orbe potuiſſe ei comparari." Plin. lib. iii. cap. 9.

All the beſt manuſcripts of Pliny read the paſſage as here cited, and fix the compaſs of the walls of Rome to be thirteen miles. The queſtion is, What Pliny means by 30,775 paces, and how that number was formed? The manner in which I conceive it, is this. Rome was a ſemicircular area of thirteen miles circumference. The Forum, and conſequently the Milliarium, we know, was ſituated on the banks of the Tyber, and near the centre of the circle, or upon the diameter of the ſemicircular area. Though there were thirty-ſeven gates to Rome, yet only twelve of them had ſtraight ſtreets, leading from them to the Milliarium. Pliny, therefore, having aſſigned the circumference of Rome, and knowing that that alone was not ſufficient to give us a juſt notion of its ſurface, uſes this farther method. He ſuppoſes all the ſtreets, leading from

the Milliarium to the twelve gates, to be laid together into one ſtraight line, and ſuppoſes we run along that line ſo as to count each gate once: In which caſe, he ſays, that the whole line is 30,775 paces; or in other words, that each ſtreet or radius of the ſemicircular area is upon an average two miles and a half; and the whole length of Rome is five miles, and its breadth about half as much, beſides the ſcattered ſuburbs.

Pere Hardouin underſtands this paſſage in the ſame manner, with regard to the laying together the ſeveral ſtreets of Rome into one line, in order to compoſe 30,775 paces: But then he ſuppoſes, that ſtreets led from the Milliarium to every gate, and that no ſtreet exceeded 800 paces in length. But (1) a ſemicircular area, whoſe radius was only 800 paces, could never have a circumference near thirteen miles, the compaſs of Rome as aſſigned by Pliny. A radius of two miles and a half forms very nearly that circumference. (2) There is an abſurdity in ſuppoſing a city ſo built as to have ſtreets running to its centre from every gate in its circumference. Theſe ſtreets muſt interfere as they approach. (3) This diminiſhes too much from the greatneſs of ancient Rome, and reduces that city below even Briſtol or Rotterdam.

The ſenſe which Voſſius in his *Obſervationes variæ* puts on this paſſage of Pliny, errs widely in the other extreme. One manuſcript of no authority, inſtead of thirteen miles, has aſſigned thirty miles for the compaſs of the walls of Rome: And Voſſius underſtands this only of the curvilinear part of the circumference; ſuppoſing, that as the Tyber formed the diameter, there were no walls built on that ſide. But (1) this reading is allowed to be contrary to almoſt all the manuſcripts. (2) Why ſhould Pliny, a conciſe writer,

repeat the compaſs of the walls of Rome in two ſucceſſive ſentences? (3) Why repeat it with ſo ſenſible a variation? (4) What is the meaning of Pliny's mentioning twice the Milliarium, if a line was meaſured that had no dependence on the Milliarium? (5) Aurelian's wall is ſaid by Vopiſcus to have been drawn *laxiore ambitu*, and to have comprehended all the buildings and ſuburbs on the north ſide of the Tyber; yet its compaſs was only fifty miles; and even here critics ſuſpect ſome miſtake or corruption in the text; ſince the walls which remain, and which are ſuppoſed to be the ſame with Aurelian's, exceed not twelve miles. It is not probable, that Rome would diminiſh from Auguſtus to Aurelian. It remained ſtill the capital of the ſame empire; and none of the civil wars in that long period, except the tumults on the death of Maximus and Balbinus, ever affected the city. Caracalla is ſaid by Aurelius Victor to have increaſed Rome. (6) There are no remains of ancient buildings which mark any ſuch greatneſs of Rome. Voſſius's reply to this objection ſeems abſurd: That the rubbiſh would ſink ſixty or ſeventy feet under ground. It appears from Spartian (*in vita Severi*) that the five-mile ſtone *in via Lavicana* was out of the city. (7) Olympiodorus and Publius Victor fix the number of houſes in Rome to be betwixt forty and fifty thouſand. (8) The very extravagance of the conſequences drawn by this critic, as well as Lipſius, if they be neceſſary, deſtroys the foundation on which they are grounded, That Rome contained fourteen millions of inhabitants; while the whole kingdom of France contains only five, according to his computation, *&c.*

The only objection to the ſenſe which we have affixed above to the paſſage of Pliny, ſeems to lie in this, That

Pliny, after mentioning the thirty-ſeven gates of Rome, aſſigns only a reaſon for ſuppreſſing the ſeven old ones, and ſays nothing of the eighteen gates; the ſtreets leading from which terminated, according to my opinion, before they reached the Forum. But as Pliny was writing to the Romans who perfectly knew the diſpoſition of the ſtreets, it is not ſtrange he ſhould take a circumſtance for granted which was ſo familiar to every body. Perhaps too, many of theſe gates led to wharfs upon the river.

NOTE [Z], p. 203.

QUINTUS CURTIUS ſays, its walls were ten miles in circumference, when founded by Alexander; lib. iv. cap. 8. Strabo, who had travelled to Alexandria as well as Diodorus Siculus, ſays it was ſcarce four miles long, and in moſt places about a mile broad; lib. xvii. Pliny ſays it reſembled a Macedonian caſſock ſtretching out in the corners; lib. v. cap. 10. Notwithſtanding this bulk of Alexandria which ſeems but moderate, Diodorus Siculus, ſpeaking of its circuit as drawn by Alexander (which it never exceeded, as we learn from Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. xxii. cap. 16.), ſays it was μεγεθει διαφερουσα, *extremely great*, ibid. The reaſon which he aſſigns for its ſurpaſſing all cities in the world (for he excepts not Rome) is, that it contained 300,000 free inhabitants, He alſo mentions the revenues of the kings, to wit 6000 talents, as another circumſtance to the ſame purpoſe: No ſuch mighty ſum in our eyes, even though we make allowance for the different value of money. What Strabo ſays of the neighbouring country means only, that it was well peopled, οικουμενα καλως. Might not one affirm, without any great hyperbole, that the whole banks of the river from Graveſend to Windſor are

one city? This is even more than Strabo ſays of the banks of the lake Mærotis, and of the canal to Canopus. It is a vulgar ſaying in Italy, that the king of Sardinia has but one town in Piedmont; for it is all a town. Agrippa in Joſephus *de bello* Judaic. lib. ii. cap. 16. to make his audience comprehend the exceſſive greatneſs of Alexandria, which he endeavours to magnify, deſcribes only the compaſs of the city as drawn by Alexander: A clear proof that the bulk of the inhabitants were lodged there, and that the neighbouring country was no more than what might be expected about all great towns, very well cultivated, and well peopled.

NOTE [AA], p. 203.

HE ſays (in Nerone, cap. 30.), that a portico or piazza of it was 3000 feet long; "tanta laxitas ut porticus tri-" plices milliarias haberet." He cannot mean three miles. For the whole extent of the houſe from the Palatine to the Eſquiline was not near ſo great. So when Vopiſc. in Aureliano mentions a portico in Salluſt's gardens, which he calls *porticus milliarenſis*, it muſt be underſtood of a thouſand feet. So alſo Horace:

"Nulla decempedis
"Metata privatis opacam
"Porticus excipiebat Arcton." Lib. ii. ode 15.

So alſo in lib. i. ſatyr. 8.

"Mille pedes in fronte, trecentos cippus in agrum
"Hic dabat."

NOTE [BB], p. 215.

IT appears from Cæsar's account, that the Gauls had no domestic slaves who formed a different order from the *Plebes*. The whole common people were indeed a kind of slaves to the nobility, as the people of Poland are at this day: And a nobleman of Gaul had sometimes ten thousand dependents of this kind. Nor can we doubt, that the armies were composed of the people as well as of the nobility. The fighting men amongst the Helvetii were the fourth part of the inhabitants: A clear proof that all the males of military age bore arms. See Cæsar *de bello Gall.* lib. i.

We may remark, that the numbers in Cæsar's *Commentaries* can be more depended on than those of any other ancient author, because of the Greek translation which still remains, and which checks the Latin original.

NOTE [CC], p. 218.

THE inhabitants of Marseilles lost not their superiority over the Gauls in commerce and the mechanic arts, till the Roman dominion turned the latter from arms to agriculture and civil life. See Strabo, lib. iv. That author, in several places, repeats the observation concerning the improvement arising from the Roman arts and civility: And he lived at the time when the change was new, and would be more sensible. So also Pliny: "Quis enim non, communicato orbe terrarum, majestate Romani imperii, profeciſſe vitam putet, commercio rerum ac societate festæ pacis, omniaque etiam, quæ occulta antea fuerant, in promiscuo usu facta. Lib. xiv. præm. Numine deûm electa (speaking of Italy) quæ cœlum ipsum clarius face-

" ret, ſparſa congregaret imperia, rituſque molliret, & tot " populorum diſcordes, feraſque linguas ſermonis commercio " contraheret ad colloquia, & humanitatem homini daret; " breviterque, una cunctarum gentium in toto orbe patria " fieret; " lib. ii. cap. 5. Nothing can be ſtronger to this purpoſe than the following paſſage from Tertullian who lived about the age of Severus. " Certè quidem ipſe orbis in " promptu eſt, cultior de die & inſtructior priſtino. Omnia " jam pervia, omnia nota, omnia negotioſa. Solitudines " famoſas retro fundi amœniſſimi obliteraverunt, ſilvas arva " domuerunt, feras pecora fugaverunt; arenæ ſeruntur, " ſaxa panguntur, paludes eliquantur, tantæ urbes, quantæ " non caſæ quondam. Jam nec inſulæ horrent, nec ſcopuli " terrent; ubique domus, ubique populus, ubique reſ- " publica, ubique vita. Summum teſtimonium frequentiæ " humanæ, oneroſi ſumus mundo, vix nobis elementa ſuf- " ficiunt; & neceſſitates arctiores, & querelæ apud omnes, " dum jam nos natura non ſuſtinet. " De anima, cap. 30. The air of rhetoric and declamation which appears in this paſſage, diminiſhes ſomewhat from its authority, but does not entirely deſtroy it. The ſame remark may be extended to the following paſſage of Ariſtides the ſophiſt, who lived in the age of Adrian. " The whole world, " ſays he, addreſſing himſelf to the Romans, " ſeems to keep one " holiday; and mankind, laying aſide the ſword which " they formerly wore, now betake themſelves to feaſting " and to joy. The cities, forgetting their ancient animo- " ſities, preſerve only one emulation, which ſhall em- " belliſh itſelf moſt by every art and ornament: Theatres " every where ariſe, amphitheatres, porticoes, aqueducts, " temples, ſchools, academies; and one may ſafely pro- " nounce that the ſinking world has been again raiſed by

" your auſpicious empire. Nor have cities alone received " an increaſe of ornament and beauty; but the whole " earth, like a garden or paradiſe, is cultivated and adorn- " ed: Inſomuch, that ſuch of mankind as are placed " out of the limits of your empire (who are but few) " ſeem to merit our ſympathy and compaſſion. "

It is remarkable, that though Diodorus Siculus makes the inhabitants of Ægypt, when conquered by the Romans, amount only to three millions; yet Joſeph. *de bello Jud.* lib. ii. cap. 16. ſays, that its inhabitants, excluding thoſe of Alexandria, were ſeven millions and a half, in the reign of Nero; and he expreſsly ſays, that he drew this account from the books of the Roman publicans who levied the poll-tax. Strabo, lib. xvii. praiſes the ſuperior police of the Romans with regard to the finances of Ægypt, above that of its former monarchs: And no part of adminiſtration is more eſſential to the happineſs of a people. Yet we read in Athenæus (lib. i. cap. 25.), who flouriſhed during the reign of the Antonines, that the town Mareia, near Alexandria, which was formerly a large city, had dwindled into a village. This is not, properly ſpeaking, a contradiction. Suidas (Auguſt.) ſays, that the Emperor Auguſtus, having numbered the whole Roman empire, found it contained only 4,101,017 men (ανδρες). There is here ſurely ſome great miſtake either in the author or tranſcriber: But this authority, feeble as it is, may be ſufficient to counterbalance the exaggerated accounts of Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus with regard to more early times.

NOTE [DD], p. 219.

LIB. ii. cap. 62. It may perhaps be imagined, that Polybius, being dependent on Rome, would naturally extol the Roman dominion. But in the *firſt* place, Polybius, though one ſees ſometimes inſtances of his caution, diſcovers no ſymptons of flattery. *Secondly*, This opinion is only delivered in a ſingle ſtroke, by the bye, while he is intent upon another ſubject; and it is allowed, if there be any ſuſpicion of an author's inſincerity, that theſe oblique propoſitions diſcover his real opinion better than his more formal and direct aſſertions.

NOTE [EE], p. 221.

I Muſt confeſs, that that diſcourſe of Plutarch concerning the ſilence of the oracles, is in general of ſo odd a texture, and ſo unlike his other productions, that one is at a loſs what judgment to form of it. It is written in dialogue; which is a method of compoſition that Plutarch commonly but little affects. The perſonages he introduces advance very wild, abſurd, and contradictory opinions, more like the viſionary ſyſtems or ravings of Plato than the plain ſenſe of Plutarch. There runs alſo through the whole an air of ſuperſtition and credulity, which reſembles very little the ſpirit that appears in other philoſophical compoſitions of that author. For it is remarkable, that though Plutarch be a hiſtorian as ſuperſtitious as Herodotus or Livy, yet there is ſcarcely in all antiquity a philoſopher leſs ſuperſtitious, excepting Cicero and Lucian. I muſt therefore confeſs, that a paſſage of Plutarch cited from this diſcourſe, has much leſs authority with me than if it had been found in moſt of his other compoſitions.

There is only one other diſcourſe of Plutarch liable to like objections, to wit, that *concerning thoſe whoſe punishment is delayed by the Deity.* It is alſo writ in dialogue, contains like ſuperſtitious, wild viſions, and ſeems to have been chiefly compoſed in rivalſhip to Plato, particularly his laſt book *De re republica.*

And here I cannot but obſerve, that Monſ. Fontenelle, a writer eminent for candor, ſeems to have departed a little from his uſual character, when he endeavours to throw a ridicule upon Plutarch on account of paſſages to be met with in this dialogue concerning oracles. The abſurdities here put into the mouths of the ſeveral perſonages are not to be aſcribed to Plutarch. He makes them refute each other; and in general, he ſeems to intend the ridiculing of thoſe very opinions which Fontenelle would ridicule him for maintaining. See *Hiſtoire des oracles.*

NOTE [FF], p. 246.

IT is remarkable, that in the remonſtrance of the duke of Bourbon and the legitimate princes againſt this deſtination of Louis the XIVth, the doctrine of the *original contract* is inſiſted on, even in that abſolute government. The French nation, ſay they, chuſing Hugh Capet and his poſterity to rule over them and their poſterity, where the former line fails, there is a tacit right reſerved to chuſe a new royal family; and this right is invaded by calling the baſtard princes to the throne, without the conſent of the nation. But the Comte de Boulainvilliers, who wrote in defence of the baſtard princes, ridicules this notion of an original contract, eſpecially where applied to Hugh Capet, who mounted the throne, ſays he, by the ſame arts which

have ever been employed by all conquerors and uſurpers. He got his title, indeed, recognized by the ſtates after he had put himſelf in poſſeſſion: But is this a choice or contract? The Comte de Boulainvilliers, we may obſerve, was a noted republican; but being a man of learning, and very converſant in hiſtory, he knew that the people were never almoſt conſulted in theſe revolutions and new eſtabliſhments, and that time alone beſtowed right and authority on what was commonly at firſt founded on force and violence. See *Etat de la France*, Vol. III.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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